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Abstract 
This thesis describes the research leading from the conception, through development, to the practical 
implementation of a comprehensive security architecture for use within, and as a value-added enhancement 
to, the ISO Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. 
The Comprehensive Security System (CSS) is arranged basically as an Application Layer service but can 
allow any of the ISO recommended security facilities to be provided at any layer of the model. It is 
suitable as an 'add-on' service to existing arrangements or can be fully integrated into new applications. 
For large scale, distributed processing operations, a network of security management centres (SMCs) is 
suggested, that can help to ensure that system misuse is minimised, and that flexible operation is provided 
in an efficient manner. 
The background to the OSI standards are covered in detail, followed by an introduction to security in open 
systems. A survey of existing techniques in formal analysis and verification is then presented. The 
architecture of the CSS is described in terms of a conceptual model using agents and protocols^ followed 
by an extension of the CSS concept to a large scale network controlled by SMCs. 
A new approach to formal security analysis is described which is based on two main methodologies. 
Firstly, every function within the system is built from layers of provably secure sequences of finite state 
machines, using a recursive function to monitor and constrain the system to the desired state at all times. 
Secondly, the correctness of the protocols generated by the sequences to exchange security information 
and control data between agents in a distributed environment, is analysed in terms of a modified temporal 
Hoare logic. This is based on ideas concerning the validity of beliefs about the global state of a system 
as a result of actions performed by entities within the system, including the notion of timeliness. 
The two fundamenul problems in number theory upon which the assumptions about the security of the 
finite state machine model rest are described, together with a comprehensive survey of the very latest 
progress in this area. Having assumed that the two problems will remain computationally intractable in 
the foreseeable future, the method is then applied to the formal analysis of some of the components of the 
Comprehensive Security System. 
A practical implementation of the CSS has been achieved as a demonstration system for a network of IBM 
Personal Computers connected via an Ethernet L A N , which fully meets the aims and objectives set out 
in Chapter 1. This implementation is described, and finally some comments are made on the possible 
future of research into security aspects of distributed systems. 
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First, my fear; then, my curtsy; last, my 
speech. My fear is, your displeasure; my 
curtsy, my duty; and my speech, to beg your 
pardons. I f you look for a good speech now, 
you undo me; for what I have to say is of mine 
own making; and what indeed 1 should say 
wil l , I doubt, prove mine own marring. But to 
the purpose, and so to the venture. 
William Shakespeare 
King Henry IV, Pan II 
Only for you, children of doctrine and 
learning, have we written this work. Examine 
this book, ponder the meaning we have 
dispersed in various places and gathered again; 
what we have concealed in one place we have 
disclosed in another, that it may be understood 
by your wisdom. 
Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa 
von Nettesheim 
De occulta philosophia, 3, 65. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1, Network Security 
The joining together of computer networks is widespread. The financial community 
make use of international Wide Area Networks, large corporations network their plants 
together and higher education uses networks for collaboration in research. The military 
uses networks to coordinate operations and for communications at all levels of security. 
Offices use Local Area Networks to decrease the use of paper in the office and to 
facilitate sharing of expensive peripherals [COOP, 1988]. As a result, the use of 
networks continues to grow and the traffic across networks is increasing all the time. 
As the use of networks increases, the amount of sensitive data carried increases. 
Network users, particularly the military, financial and commercial users, need to be able 
to protect their networks from infiltration and abuse. Attackers who tap network lines 
and read, modify or destroy network traffic must be stopped [STOL, 1988]. Due to the 
long communications distances involved in most networks, it is almost impossible to 
protect the physical medium being used to carry the sensitive data. I t is usually possible 
for the attacker to gain access to the medium, and since this cannot easily be protected, 
the data must be protected instead. The advent of optical fibre technology for network 
communications will go some way to alleviating the problem of tapping, because it is 
very difficult to place a tap on a fibre optic cable. This technology does nothing, 
however, to overcome the problem of denial of service attacks (see section 2.3.) due to 
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physical damage to, or destruction of, the cable. 
The subject of network security is a large one and there are many approaches to security 
provision, each of which need to be considered in order to provide a secure network. 
Open Distributed Processing (ODP) is the conceptual framework within which systems 
of diverse origin, application and location can interact freely i f required (see Chapter 3). 
Because there may be many different components, operations, resources and entities 
involved in such an arrangement, a network constructed within this framework presents 
a very convenient target for various attacks and illegal operations, which means that 
protection of the system resources and assets is becoming an increasingly important 
factor in network design. 
Systems currently exist which have made some attempt to implement security measures. 
In many cases, the most effective are those which were conceived from the outset to 
offer security as a prime function and are typical of those used by governments, military 
and financial institutions. 
The majority of other communications systems which exist, however, were not originally 
conceived with the security function in mind and make no provision for it other than 
allowing the execution of specific applications which have security measures built into 
their facilities on an individual basis. A typical example is the JANET academic 
network which does not provide encryption facilities, but may be used to send encrypted 
messages i f the appropriate mechanisms are provided by individual system users. A 
secure E-mail facility using the RSA algorithm has been implemented in the Network 
Research Group at the University of Plymouth and is used for secure correspondence 
with collaborators at home and abroad. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is 
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very difficult to assess the overall strength of such a system, where security is provided 
on an individual 'ad hoc' basis, due to the absence of a formal architecture capable of 
rigorous analysis. 
Information security technology encompasses all measures that are used to protect 
information from unauthorised disclosure, modification or destruction. In an age where 
information is widely regarded as a valuable commodity, information security has 
become particularly vital. 
The technology of information security has evolved through three basic stages: data 
protection, system protection and system verification. 
Encryption has been used since antiquity to protect information from unauthorised 
disclosure. It was the advent of high-speed digital computers, however, that made the 
wide-scale use of sophisticated encryption systems possible for the first time. The 
principles and mechanisms of encryption are well understood and many ingenious new 
algorithms are reported every year. In particulzu^, the advent of public key ciphers 
[DIFF,19761(RIVE,1978] has allowed the possibility of encryption over large-scale 
networks without the logistical problems of key distribution associated with classical 
(symmetric) cipher systems. Given that the fundamental assumptions upon which the 
security of these ciphers are based are true, the strength of modem ciphers can be taken 
as being very high indeed. 
Security technology, however, must do much more than just protect data. The systems 
that handle the data must themselves be protected to safeguard their operating principles 
as well as the data they contain. Before the advent of communications, such protection 
could be ensured by physical means, such as placement of the equipment in locked 
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rooms. As long as the equipment could not be operated remotely, this solved the 
problem. The advent of communications networks between data processing systems, 
however, has compounded the problem enormously. I f physical protection of the data 
channels is impossible then ways logically to protect the channel must be sought instead. 
The main problem, however, in the implementation of a successful security system, lies 
in the difficulty of verifying that the system wi l l behave exactly as it should. Otherwise, 
it is not possible to give assurances about the absolute level of security offered by the 
system. It may have undetected design flaws that allow insecure behaviour under certain 
conditions not foreseen by the designers. It may be that the system could be altered 
secretly and maliciously by an outsider who wishes to manipulate the system for his own 
ends. In very simple systems, visual inspection and exhaustive trial is sufficient to 
verify correctness, but in large, modem systems such an approach is out o f the question 
for the reasons given in Chapter 4. The power of the modem computer system is a 
double-edged sword: it makes possible very sophisticated encryption, but brings 
enormous problems in systems verification. It is in this area that standards have a very 
important ro!e to play i f these problems are to be overcome, see Chapter 3. 
Customers for secure systems have historically been the government, financial and 
military communities. The government and military requirements fall into three areas: 
secrecy, integrity, and reliability. Although formal definitions of these terms are given 
in Chapter 2, these requirements can be summarised respectively as: prevention of 
disclosure of information to the outside world as well as separating data on a need-to-
know basis within the system, protection of data from corruption while in storage or 
transit and the knowledge that the system and data wi l l always be available when 
required. 
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The needs of the financial community are especially demanding. Here, concern for 
secrecy is equalled and even surpassed by the need for strong data integrity. For 
example, any part of a financial transaction system must be able to convince not only 
itself of authenticity, but be able to establish legitimate claims before a judicial authority. 
As other commercial organisations see the benefit that they can gain from 
interconnection of their resources, they too perceive the need for security. Few 
companies wil l entrust commercially sensitive information to a communication system 
which wi l l allow free access to all and sundry. 
So important is this problem of security, that the Commission of European Economic 
Communities (EEC) commissioned a special study into the need for security. It was the 
largest study of its kind ever undertaken, and was conducted by Coopers and Lybrand 
[COOP, 1988]. The report came to the worrying conclusion that "...computer and 
network security is inadequate..." and that i f standards and systems are not put in place 
to correct the deficiencies, the problem could "...act as a brake on economic 
development in the European Community...". The study encompassed seven European 
countries: the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. 
Among the 17 vendors of computer equipment who took part were organisations such 
as the Digital Equipment Company and British Telecom. 
The report discovered that users of networked systems were critically dependent on their 
systems in * virtually all aspects of their operational, administrative and financial 
processes', more so than many believed [RAYM,1988]. In addition, the report found 
that 'network systems are extensively exposed to disruptive events' and that 'the nature 
and extent of this exposure is not always understood'. 
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The conclusion recommends that users adopt 'as a matter of priority, a systematic, 
methodical, comprehensive and well-founded approach to network system security'. 
Another important finding of the study from the point of view of this research, is that 
it is strongly believed that there is '...considerable scope for standardisation in the field 
of security...'. This could be achieved by rationalising conflicting national legislation 
and regulations and by developing multi-vendor standards for commonly required 
security mechanisms. This research addresses the first of these recommendations. 
In any discussion of computer security, the central element is the statement of threat. 
The threat is the list of occurrences, both accidental and deliberate, against which the 
system is to be protected. The study of threat assessment is an art in itself and attempts 
have been made to address the process from a systems point of view in a rigorous 
manner [PIER, 1988]. Once the threat has been established, a security policy (see 
Chapter 5) is drawn up to address the aspects of the threat and specify the 
countermeasures to be adopted to minimise the threat. In general, the approach taken 
is that designers of secure computer systems have little interest in identifying the 
resources available to specific classes of perpetrators. Instead, they assume that the 
perpetrator wil l apply resources in proportion to the value of the protected resource to 
be subverted. 
The concept of a Comprehensive Security System (CSS), which can be retrospectively 
added to an existing data processing system as a value-added function provider and the 
integrity of which can be demonstrated by formal models and methods of logical 
analysis, is very attractive to owners and managers of large, existing communication 
networks. New applications can be written to utilise the security functions on offer, and 
existing applications can be modified or updated to use the system. 
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The CSS to be described in Chapter 5 involves the provision of security services for use 
at, and for the transfer of data between, remote end user entities. Within the ISO 
model, there are potentially many different services and applications which w i l l benefit 
from a value-added (an additional feature or service retrospectively added to a system 
to enhance its usefulness) security system, but in general, each requiring a different 
combination or sequence of security functions. The CSS is simply another application 
layer entity. Applications communicate with the CSS via an Application Program 
Interface (API). Unless applications are written to take advantage of the interface, they 
cannot avail themselves of security services. The output of the CSS is of a form that is 
comprehensible to the receiving CSS at the other end of the network, but 
incomprehensible to any other entity. 
1.2. Aim and Objectives of the Research 
It is being recognised [COOP, 1988] that the use and advantages o f information 
technology will be severely limited within Europe unless sufficient attention is given to 
all aspects of data security and systems dependability in both the storage and 
communication spheres [ESPR,1988] [POLI,1988]. Over the last decade, a number of 
conventional and public key algorithms together with their associated protocols 
[DIFF,19841 [RIVE, 1978] [MERK,1978] have been developed for use in non-military 
applications, mainly the financial sector, but have operated within relatively small-scale, 
point-to-point, star arrangements [SUMM, 1987] [RUSH, 1986] [RUTL. 1986] 
[MUFT,1989]. With the proliferation of large-scale, multi-user networks designed for 
an open system environment on a global scale, it is becoming essential for suitable data 
confidentiality, integrity and user identification techniques to be incorporated into a cost 
effective, simple operating system for the average user [COOP, 1988]. 
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The aim of the research program, therefore, was to investigate the possibility of bringing 
about the realisation of such a system, and comprises the following stages: 
1. an initial updating on the latest techniques in the relevant areas of 
security, many of which are described in [COOP, 1988] [DENN,1983] 
[DTI , 1989] [ESPR,1988] [GASS,1988] [MUFT,1989] [MUFT.1990] 
[MUFT,1992]; 
2. a detailed examination of the relevant standards in existence 
[CCIT, 1987a] [CCIT. 1987b] [DOD,1985] [ D T I , 1989] [ECM, 1987a] 
[ECM, 1987b] [ISO,7498] [ISO,7498-2] [ISO,8571] nSO,JTCl] 
[ISO,SC21] [ISO,TC97]; 
3. a discussion of open system architectures that wi l l be required for the 
development of the security architecture within the framework of the 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model [ISO,7498] [ISO,7498-2] 
[ISO,8571] [IS0,JTC1] [IS0,SC21] [ISO.TC97]; 
4. an investigation into the potential problems associated with large system 
operaUon is reviewed [BLAT,1987] [COOP, 1988] [DOD,1985] 
[ECM,1987b] [ESPR,1988] [GASS,1988] [MUFT,1990] [MUFT,1992] 
[PATE,1988] [POLI,1988] [RAMA,1990] [RAYM,1988] [RUSH,1986] 
[RUTL,1986] [SAN, 1988b] [SIDE, 1988] [SPAF,1988] [STOL,1988] 
[SUMM,1987] [VOYD,1983]. From this invesUgation, an overall 
security policy is developed; 
5. a review of complete communication systems from the point of data 
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generation to its final destination is given. Appropriate security 
techniques are developed to allow the security policy to meet the needs 
of the OSI environment; 
6. the development of a software demonstration of a secure communications 
system to run on an Ethernet L A N of I B M Personal Computers; 
7. the extension of the above ideas to develop a formal model for the 
analysis of security operations and mechanisms, to allow the strengths and 
potential weaknesses to be analysed. The structure and attributes of 
system entities wil l be clearly specified and their interactions and 
constraints specified mathematically; 
8. an analysis of the demonstration system using the formal techniques 
developed earlier; 
9. a review of the effectiveness, strengths and weaknesses o f the analysis, 
and recommendations for further development of security systems using 
this work. 
1-3. Layout of Material in the Thesis 
This thesis describes the research leading to the conceptual development, practical 
implementation and formal verification of a Comprehensive Security System. The 
subject matter is arranged as follows. 
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The present chapter provides a general introduction to the topic of computer security, 
discusses with extensive references the motivation, aims and objectives of the research 
and describes the layout of the material in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 covers the background to the concept of security, the definition of and need 
for security, the concepts of internal and external security, secrecy and integrity and 
trusted system evaluation criteria. The concepts of users and trust are introduced and 
defined, and the components of secure systems are discussed. The boundaries of the 
system in question and various system entities are defined. 
Having established the background against which the research is set, Chapter 3 discusses 
the special requirements of security in open systems. The concept of an open system is 
introduced, and the need for international standards for open systems is discussed, with 
a status report of current progress and government attitudes to these efforts and current 
approaches to security in open systems. By far the most important standard to emerge 
in the field of open systems is the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model 
drawn up by the International Standards Organisation (ISO). This architecture is the 
basis for the new research, and the details of the seven-layer model are discussed in 
detail although it is important to realise that the basic principles o f the security 
methodology may be applied to any open system. By way of example, the important 
File Transfer, Access and Management (FTAM) service is described to illustrate the 
principles of the model. ISO themselves have recognised the need for security within 
open systems, and have drawn up draft recommendations and statements of 
requirements. Due to the inaccessible nature of the standards documents, the OSI 
Security Architecture is discussed in depth. In order to f u l f i l the requirements of the 
recommendations in the standards, it was found necessary to extend the Security 
Architecture. The requirements for this are outlined together with a discussion of the 
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placement of security provisions within the framework of the Reference Model. 
Chapter 4 introduces the concepts underlying existing techniques for the formal analysis 
and verification of computer systems, including the important state-machine model which 
is used later in a rigorous manner for the design of the CSS. Methods for controlling 
the activities of, and data flow between, various system entities are discussed, and 
existing approaches to methods of decomposition are described. The powerful ideas 
underlying proofs of correctness via the mechanism of formal logic are introduced. The 
methods of Hantler and King [HANT, 1976] are discussed by way of an example of early 
attempts at formal logic proofs. The resulting extreme difficulty of conventional 
debugging techniques when applied to large software systems is examined, and the 
limitations of existing approaches to formal analysis are then exposed with the need for 
a new verification methodology being highlighted. 
These methods are applied in a new approach to the distributed security problem, the 
Comprehensive Security System (CSS) which is described in detail in Chapter 5. The 
basic concept of the system is presented and various definitions pertinent to the design 
are introduced. The design methodology from the conceptual overview, through the 
generic models, to the agents and protocols which comprise the system is described. 
The concept of the Security Management Centre (SMC), an important feature of the 
design, is introduced. The basic implementation for an Ethernet Local Area Network 
(LAN) of IBM Personal Computers running MS-DOS is described, together with the 
details of the Application Program Interface (API) to the CSS. 
Chapter 6 describes the main body of the research - a new analysis methodology based 
on a *botlom-up' design technique for large systems like the CSS described in Chapter 
5, but without many of the shortcomings of the analysis and verification methods 
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described in Chapter 4. The fundamental security assumptions upon which the method 
is founded are described and the layered approach to mechanism generation is detailed. 
This technique requires that every system function be built from layers o f verified and 
validated finite-state machines, stored in a library of trusted fiitictions. These functions 
are activated in a monitored sequence and a recursive algorithm for the determination 
and verification of the stale of the CSS sequences at any time constrains the number of 
variables to a point where analysis is feasible. Several examples of security mechanisms 
generated in this way are given. As well as providing the functions used to manipulate 
the data from a security point of view (eg encryption), the functions are also used to 
generate the protocols by means of which the agents communicate securely. The new 
methodology therefore includes a modified Hoare logic [HOAR, 1969], using the work 
of Burrows et al [BURR, 1988], for the verification of protocols from a security 
standpoint. This is a predicate logic concerning certain formal aspects o f beliefs about 
the global system state as a result of actions performed on system data by subject 
entities. The new analysis techniques are then applied to some examples o f mechanisms 
and protocols from the CSS, demonstrating the approach to formal verification. 
A review of the findings and limitations of the results and conclusions drawn as a result 
of it are given in Chapter 7, with some suggestions for further work in this field and 
some comments on the possible future of secure distributed systems. 
Several annexes cover additional material including circuit diagrams, R O M firmware 
listings and a mathematical treatment of a general approach to primality testing and 
integer factorization. A glossary of terms and abbreviations is provided followed by 
a comprehensive bibliography and reference list. An addendum cites publications by the 
author relevant to this research and finally the source code of the DOS version of the 
prototype CSS is included on a floppy disk. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
2 .1 . The Definition of and Need fo r Security 
Generally, security refers to a complex of measures which may be broadly classified 
into: 
(a) physical; 
(b) procedural; 
(c) logical; 
aspects which are aimed at the 
(a) prevention; 
(b) detection and indication; 
(c) correction; 
of certain kinds of system misuse either accidental or deliberate [ECMA, 1987b]. Some 
example considerations covered by these three aspects of security are: 
Procedural Security selecting trustworthy personnel, changing 
passwords regularly; 
Logical Security access controls, cryptography; 
Physical Security vaults and doorlocks, guards, screening against 
emanation of interpretable emissions. 
25 
2.2. Internal and Externa! Security 
Security not only addresses attacks and threats external to the system, but internal attacks 
from known user entities. I f guarantees of authentication can be provided, it may be 
possible to devise a system in which all user entities are subject to strict access control, 
thus minimising the internal threat. Of course, it is virtually impossible to stop a user 
passing information to an attacker directly, so user trust and strong enforcement 
procedures are also required. 
Only authorised users can obtain/provide information which wil l help to eliminate, as 
far as possible, misuse of the system, such as eavesdropping on confidential data, abuse 
of resources, fraudulent activity, forgery of messages, etc. The recommended range of 
services which a security system could provide is comprehensively addressed in 
[ISO,7498-2]. 
2.3. Secrecy and Integrity 
Nearly all aspects of computer security come under two broad categories, secrecy and 
integrity. 
Secrecy refers to those aspects of security which prevent information disclosure 
to parties not authorised to receive it . 
Integrity refers to those measures which are taken to protect information from 
unauthorised modification or destruction. 
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Throughout the literature, the main emphasis is placed on secrecy, while integrity is 
addressed as a secondary consideration. There are two reasons for this seemingly one-
sided point of view, one historical and one technical. The historical reasons arise from 
the fact that the vast majority of research into computer security has been funded by the 
United States government, whose primary concern has been the maintenance of secrecy 
of classified information. This tradition has persisted even in commercial applications, 
where classified information is not the concern and where integrity, not secrecy, is the 
primary goal. The technical reason for the bias is simply due to the fact that the 
information disclosure problem is more interesting to computer security researchers, and 
the literature reflects this bias [GASS,1988]. 
However, the tools required to protect information against modification are basically the 
same as (or a subset oO those required to protect it against disclosure. 
The final aspect of computer security which cannot be placed in either of the two 
categories above is denial of service. This again has not traditionally been a topic of 
computer security research, partially for the reasons given above but also because while 
great strides have been made in secrecy and integrity, little progress has been made in 
solving the denial of service problem. This is because the problem is fundamentally 
much harder; preventing denial of service requires ensuring the complete functional 
correctness of a system - something considered by many to be unlikely to be done in the 
foreseeable future, i f indeed it is possible at all. 
2.4. The System Boundary and Security Perimeter 
The system is loosely defined as the collection of components comprising the computing 
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and communications resources over which the designers, administrators and users have 
some control. Everything within the system is protected by the system, and everything 
outside the system is unprotected. The importance is not the generic definition of the 
term system, but the definition as applicable to each case in particular. Any scheme to 
implement security features must clearly define the system boundary for the system in 
question, and establish a clear understanding of the threats to which the system may be 
exposed and against which it must defend itself. 
Identification of the system boundary relies on a precise specification of the interface 
between the system and the outside world. The components within the system may be 
divided into two classes; those responsible for maintaining the security o f the system, 
and all others. The separation of the components in this way defines an imaginary 
boundary called the security perimeter. In a dedicated secure system, such as a trusted 
military communications network, typically the operating system and the computer 
hardware wi l l lie within the security perimeter, whereas user programs, data, terminals, 
modems, printers and other components which the security system protects wi l l lie 
outside the security perimeter. 
The characteristics and behaviour of all the components within the security perimeter 
must be carefully analysed under all foreseeable conditions, because a malfunction or 
deliberate functional modification of any one can lead to a security violation. Indeed, 
for a completely trusted system, unforeseen conditions must be accounted for as well. 
This may possibly be realised by ensuring that the system has a failsafe architecture 
whereby under fault or error conditions the system reverts to a known reference state. 
By contrast, the components outside the security perimeter do not require consideration, 
because they become subject to security constraints only at the point where they 
penetrate the security perimeter. In an ideal system, a malfunction within the security 
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perimeter wi l l have the effect of expanding the security perimeter to the system 
boundary, causing all components of the system previously outside the perimeter to 
become subject to the security policy within the perimeter. 
In a similar manner to the definition of the system boundary, it is important to define 
precisely the interface across the security perimeter. This interface should be enforced 
by the security system. For example, the list of operating system calls which require 
vetting for security reasons are interfaces to the security perimeter. 
2.5. Users and Trust 
The user may be defined for security purposes as the person or application whose data 
and activities the system protects and whose access to information and services the 
system controls. Any entity who does not access the system directly, but gains indirect 
access through another entity is still regarded as a user. 
One of the assumptions that many systems make about trust is that i f a trusted user 
wishes to breach the trust he holds, there is little or nothing the system can do about i t 
[GASS,1988]. Although assumptions of this sort simplify system design considerably, 
they also introduce considerable weakness as well. The Bell-La Padula [BELL, 1973] 
model introduces the concept of 'no read up, no write down', as encapsulated in many 
military systems currently in use. Here, the user, trusted or otherwise, is prevented 
from disclosing information by declassification even i f he wishes to do so. 
29 
2.6. Trusted Systems 
Although to a certain extent human users can be trusted, the concept o f trusting a 
computer is much more difficult to define. It is extremely difficult to write software 
which performs exactly as desired under all conceivable conditions, especially in large 
projects. System activity must therefore be supervised by a kernel of software routines 
which have been formally analysed in terms of security criteria. Such routines are called 
trusted software, and are typical of the routines to be found in the kernel o f the security 
processor of a secure system. 
The majority of the rest of the software on the system does not therefore require to be 
trusted, and this considerably simplifies the design (and hence reduces the cost) of the 
application software packages. In addition, items of software which may be considered 
to be malign in intent, such as trojan horses or computer viruses, may be thwarted in 
their attempts to penetrate the system security by close supervision of their operation and 
execution by the trusted software in the kernel [SPAF,1988]. 
2.7. Subjects. Objects and Access Control 
A l l activities within a system can be considered to be sequences of operations carried on 
by subjects on objects. A subject is defined as any active entity capable of initiating a 
data manipulation within the system. At the highest conceptual level, human users are 
subjects, but within a system, a subject is usually considered to be a process, job, task 
or operation on behalf of the eventual end user. An object, therefore, is any entity 
manipulated by a subject in the pursuance of a task or process. Clearly, an entity can 
be a subject under certain conditions and an object under other conditions. For example, 
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a computer program residing on a disk storage medium wi l l be an object i f it is moved 
or deleted, but wi l l become a subject when executed and manipulating data under its own 
control. 
It is very important that every entity within a system has a unique identifier. In the 
above example, distinguishing between the program as it resides on disk, and the process 
it becomes when executed, is important because the same program may be run 
simultaneously by different processes on behalf of different users, where each process 
possesses a unique ID. It is easy to fall into the trap of loosely identifying the program 
as a subject rather than as the process within which the program executes. 
2.8. Distributed Secure Systems 
A secure network is a set of communications mechanisms that provides to its subjects 
a specific type of service at a given protocol layer, normally the Application layer in the 
context of OSI. The subjects (users) are the communicating entities that use the secure 
network, implementing their own protocols to communicate among each other. The 
nature of these subject to subject protocols is of no concern to the trusted network. The 
network consists of all the elements that make up the protocols; the internal layers of the 
secure network are transparent to the subjects. This concept of 'hiding' functions and 
protocols is consistent with that of a layered protocol model. 
The policy enforced by the secure network has the sole aim of determining and 
controlling which pairs of subjects can communicate, and which subjects can access 
and/or manipulate which objects. Taken together, a network of several systems - each 
of which contains a portion of a secure network - is a distributed secure system. The 
3
trusted portions of the individual systems interact via secure paths, and the untnisted 
portions are managed within each system in accordance with the security policy. This 
is akin the idea of domains which are discussed in Chapter 5. 
When physical protection does not extend from end to end (between entities in remote 
systems), it is necessary to replace the physical protection with logical protection through 
such mechanisms as encryption. From outside the security perimeter the logical view 
of the network is the same as any other unprotected system, but the architectural view 
differs from the point of view that the software and hardware in the lower protocol 
layers need not be trusted while still maintaining security. For example, encryption in 
protocol layer 3 serves to provide a protected path between remote systems at layer 3, 
compensating for the lack of physical protection at layers 1 and 2. Protocols using 
encryption are also capable of providing a mechanism for authentication, which aims to 
ensure that neither of the two communicating entities are masquerading. 
2.9. Mutually Suspicious Systems 
Together, the systems comprising the secure distributed system constitute security 
domains which operate under a common security policy. Each domain is equally 
responsible for the overall security of the system. Despite the fact that systems may 
assure themselves of their own security within their own domain, it is often a 
requirement that domains communicate with each other, and possibly exchange 
confidential information. Each domain will therefore regard the other as lying outside 
its own domain and hence the scope of its own policy, and needs assurance of the 
trustworthiness and security 'goodness' of the other system before divulging information. 
Such a pair constitutes a mutually suspicious system. 
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2,10. Security Kernel on a Network 
Fundamentally, the distributed systems so far discussed constitute a distributed operating 
system. If the secure part of that operating system in each domain is a security kernel, 
then it is necessary for the security kernels to cooperate in some way i f security is to be 
maintained across the entire system. One way to accomplish this is to allow the kernels 
in the individual systems to communicate directly with each other, exchanging the 
necessary control information to coordinate the exchange of traffic and activities. This 
technique requires a trusted set of kernel to kernel protocols, and is explored fully in the 
Security Management Centre (SMC) concept which is central to the methodology 
described in this thesis. The SMC concept combines this with the technique of keeping 
the kernels or SMCs as autonomous as possible, thus limiting the amount of information 
required to be exchanged. 
2.11. Trusted System Evaluation Criteria 
Trusted system evaluation criteria are based mainly on the US Department of Defense 
Orange Book, after the colour of its cover [DOD,1985]. The document employs the 
concept of a trusted computing base, a combination of hardware and an operating system 
that supports untrusted applications and users. This concept is also central to the 
Comprehensive Security System described later in this thesis. The Orange Book defines 
seven levels of trust ranging from systems that have minimal protection features to those 
that provide the highest level of security. The book also attempts to define objective 
guidelines along which evaluation criteria can be based for both commercial and military 
applications. 
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The European Community have recently produced equivalent standards under the 
Harmonised Criteria of France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
entitled Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) ITrSE,1990]. 
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3. SECURITY IN OPEN SYSTEMS 
3.1. The Concept of Open Systems 
As computers have become smaller, cheaper and more numerous, there has been much 
interest in connecting them together to form networks and distributed systems. There 
is still some debate among researchers as to the exact difference in definition between 
a raw network and a fully distributed system [ENSL,1978], but for most purposes, the 
difference may be summarised as follows. A network comprises a number of system 
elements connected to a central processing unit (CPU) which are able to exchange data 
via a communications channel, whereas a distributed system takes the concept somewhat 
further in that it is the processing power itself which is distributed throughout the 
system, accessed via an operating system which is itself of a distributed nature. 
Initially, connections between computers were made in a somewhat ad hoc way, 
typically with a host computer regarding everything else connected to it as terminals. 
However, the concept underlying a modem system is that due to the computing power 
itself being distributed throughout the network, each component is able to talk on equal 
terms with its peers. This distribution of processing power has the additional effect of 
enhancing reliability considerably, because failure of a single component wil l have little 
effect on the system as a whole. 
These advantages are the two main driving forces behind the networking of computer 
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systems. By way of example of the first, many organisations have a substantial number 
of computers in operation, often located far apart. A company with several factories and 
an administrative site may have a computer at each location to keep track of inventories, 
stock control, monitor productivity, do the payroll, and so on. Initially, these computers 
worked in isolation from one another, but management may have decided to reap the 
benefits of connecting them together so that information about the entire company may 
be extracted and correlated for management purposes. In addition, expensive peripherals 
such as laser printers need not be provided for each user, but be made available to all 
users of the network. In general, the goal of this approach is to make all programs, data, 
peripherals and other resources available to any user of the network without regard to 
physical location of either the resource or the user. Taken to its logical conclusion, this 
could have a very significant social impact on the whole concept of 'going to work'. 
It is possible that in the future many people may work entirely from home, eliminating 
the need for travel to and from a place of work. In addition, their choice of 
geographical location in which to live will have very little bearing on their ability to do 
a particular job. It is interesting to note that the first regional council in the United 
Kingdom to embrace the new ISDN public network is the Highlands and Islands Council 
serving some of the most remote communities in the country. In addition, the 
opportunities of computer-aided open learning are created. It may be possible to use the 
enhanced communication capabilities of future systems for interactive learning programs, 
and research effort towards this end is being carried out at the University of Plymouth 
using satellite technology as the communications medium. 
the second goal is to provide high reliability by having alternative resources available. 
With unconnected computers, i f the machine 'goes down' due to hardware failure for 
example, the local users are denied service, even though there may be substantial 
computing resources available elsewhere which are being under utilised at that time. 
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With a network, the temporary loss of a single processor is much less serious, because 
its users can be accommodated elsewhere until normal service is restored. For military, 
banking, industrial process control and other critical applications, complete loss of 
computing power for even a few minutes for whatever cause can be catastrophic to the 
business in hand. 
The fundamental ability to network computers came with the change in the relative cost 
of computing versus communications. Until around 1970, computers were expensive 
compared with communication facilities. The reverse is now true. In some applications, 
data is generated at widely scattered points. Prior to the advent of cheap computing, it 
was not possible to analyse the data at each point because computers were so expensive. 
Raw data was sent back to a central processor for analysis. Now that the cost of a small 
computer is comparatively negligible, the local data can be processed, and results 
exchanged with other computers. The result is a computer network with the processing 
power distributed throughout the system. 
Networks of computers are generally classified by size into Local Area networks (LANs) 
and Wide Area Networks (WANs). While there is no fixed boundary between the two, 
in general a LAN is understood to be a network serving one site such as a factory or a 
University campus. A WAN is a network connecting remote sites, either country-wide 
or even world-wide in extent. 
Some researchers state that in addition to the advantages already discussed, users of 
networks can expect that as a result of coupling large numbers of smaller processors into 
large systems, simpler software designs will result [TANE, 1981]. The argument for this 
is that in a network, it is possible to dedicate some (or all) of the processors to 
specialised functions, for example, database management. Instead of having one large 
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machine multiprogrammed on a time-shared basis, each machine only performs one task 
at a time. By eliminating the multiprogramming, much of the software complexity 
associated with large mainframes is eliminated. 
In summary, the concept of open systems or Open Distributed Processing (ODP) is the 
conceptual framework within which systems of diverse origin, application and location 
can interact freely if required with the attendant advantages described. 
3.2. The Need for, and Attitudes Towards, Standards 
The situation with many aspects of commercial engineering has traditionally been to get 
your own product to market first, and if anyone else wishes to produce other products 
compatible with yours, then they must conform to your standards or face exclusion from 
the marketplace. While this makes sound commercial sense from the manufacturers 
point of view, and indeed was the attitude and major reason for the total computer 
industry dominance of IBM, the situation was intolerable for users. Once a user had 
invested in a product from a particular company, if he ever wished to expand or enhance 
his system, he was compelled to make all future purchases from the same supplier. This 
is called locking in to a product range. The disadvantages are obvious. Manufacturers 
can go out of business, competitors can offer superior products at cheaper cost, but the 
user is unable to avail himself of them. In addition, users who have bought their 
equipment from different suppliers stand very little chance of being able to connect their 
systems together and so gain the advantages of networks described above. 
An impressive example of the services made possible by the adoption of universally 
accepted standards is the international telephone system. Subscribers in different 
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countries can make direct calls to one another as a matter of course. This is made 
possible by the existence of standards, agreed between the telecommunications 
administrations throughout the worid. 
Pressure from customers persuaded the various standard bodies to develop sets of 
common standards to which computing equipment must conform i f it is to be able to 
claim compatibility with other similarly equipped machines. This will allow a potential 
customer to satisfy himself that the equipment he is considering buying wil l allow him 
to expand and enhance his system with other vendors products which also conform to 
the standards. Clearly, it would be in the manufacturers interests to design their 
equipment around these standards, or they would find few customers for their products. 
By far the most prevalent of these standards to emerge is the Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) framework developed under the auspices of the International 
Standards Organisation (ISO) based in Geneva. It is thus towards this standard that the 
vast majority of research effort is being directed, and the research described in this 
thesis is no exception. 
As part of Government recognition of the central importance of information technology 
to a healthy and prosperous economy, a high level committee was established in 1981 
to reflect the views of both suppliers of computer equipment and the wide potential user 
base [SIDE, 1988]. This FOCUS committee is chaired by the Minister of the Department 
for Trade and Industry (DTI). This action acknowledged the vital need for 
internationally recognised and respected information technology (TT) standards, and 
FOCUS have the remit to advise on Government policy towards IT standards generally 
and to indicate what action can be effectively undertaken to encourage and assist 
standardisation in priority areas. FOCUS quickly established that the '...immediateand 
urgent priority was standardisation on OSI... ' , and the committee have since been 
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consistently unremitting that there should be no let-up to the efforts applied in this area. 
While the Government play no part in the actual making of standards they have provided 
a powerful incentive to their implementation, by specifying them for their own use. 
In addition to Government efforts, other powerful bodies have added their weight to the 
universal adoption of OSI standards. In particular, the European Computer 
Manufacturers Association (ECMA) have drawn up a series a proposals for Distributed 
Office Applications based upon the OSI framework [ECMA, 1987a]. Their 
recommendations examine the needs of office applications of a supportive nature versus 
those of a productive nature, and how cooperation between these two elements can be 
harmonised to create a more productive and efficient office environment. ECMA have 
also addressed the security aspects of open systems, and their recommendations are 
discussed in [ECMA, 1987b]. 
3,3. The OSI Reference Model 
It is against this background of almost universal adoption of the OSI standards that the 
research described in this thesis is set. The fundamental reference architecture which 
is applicable to this research is the International Standards Organisation (ISO) Basic 
Reference Model [ISO,7498]. The model establishes a framework for coordinating the 
development of existing and future standards for the interconnection of systems. The 
objective of OSI is to permit the interconnection of heterogeneous computer systems so 
that useful communication between application processes may be achieved, raising the 
possibility that the users of any two computer systems may, for example: 
1. exchange files; 
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2. exchange electronic messages (e-mail); 
3. log onto each other's systems; 
4. submit jobs to each other's systems. 
Thus, isolated systems and 'closed' groups of systems will be opened to one another as 
OSI products become widely available. As a basis for the development of these 
standards, ISO have developed a Reference Model (ISORM), to partition the problem 
into discrete layers, and provide a conceptual framework for the understanding of the 
complex processes involved in computer communications. 
3.3.1. The Seven Layer Model 
The ISORM has seven layers, see Figure 3.1.: 
1. application layer; 
2. presentation layer; 
3. session layer; 
4. transport layer; 
5. network layer; 
6. data link layer; 
7. physical layer. 
The ISORM specifies the functionality of each layer, the interfaces between adjacent 
layers and the method of achieving layer-specific functionality between cooperating 
computer systems over real physical media. The communication functions of each layer 
are examined in turn. 
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Figure 3.1. The Seven Layers of the OSIRM 
APPLICATION LAYER 
The goal of OSI is realized at the application layer, since it is this layer that provides 
the communication-based service to end users. The subordinate layers of the model exist 
only to support, and make possible, the activities that take place at the application layer. 
In this layer, all 'high-level' system-independent applications activities are performed. 
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These activities are controlled by entities via the local operating system which acts to 
interface the system-independent nature of the ISORM to the specific nature of the 
individual computer system. This entity is referred to as an application agent. An 
application agent may operate purely in a local, interactive mode, such as a text editor, 
it may provide a local user with an interface to an OSI application, or it may coexist 
with other application agents to provide support services to the system. It is towards this 
last mode of operation that the Comprehensive Security System to be described in 
Chapter 5 is directed. 
As the uppermost layer of the ISORM, the application layer is unique. It differs from 
the lower six layers in that it alone makes OSI services available to the users of the 
computer system on which it resides. The layer embodies a wide range of system-
independent application functions, some of which are widely applicable, well defined and 
standardised by OSI. These include such applications as: 
1. file transfer and directory operations; 
2. message handling services; 
3. job transfer and remote job management. 
The first of these, FT AM (File Transfer, Access and Management) is discussed in detail 
as an example of an OSI service in the following section. In all standardised 
applications, the way in which the functionality is achieved is covered by the standards. 
Any product, independent of specific implementation details, which conforms to the 
standards is assured (in theory) of the ability to interwork with all other conforming 
products. 
Thus, the application layer is concerned with providing services, covering a wide range 
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of applications, to the end user. All application layer activity involves the transfer of 
information over OSI between distinct cooperating computer systems. Clearly, the 
representation of information within the individual systems will differ in the details of 
data structure, syntax and so forth, but the commonality of encoding of the information 
to be transferred must be established between the cooperating systems. This is the 
function of the next layer. 
PRESENTATION LAYER 
The function of the presentation layer is to provide a common representation of 
application information whilst in transit between two cooperating computer systems. By 
way of example, consider the differences in the representation of characters across 
different systems. It may be that the two computer systems both use the standard ASCII 
(American Standard Code for Information Interchange) code for character representation. 
In this case, little need be done by the presentation layer other than to establish that this 
common coding does indeed apply. If, on the other hand, one machine uses ASCII 
while the other uses EBCDIC character encoding, then the presentation layer must 
ensure that appropriate transformations are performed on the information. To do this, 
it establishes by negotiation between the two computer systems, a common 
representational form for character information for use whilst such information is in 
transit between them. 
In summary, while the application layer offers system-independent activity over OSI, the 
presentation layer exists to ensure that any information exchanged between the systems 
as a result of application layer activity, is in a commonly understood form. The 
presentation layer takes no part in the activity associated with the actual establishment 
and control of data communication between systems; this is provided by the next layer. 
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SESSION LAYER 
The session layer fits between the application-oriented upper two layers, and the four 
lower layers which comprise the 'real-time' data communications environment. Its 
fundamental role is to provide services for the management and control of data flow 
between the two computer systems. For example, the session layer allows for the 
insertion of synchronisation points in the data flow of application information so the 
communicating processes can determine, should the flow be interrupted for some reason, 
the correct point at which to restart transmission, thus avoiding a wasteful rerun of the 
whole association. Session layer activity allows activities to be started, halted, restarted 
or abandoned under the (indirect) instruction of the application layer. An activity may 
be halted, for instance, to allow a more urgent activity to take place, and then restarted 
at a later time. 
TRANSPORT AND LOWER LAYERS 
The transport and lower three layers are not of major concern. The lowest three layers 
(Network [ayer, DataLink Layer and Physical Layer) are fully defined by the CCITT 
X.25 specification, an excellent tutorial summary of which can be found in 
[SNAR,1983]. Reliable data transmission between end systems, that is end-to-end 
communications, are assumed by the session layer. 
The fundamental job of the lower layers is to deal with the problems of data transmission 
over a real, physical medium. In reality, this may be a landline, a public switched 
network, a satellite link, optical fibre and so on. Communications media differ in 
fundamental ways, and so must the data transmission techniques used over them. The 
result of the activities of the lower layers is that, although the quality of service may 
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differ between one sub-network and another, the data is reliably transmitted and received 
by the communicating systems. The main job of the transport layer is to perform error 
handling on data transmitted across sub-networks not designed for reliable data 
exchange. For example, modems are used to communicate between personal computers 
using the public telephone system, which was designed only for voice traffic. Much of 
the modem's effort goes into error detection and correction for computer data which is 
quite alien to the telephone system. Hence, the transport layer provides the session with 
reliable data transport irrespective of the nature of the underiying sub-network. 
Sub-networks using packet-switching fall into two categories, connection oriented and 
connectionless. Connection oriented sub-networks operate by establishing connections 
(discussed later) and exchanging data in discrete packets. One of more intermediate 
computers called switches may be used to direct the data packet correctly from origin 
to destination. Connection oriented networks generally operate at lower speeds up to 
around 64,000 bits per second, but can operate over almost unlimited distances. This 
is exemplified by the virtual circuit approach. They are seen as the backbone of the 
WANs described earlier, and are operated throughout the worid by the public telegraphic 
systems providers as well as private concerns such as AT&T ISTEL. 
By contrast, connectionless sub-networks are often capable of higher speed operation, 
the datagram approach being typical. Very high speed connectionless operation up to 
10 million bits per second is sometimes possible if the nature of the physical medium 
which can be used for the transmission is suitable and the systems are in close 
proximity. This capability is associated with LAN technology, such as Ethernet. 
The ISORM defines methods whereby high-level application activity can be performed 
between remote systems by either of the two connection modes described above. 
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Indeed, between some systems there may be a combination of both. A local user may 
access a gateway via the local, high-speed connectionless LAN, which gives him access 
to a long-haul packet-switched X.25 backbone. At the other end, a gateway onto another 
LAN may make the final connection to the actual receiver. 
In summary, the lower four layers provide the ISORM with a means of reliable 
transmission of data. The physical layer is concerned with such aspects as voltage 
levels, pin assignments for connectors and so forth. The data link layer provides an 
error correcting, flow control and synchronisation framework around data for reliable 
transmission by the physical layer. The network layer makes use of underlying data link 
services to provide data transmission services across sub-networks. It is particularly 
concerned with routing, that is, establishing a route between the two computer systems, 
and relaying, the use of intermediate computer systems to provide a data flow from one 
sub-network to another which may be necessary as a result of the chosen route. In this 
way, communications facilities can be established between systems which are not even 
connected to the same network. The transport layer is said to operate end-to-end 
between the two computer systems, that is, without explicit involvement in any 
intermediate computer system that may be relaying between the sub-networks. 
Throughout the rest of the thesis, the term network is used to mean the network as seen 
by the transport layer, that is, a transparent, reliable communication medium across 
which data will flow without error or mishap. 
3.3.2. Layer Cooperation 
When two computer systems, or end-systems, are involved in an OSI communication, 
they conform to the standards associated with each layer of the ISORM. An 
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implementation of a layer conforming to the standards must be capable of understanding 
and acting upon messages exchanged with an implementation of the same layer standard 
on another cooperating system. When such an implementation is invoked it is known 
as a layer entity. The layer is conceptualised as being split across the two end systems 
and represented on each by a layer entity. These two entities, called peer entities, will 
perform a layer function by exchange of messages in a coordinated manner as defined 
by the standard associated with that layer, see Figure 3.2. 
End system A End system B 
Services requested 
by higher layer 
entity 
Peer entitles 
Exchonoe of nessa^e 
Use of lower layer 
services 
layer n+1 
layer n 
loyer n-l 
Reol Physical Medium 
Figure 3.2. Peer Entity Association 
By way of example, an application layer entity may request the reading of a file on a 
remote end-system. This function is achieved by an exchange of messages between peer 
application entities, resulting in a flow of information between application entities and 
hence between the file and the user. The representation of the information in common 
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form over the communication path is the responsibility of the presentation layer, so in 
order to achieve the information transfer, the application layer must make use of the 
services of the presentation layer. The process begins with the user requesting a service 
of the application entity. The entity will perform the function of an exchange of 
messages with the peer application entity on the remote end-system in question. The 
initiating application entity will bring about this exchange by requesting a service from 
a presentation entity. The presentation entity will in turn initiate the required functions 
by the exchange of messages with a peer presentation entity. I f this process is continued 
for the presentation layer's use of a session entity and so on, it will be seen that a 
'cascade' is developing. This is the whole principle of communication in the OSI 
is 
environment, for it only via the physical medium that actual communication occurs. 
The communication at the higher layers between peer entities is purely a logical 
association. 
3.3-3, Principles of the ISO Reference Model 
As described above, all seven layers of the ISORM must be involved in any OSI 
application activity. Entities of each layer must be present at each cooperating end 
system to play their role in the mechanism of cooperation. The terminology used when 
referring to the architectural principles of the ISORM is now discussed. A layer n user 
on end system A requests of a layer n entity an n-specific service. Note that only i f the 
layer happened to be the application layer would the user be a 'real' user! In other 
instances, the 'user' would be a layer /zH-7 entity. The realisation of this service over 
OSI requires the cooperation of two peer n entities, one on each of the cooperating end-
to-end systems, and involves the exchange of a control message between the peer n 
entities. This message indicates the nature of the required cooperation and carries with 
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it any parameters associated with the particular service, encoded in a precisely defined 
format. Direct message exchange therefore is only notional, since the only physical 
route between end systems is provided via the physical medium, and access to this 
medium is only via the physical layer. The n entity can only achieve peer entity 
association by calling on the next lower n-1 layer, to act on its behalf. In general, an 
n entity operates by utilising services on an n~l entity. 
The process is now repeated for the n-1 entity. Having been invoked by the n entity, 
the n-} entity satisfies the service request by cooperating with its peer on the remote end 
system. To do this it constructs an n-] control message. The n control message is 
passed to the n-1 entity as part of the service request and is packaged into the n-1 control 
message. I f n-1 is not the layer at which physical data exchange between the end 
systems can occur, the procedure is repeated with a service request by the n-1 entity 
acting as a user of an n-2 entity. This continues until the physical layer is reached, at 
which data exchange consists of a series of encapsulated control messages. 
On reaching the receiver, the process is reversed. The control message associated with 
each layer is examined and the activity implicit in that message is performed. It may 
be that the control message may just instruct the entity to pass on the residual part of the 
message, which contains encapsulated control messages for higher layers, without any 
other action. This case is known as normal data transfer. Other types of control 
message instruct an entity to perform some layer specific activity. A point of 
importance is that each entity issues a report to its user (the layer above) which 
corresponds to the original request issued by the peer user. This report, called an 
indication, implies that the requested layer service has been performed by the 
cooperating peer entities. Together with the indication the layer passes the residual part 
of the control message for action by the higher layer. 
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3.3.4. OSI Protocols and Primitives 
To summarise, a layer comprises a set of functions which, when activated by user 
requests, provides the realisation of the services. Every function has its own associated 
control message which conveys instructions between cooperating peer entities in order 
that the required function can be performed by the peer entity without ambiguity. Every 
layer is defined by a precise set of functions and associated control messages. These 
functions, the format and parameters of the control messages, and the actions to be taken 
on receipt of a control message or service request, are defined as the layer protocol 
specification. A layer user communicates a request for a service to a layer entity, or 
receives an indication of a service invoked by a remote peer user, in a service primitive. 
Every service element has a set of service primitives which are defined in the service 
definition. The user, known as a service user (S user), requests a service by means of 
a service primitive. As well as this request, the S user may include the control message 
or protocol data unit (PDU) that it wishes to convey to its peer. This results in an n 
entity^ which as an n-J S user, issuing an n-J service primitive to request a service of 
an n-J entity. The n-J S user may include any n PDU that it wishes to convey to its 
peer. This 'user data', passed between the n entity and the n-J entity as part of a service 
primitive call, is known as a service data unit (SDU). In this case, the n PDU is an n-1 
SDU. This situation is summarised in Figure 3.3. 
Again, at the receiving end, the opposite is performed. The n-2 entity strips off the 
protocol control information and acts according to the instructions implicit in it. It then 
issues an n-2 service primitive to indicate to the n-2 S user (an n-] entity) that activity 
has been performed as a result of an n-2 S user request on the sending system. The n-2 
SDU which contains the residue of the n-2 PDU (ie the n-] PDU), accompanies this 
indication. The n-I entity acts in precisely the same manner resulting in an n entity 
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Figure 3.3. Peer cooperation via subordinate layer entities 
receiving the n PDU (in an n-l SDU) which the initiating n entity sought to convey. 
This continues upwards until the n entity issues an n service primitive to the n S user, 
indicating that the remotely initiated activity has occurred. Thus, the objective of the 
original n S user request, issued on the initiating system, has been fulfilled. The service 
primitives that are used to request services or indicate the occurrence of services are 
called a request service primitive and an indication service primitive respectively. 
For the above sequence of events to occur without problem, it is vitally important that 
the interfaces to each layer entity be precisely defined. The entry point to each is 
defined via a service access point (SAP). An n entity offers services to an /i+7 entity 
through an n SAP. 
Thus, the consequence of issuing a request service primitive on an end system is the 
activation of a service element, resulting in the exchange of a PDU with a peer layer 
entity. This brings about a cooperative activity and results in a indication service 
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primitive on the remote end system. However, the initiating user has no explicit 
confirmation that the service has been performed. A service of this nature is therefore 
called an unconfirmed service. There are many instances where confirmation is desirable 
or even necessary to convey some information resulting from the activity. A service of 
this type is called a confirmed service, and associated with the process of confirmation 
are two further service primitives. These are the response and confirm service 
primitives. The use of these primitives is indicated in Figure 3.4-
0 
n SAP 
n service prlnrtrve 
request 
n service prinitive 
indicatlonn 
© 
n service 
pripiltlve 
confirm 
n service 
primitive 
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Figure 3.4, Connrmed Service Primitive Usage 
A service element can therefore have a maximum of four service primitives associated 
with it. I f it provides a confirmed service there will be four, i f unconfirmed, two. 
Certain service elements have a single associated service primitive, called an indication. 
This may occur in a situation where a communications failure occurs in a lower layer, 
that is, in the n S provider. The n S provider detects the failure and issues an n 
indication service primitive to both n S users. 
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3.3,5. Connection Oriented Operation 
In connection oriented operation, the first task of the session S (SS) user, triggered by 
some application request, is to establish a data communications path between itself and 
the peer SS on the remote end user. This is known as session connection. It is a 
relationship between peer SS users, which once established and until released, constitutes 
a channel through which SSDUs can flow. The session connection can be released as 
a result of an SS user request, or as a result of a (possibly catastrophic) event in a lower 
layer. In connection oriented operation there is no way for SSDUs to be exchanged 
between SS users other than over an established session connection. By way of analogy, 
many readers will be familiar with the idea of logging onto a remote mainframe from 
a terminal. At the T A D ' prompt the command CALL <HOSTNAME> is issued, and 
a name and password have to be entered before the session is established. This will 
continue until the user logs off and the session is terminated. We now examine the steps 
involved in a session connection establishment. 
Using the terminology introduced in the previous sections, a session is established as 
follows. On receipt of a session CONNECT-REQUEST from the SS user, the session 
service element concerned with establishing the connection constructs a CONNECT 
SPDU. It must then utilise a transport layer service to bring about the transfer of the 
SPDU to its peer on the remote end system. At this point, the transport entity on the 
initiating end system is 'idle', that is, there is no transport connection established 
between peer transport service (TS) users. As discussed, in a connection oriented 
environment, n SDUs cannot flow between S users until connection has been established, 
and so we encounter a problem in that the session entity cannot use the transport service 
to transfer the CONNECT SPDU (as a TSDU) until a transport connection is 
established. The session entity must retain the CONNECT SPDU in the meantime, and 
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issue a transport connect request service primitive to the transport entity. The session 
entity then leaves the *idle' state and goes to the 'connecting' state. In this state, it 
cannot accept any SSDUs for transfer. 
This process is repeated in the transport layer, with the transport entity holding on to its 
CONNECT TPDU and entering the 'connecting' state until such time as a network 
connection is established between it and its peer. When the network entity receives a 
NPDU and issues a network CONNECT-INDICATION service primitive to the transport 
entity, the receiving transport entity must decide whether to accept or reject the proposed 
connection between itself and the initiating transport entity. Security constraints or 
resource problems may dictate rejection. If, however, it is accepted, the receiving 
network entity builds a CONNECTION-ACCEPT NPDU which it transmits to the 
initiating peer, which informs the transport entity of this fact in a network CONFIRM 
service primitive. The initiating transport entity can now 'release' the held CONNECT-
TPDU which it conveys to its peer. A similar sequence ensues in the higher layers, the 
session entity receiving a transport CONNECT-CONFIRM. Again, this is followed by 
the session release of the 'held' SPDU which finally causes the session to be established 
and the initiating SS user informed by a session CONNECT-CONFIRM. At this point, 
the SS user knows that a data communication channel has been established between it 
and its peer, and SSDU exchange and associated session services are now available. The 
activity to be undertaken by the application entity can therefore begin. 
3.3.6. Connectionless Operation 
A connectionless mode of operation is one in which an SPDU transfer service can be 
requested of an entity at any time. There is no requirement for a connection between 
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SS users to be established before session services can be utilised. Thus, connectionless 
entities are never strictly *idle' since they are always 'ready'. Since no connection exists 
between SS users, the route (defined by the network address together with the SAP 
addresses) must be included explicitly with every SSDU transfer request. Clearly, a 
connection oriented n entity cannot cooperate with a connectionless n entity. By 
contrast, however, a connection oriented service can be offered over a connectionless 
network service. 
3.3.7. Structure of an Application Entity 
We now consider the structure of an OSI application entity in more detail. Within the 
OSI environment, an application process is represented by one or more application 
entities. That is, each application entity represents a different aspect of the 
communication behaviour of the application process. Each application entity has to 
request an application service element (ASE) to perform tasks for it. A service element 
is a primitive defined at the interface between two adjacent layers. An ASE is a set of 
functionalities that supports a typical application. This concept is represented in Figure 
3.5. Each ASE stands for one implementation of an OSI service on the system. For 
example, ASEl could be X.400 electronic mail, and ASE2 could be FT A M . 
At any given instant, the application process works with either ASEl or ASE2. The 
single controlling function routes the application process to the appropriate ASE. In the 
case of several OSI communications (a multiple session)^ the multiple association control 
function manages coordination of the application entities. Each application entity 
contains one user (element) and a set of application service elements. The specific 
combination of these different elements determines the type of application entity. 
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Figure 3.5. Use of Application Service Entities 
The user element represents, or acts on behalf of, the application processes and allows 
the ASEs to communicate with other application entities. In general, the user element 
represents the ultimate source and destination of all information transfer. An ASE is a 
coherent set of integrated functions that allows application entities to interoperate for 
a specific purpose. ASEs may be used independently or in combination to meet specific 
information processing goals. The X.400 and FTAM ASEs are already defined, and 
FTAM is discussed in more detail in the next section. One particular type of ASE, the 
association control service element (ACSE) facilitates other ASEs working together. 
As of the very latest release of standards [ISO,7498] only the term ASE is in use; the 
terms CASE and SASE are no longer in frequent currency. A CASE, or common ASE, 
represented the common functions needed for different jobs, and a SASE, or specific 
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ASE was used to differentiate FT AM from MHS and other kinds of defined application 
protocols. (It must be pointed out that, to date, no satisfactory objective criteria have 
been established for distinguishing a CASE from a SASE). 
Entities in an OSI environment must be addressable, and moreover, an application entity 
may be able to support one or more associations. To accomplish this, each application 
entity is attached to a presentation address, which points to one or more presentation 
service access points (PSAPs). At any time, the application is bound to the presentation 
address of the PSAP to which the application entity is attached. 
3.4. FTAM - A Typical QSI Application 
Having established the basic framework of the OSIRM, the important FTAM (File 
Transfer, Access and Management) service is discussed as an example of a typical OSI 
application. 
The ISO FTAM standard is defined in [ISO,8571]. The standard introduces the concept 
of the virtual filestore which is central to remote file manipulation. FTAM offers three 
modes of file manipulation: transfer, access and management. File transfer is the 
movement, over OSI, of a complete file between two filestores on different end systems. 
File access is the reading, writing or deleting of parts of files residing on a remote end 
system. File management involves aspects of file handling such as amendment of 
attributes on files in a remote filestore. Peer application FTAM entities provide the 
services to make these services possible. Clearly, there is a master and slave 
relationship between the cooperating FTAM entities. The master, or initiating FTAM 
process is invoked by a local user request, and supplied with information about the 
58 
remote files to be operated upon. The slave, or responding FTAM process is awakened 
on the remote end system to become the cooperating peer; its activity is governed 
entirely by the requirements of the initiating FTAM process. 
If it is required to work with files on the local filestore, it can be safely assumed that 
the local FTAM entity has knowledge of the structure of the store. Since OSI is 
designed as a system-independent concept, the FTAM entity is unlikely to have any 
knowledge of the structure of a remote filestore. Its only contact with such a store will 
be a protocol data unit (PDU) exchange conveyed over OSI between itself and its peer 
entity. Therefore, any reference to the remote filestore cannot be in implementation 
specific terms, but only in terms of some generalised filestore which is applicable by 
mapping to any specific filestore. This generalised filestore is known as a virtual 
filestore and models all possible filestores. FTAM SASEs relate to the virtual filestore 
and not to any specific instances of a real filestore. 
The virtual filestore is a representation of a real filestore within the OSI environment. 
Within the virtual store, a file is represented by the following elements: 
1. a unique filename, allowing identification without ambiguity; 
2. attributes, expressing such properties as accounting information and 
history, such as time and date of creation; 
3. attributes defining the logical structure of the information stored within 
the file. 
The elements described above remain with the file throughout its life unless specifically 
modified. In addition, however, there are a number of activity attributes which are 
transitory, and reflect the current status of the file within the context of FTAM. These 
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are: 
current access request; 
current initiator identity; 
current access passwords; 
current calling application entity title; 
current account; 
current responding entity title; 
current access context; 
current concurrency control; 
current location; 
current processing mode. 
FTAM offers a file service which is provided by a large number of SASEs. An 
association between peer FTAM processes is achieved by the use of an ACSE and is 
generally referred to as an FTAM association. The service elements associated with 
FTAM can be grouped into the following areas: 
kernel; 
read; 
write; 
file access; 
limited management; 
enhanced management; 
grouping; 
recovery; 
restart. 
For example, kernel and write service elements together constitute a regime that permits 
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the user on the initiating end system to transfer a complete file to the responding 
filestore. Because of the unusually large number of elements in FTAM, the possibility 
of disagreement between cooperating peer processes is increased and so to simplify 
negotiation, the standard defines a set of service classes. Each class defines a set of 
service elements designed to address a typical application requirement. In each class, 
the presence of certain elements is mandatory, while other are optional. The following 
service classes are defined: 
1. TRANSFER allows movement of files or parts of files between end 
systems; 
2. MANAGEMENT allows reading and modification of attributes; 
3. TRANSFER & MANAGEMENT combines the first two classes; 
4. ACCESS permits the location of a specific part of a file, which can then 
be read, written or erased; 
5. TRANSFER & ACCESS combines classes (1) and (4); 
6. UNCONSTRAINED leaves the selection of service elements open to the 
negotiating peer entities. 
An FTAM association regime is established between peer FTAM processes by use of 
the F-INITIALISE service element, and terminated by the use of either F-TERMINATE 
or F-ABORT. The sequences of service elements possible for various FTAM activities 
are given in diagrammatic form throughout the discussion. In these diagrams, time 
flows from left to right, and the use of a service element is indicated by a vertical line. 
For example, an FTAM association regime is represented by Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6. FTAM Association Regime 
In this example, F-INITIALISE offers a confirmed service bringing about, by 
negotiation, an association regime. F-TERMINATE brings about an orderly closing of 
the association regime, but is only available to the originator of the association. It has 
only a single parameter used by the responding end system to convey any housekeeping 
details, such as costs, to the initiator. Either party to the association, however, can 
bring about the 'panic' closing of the association (which is far less orderly) by using F-
ABORT. 
Consider Figure 3.7. overleaf. Filestore management is a generic term for activity 
applied by the initiator to the filestore at the responder. To be able to make a particular 
file the object of subsequent activity, it must first be selected (if it already exists) or 
62 
created (if it does not already exist). The selected file is assumed to be the object of all 
subsequent activity until the regime is closed. This, then, constitutes the first of the 
inner regimes. 
FTAM ASSDCIATIDN REGIME 
^ F ILE SELECTEDN REGIME \^ 
-SELECT 
F-CREATE 
F ILE MANAGEMENT 
F-DESELECT 
F -DELETE 
F-INITIALISE F-TERMINATE 
F-ABDRT 
tine 
Figure 3.7. Within the FTAM Association Regime 
Within this regime, it may be desired to open a file for various purposes. The file open 
regime is depicted in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8. File Open Regime 
It can be seen from the diagram that activities such as reading and writing file attributes 
can be performed within the file selection regime while no further inner regime is in 
force. This is in keeping with familiar operating systems such as DOS, where the 
getting and setting of file attributes must be performed on a file which has been assigned 
but not opened. Before the contents of any file can be manipulated, however, the file 
must be opened. In FTAM, it is opened by use of F-OPEN, and closed when finished 
with by use of F-CLOSE, both of which are confirmed services. (This is essential, as 
otherwise the initiating process could waste resources writing to a file it assumed has 
been opened correctly, but in fact has failed to open for some reason). 
Once the selection regime has been established, and file activity requiring the transfer 
of data units to or from the file is required, it is essential that the structure of the file 
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be understood by both initiator and responder. Such understanding is in terms of the 
virtual filestore described earlier. Consider the case where the initiator has used F-
CREATE to create a new file in the respondent's filestore. At this stage, the responder 
will not know the intended structure of the file. Similarly, when the initiator wishes to 
read data units from the responders file, he will not at the outset have any knowledge 
of the structure of that file other than the information being kept with the file in the 
respondents filestore. One of the main purposes, therefore, of F-OPEN is to convey the 
structural information between peer FTAM processes in the appropriate direction, 
initiator to responder or vice versa. This is done by use of the F-OPEN contents type 
parameter. 
Finally, as far as FTAM is concerned, the data unit (DU) is the smallest unit of data that 
can be transmitted across OSI. This may not correspond to the record size of elements 
in the file, which may be unstructured (as in the case of text files), a sequential flat file 
(as in the case of an untyped file), or an ordered flat file (as with files of records). It 
is the responsibility of the responding FTAM entity to map the DU onto the record size 
of the file in his filestore. The activity within the file open regime can now be 
considered, and is shown in Figure 3.9. The SASE*s concerned with activity in this 
regime can be divided into two groups, those associated with management services to 
the initiator, and those concerned with the transfer of data between end system filestores. 
Examples of the management services are F-LOCATE and F-ERASE. Note in passing 
that this is in sharp contrast to operating systems such as DOS, where erase must never 
be used on an open file. Examples of the transfer services include F-READ and F-
WRITE. The regime is terminated by use of F-TRANSFER-END. This does not close 
the file, but simply delimits the transfer of data to that point; any number of sequential 
read/writes are possible. 
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Figure 3.9. Within the File Open Regime 
Due to its unique and complex nature, the convention adopted for the naming of FT AM 
PDUs (FPDUs) is slightly different from the other services. Here, the FPDU associated 
with an activity is named after the associated service layer primitives. For example, the 
FPDUs associated with the F-OPEN service element are F-OPEN REQUEST FPDU and 
F-OPEN RESPONSE FPDU. 
3,5. The OSI Security Architecture 
At various times, security controls must be established in order to protect the 
information exchanged between the application processes. Such controls should make 
the cost of obtaining or modifying the data greater than the potential value of doing so, 
or make the time required to obtain the data so great that the value of the data is lost. 
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That part of the Basic Reference Model which is concerned with the provision of 
security services is called the OSI Security Architecture [lSO.7498-2]. This architecture 
defines the general security-related architectural elements which can be applied 
appropriately in the circumstances for which protection of communication between open 
systems is required. It establishes, within the framework of the Reference Model, 
guidelines and constraints to improve existing standards or to develop new standards in 
the context of OSI in order to allow secure communications and thus provide a consistent 
approach to security in OSI. 
Basic security services and mechanisms and their appropriate placement in the OSI 
seven-layer model have been identified. In addition, the architectural relationships of 
the security services and mechanisms to the Basic Reference Model have been identified. 
The standard admits that additional security measures may be needed in end systems in 
order to meet specific requirements. The fundamental architecture of the Comprehensive 
Security System to be described builds on the ISO references, and extends them to point 
where a useful, practical system may be implemented. 
3.6. Placement of Security Provisions within OSI 
The ISORM Security Architecture [ISO,7498-2] makes recommendations concerning the 
possible placement of security mechanisms within the framework of the Reference Model 
[ISO,7498], and identifies the architectural relationships of the security mechanisms to 
the Basic Reference Model. The standard also points out, however, that additional 
security measures may be needed for various application contexts, but defines these as 
being outside the scope of the standards. This extended security architecture is discussed 
more fully in the next section. 
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The layers at which the various security facilities proposed by the standard could be 
implemented are summarised in Figure 3.10. which is reproduced from the ISO 
standard. 
Figure 3.10. Recommended Placement of Security Mechanisms 
within the Seven Layer Model 
Layer 
Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Peer Entity Authentication • • Y Y • D Y 
Data Origin Authentication • • Y Y • • Y 
Access Control • • Y Y • • Y 
Connection ConfidentiaJily Y Y Y Y • • Y 
Connectionless Confidentiality • Y Y Y • • Y 
Traffic Flow Confidentiality Y • Y • • • Y 
Connection Integrity • • • Y • • Y 
Connectionless Integrity • • Y Y • • Y 
Non Repudiation of Origin • • • • • • Y 
Non Repudiation of Delivery • • • • • • Y 
As is clear from the figure, although many of the security facilities can be provided at 
a number of different layers, neariy every facility can be offered at the application layer. 
The only major exception is traffic analysis. This observation is central to the concept 
of the research to be described in later chapters. 
The Security Architecture also defines some of the security management concepts used 
in this research. In particular, the Security Management Information Base (SMIB) is 
defined as the conceptual repository for all security-relevant information needed by open 
systems. It in no way constrains the implementation of the storage, nor does it imply 
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that it resides in one physical location. This allows the concept of a distributed SMIB 
to be introduced. 
3.7. Requirement for Extensions to the OSI Security Architecture 
Although the security architecture described in the standards permits the placement of 
all the proposed security facilities at the application layer, it says nothing about how this 
may be achieved. In practice, it is necessary to extend significantly the concepts 
outlined in the standard to permit the successful development of a security system that 
will admit all the possibilities mentioned. This has been designated the Extended ISO 
Security Architecture and has been described by the author and others in [MUFT,1992]. 
3.8. Current Approaches to Security in Open Systems 
Currently, if a particular application requires security services, these are generally 
constructed by hardware/software means into the application itself from conception. In 
a system where there are several normal (insecure) applications, and one or two secure 
services, this approach is quite satisfactory. 
By contrast, in a system where there are many possible applications, as with ODP, a 
large number of which may require security facilities, it is clearly wasteful for each 
application to provide a complete set of security services for its own private use, when 
a majority subset of the services could be common to most, i f not all, applications. 
A general system was considered early in the research in an attempt to overcome this 
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problem of duplicated services, by seeking to intercept all input and output (both data 
and control) to and from applications, and to impose security functions upon the 
application by redirection of the data via a security system kernel. In principle, all 
software application packages should be written to standardised specifications. For 
example, Application Layer entities within the ISO OSI seven-layer model should 
conform to the ISO reference model [ISO,7498]. On investigation, however, this is far 
from the case in practice. Had all existing software adhered strictly to specifications, 
it may have been possible (albeit very tedious) to implement such an I/O redirection 
system, which could cope with the widely differing interface, data and control 
requirements of all the various applications. Since the majority of software applications 
are written as an amorphous entity, with no obvious interface standards, the concept was 
discarded as impractical. Even within the context of a local area network of Personal 
Computers, running MS DOS for example, the amount of operating system interrupt 
handling to account for all DOS file I/O alone, proves to be an extremely difficult task. 
The concept of providing a security system which is independent of, but available to, 
specific applications on request, is therefore only possible if the applications themselves 
are modified to include a standardised application program interface (API). The 
requests for security services, control and data information and any other data must flow 
in a rigidly defined manner across the interface which shall enable analysis of the data 
flow protocols for formal demonstration of the strengths and weaknesses of the system 
to be made. 
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4. FORMAL ANALYSIS AND VERIFICATION 
4.1, Requirement to Evaluate Security 
The requirement to evaluate formally the security of a system arises for two main 
i t 
reasons. Firstly, if is possible to obtain a measure of the 'figure of merit' or 'goodness' 
X 
of the system, it may be possible to estimate its overall effectiveness for the task it is 
required to perform, and help identify weaknesses. Once identified, shortcomings in the 
system, either in policy or implementation, can perhaps be overcome. Secondly, it is 
desirable that different systems can be compared and contrasted, and has the valuable 
commercial effect of allowing a potential customer of a system to evaluate rival products 
against each other. Once having made a final decision, it then gives the user a measure 
of confidence in the system he has bought. 
In contrast to the refinement of cryptographic algorithms, very little orderly development 
has taken place in the study of computer system security models. Up to 1983, the 
comprehensive survey by DeMilo et al [AMS,1983] expressed the view that it was 
certain that the central issues had not yet been clearly articulated. Since then, a 
considerable effort has been made in a number of areas, but the majority of research is 
aimed at specific problem areas such as authentication, access control and so forth. 
Very little appears in the current literature concerning the provision of a comprehensive 
set of security services as an integrated whole. 
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4.2. Security Models 
4.2.1. Role of a Security Model 
Success in achieving a high level of security in a system is fundamentally dependent on 
the degree of care in the design and implementation. Before anything, it is essential to 
understand clearly the requirement of what is to be achieved, and the purpose of the 
security model is to express those requirements precisely. The model, therefore, should 
ideally have the following properties [GASS,1988], although it is difficult to 
simultaneously achieve all of them: 
1. be precise and unambiguous; 
2. be abstract; 
3. be generic; 
4. be a true and accurate representation of security policy. 
The reasons for requirements (1) and (4) are self evident. The reason for requirement 
(2) is that it is necessary only to model the security properties of a system, and not the 
functions. It is important to avoid the tendency to confuse the model with the formal 
specification by including too many functional properties of the system that are irrelevant 
to security policy. The reason for requirement (3) is because the model must deal only 
with security properties, and does not unduly constrain the functions of the system or 
its implementation. 
For high security systems, such as those required by the military and financial sectors, 
the system is often based on a security kernel, and the requirement for precision is 
satisfied by writing the model in a formal mathematical notation. Although the concept 
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of modelling does not always require the use of mathematical techniques, these are 
generally the most powerful tools available, especially if the analysis is to be applied to 
a number of quite disparate systems with a view to comparison of models. 
Security systems in current use have been developed in one of two ways. For low 
grade, ad hoc security arrangements, the general route has been infi)rmal [GASS, 1988]. 
This methodology generally involves writing code to produce an implementation of the 
perceived requirement first, followed by testing to see if it meets the requirements as 
specified. Finally, the security requirements are shown to exist through demonstration. 
The methodology used (and indeed insisted upon) for high security systems is the fi)rmal 
route. This involves the production of an abstract model, which is then formally proved 
to map to a formal specification. The formal specification is then in turn proved to map 
onto the actual implementation. By maintaining an unbroken chain of validation 
techniques at every stage, the implementation is shown to fulfi l the required security 
policy of the original model. This significantly raises the assurance level of the system. 
Nonetheless, the gap between a formal specification and the actual implementation (or 
implementations across a number of hardware and software platforms) is immense, and 
this gap is sometimes filled by less formal justification methods. This is a point of 
weakness, and must be carefully addressed to minimise the possibility of error. 
4.2.2. Practical Applications of a Model 
One of the criticisms levelled at formal modelling is the highly abstract nature of the 
process. It is possible to carry the modelling details and mathematical formalism to the 
point where the model does not help in the design of the system. Generally, when the 
functional specification is written, not enough is known to specify every aspect of the 
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system's behaviour at that point. Indeed, an overly detailed functional specification at 
the early stage can unnecessarily constrain the design. 
There are certain aspects, however, which cannot be left to chance or the judgement of 
the implementors. Subtle security flaws such as coven channels can be overlooked. The 
function of the security model is to assist in the writing of the functional specification. 
With care, it is possible to constrain the system to the point where the necessary 
precautions have been specified, without constraining the functions. 
In summary, the Junctional specification serves as a guide to the fiinctions of the system, 
whereas the model serves as a guide to the security-relevant behaviour of the functions. 
4.2,3. Types of Security Model 
It is difficult to classify security models, because each is very different from every other. 
Only comparatively few have achieved wide publicity, and even fewer have actually been 
used as the basis for real implementations [LAND, 1981] and [MILL, 1984]. 
A state-machine model describes a system as an abstract mathematical state machine. 
In such a model, state variables represent the state of the machine at any given instant, 
and transition fitnciions describe how the variables may be changed. This basic idea is 
quite old, and has firm theoretical basis in the work of Turing and others [TURI,1936]. 
Hitherto, it has not been applied to large systems because modelling all the possible state 
variables of a large system is infeasible. The new reduction technique described in 
Chapter 6, however, has made possible the analysis of large systems by this 
methodology for the first time, and is the basis for the formal verification technique 
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applied to the CSS. 
The access matrix model [HARR,1976] is a state machine model that represents the 
security state of the system at any instant by a matrix array containing one row per 
system subject, and one column per system object. The entry at each intersection 
specifies the allowed access rights of any subject to any object. 
A variant on the access matrix model is the information flow model [DENN,1983], 
which rather than checking the rights of subjects to access objects, seeks to control the 
flow of information from one object into another object, constrained according to the two 
objects' security attributes. 
Another type of model is the non-interference model where subjects in one domain are 
prevented from affecting one another in a way which violates security policy 
[GOGU,1982]. This model is currently undergoing development by Honeywell in the 
Secure ADA Target research project [BOEB,1985]. 
Clark and Wilson [CLAR,1987] have addressed the integrity needs of commercial data 
processing and highlighted the differences between these requirements and the more 
traditional military concern with secrecy. 
Varadharajan has focussed on the problem of authentication using state-machine 
techniques [VARA, 1988]. 
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4.3. State-Machine Models 
The type of model which is of interest to the development of the Comprehensive Security 
System (described in Chapter 5) is the state-machine model, and we consider this in 
more detail. 
4.3.1. Development of a State-Machine Security Model 
The development of a state machine model comprises a number of stages: 
(1) definition of the security-relevant state variables; 
(2) definition of the conditions for a secure state. Mathematically, this 
definition is an invariant that expresses relationships between values of 
state variables that MUST be maintained during state transitions] 
(3) definition of the state transition Junctions; 
(4) proof that the functions maintain a secure state, eg. i f the system is in a 
secure state before an operation, it will remain secure after the operation; 
(5) definition of the initial state; 
(6) proof that the initial state is secure in terms of stage (2). 
4.3.2. An Example 
A requirement from security policy might be an implementation of the Bell-La Padula 
military model [BELL, 1973] of no read up & no write down restrictions. 
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POLICY (a): "A person may read a document only if the 
person's clearance is greater than or equal to the 
classification of the document". 
POLICY (b)\ "A person may only write a document i f the 
classification of the document is greater than or equal to 
the clearance of the person". 
Before the state machine development steps can be followed, it is necessary to develop 
com^witx abstractions of the elements of the security policy, and then restate the policy 
in terms of those abstractions. 
Real-World 
person 
document 
clearance 
classification 
Abstraction 
subject 
object 
capability 
token 
Restating the policy in terms of properties 
Property (a): "A subject may only access an object in read 
mode i f f the capability of the subject is greater than or 
equal to the token of the object". 
Property (b): "A subject may only access an object in 
write mode i f f the token of the object is greater than or 
equal to the capability of the subject". 
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Step 1 : Define the state variables 
S = set of current subjects s 
O = set of current objects o 
acl(s) = capability of subject s 
tok(o) = token of o 
A(s,o) = set of modes 
CASE A(s,o) OF 
{r} i f subject s can read object o 
{w} i f subject s can write object o 
(r,w} if both read and write 
0 i f neither read nor write 
cont(o) = contents of object o 
subj = active subject 
The symbol 0 designates the empty set. The subjects and objects are modelled as 
members of the sets S and O. The 2-dimensionaI access array A represents the access 
matrix for the system. The state of the system at any given instant is expressed as a set 
of values of all the slate variables {S,0,acljok,cont,subj}. 
Step 2: Define the secure state 
The definition of the secure state is a mathematical translation of the properties (a) and 
(b) into an invariant. 
INVARIANT: The system is secure i f f 
for all s € S, o G O 
if r G A(s,o), then acl(s) > = tok(o) 
i f w E A(s.o), then tok(o) > = acl(s) 
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The notation s 6 S means "s is contained in set S", and the notation s ^ S means "s 
is not contained in set S". 
Step 3: Define the transition functions 
A transition fitnction is defined as any procedure call to a system service routine 
requested by a subject, with the desired aim of specifically changing a state variable. 
Within the context of the PC LAN implementation, these would be calls to the DOS 
operating system 10 which are vetted by the CSS. The PC LAN DOS CSS implements 
the following functions: 
create_object (o,c)\ 
set_aceess (s,o,modes)\ 
change_object (o,c)\ 
write^object (o4)\ 
copy_object (from,to)\ 
append_data (o,d). 
Define the prime symbol (*) in front of a state variable to refer to a state variable in the 
new state. Unprimed variables refer to the old slate. 
create_object (o,c) 
if o € O 
then *0 = O U {o} and 
'tok(o) = c and 
for all s € S. 'A(s,o) = 0 U 
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set_access (s,o,modes) 
if s E S and o e O 
and if 
{ [ r E modes and acl(s) > = tok(o)] or r ^ modes } 
and 
{ [ w E modes and tok(o) > = acl(s)] or w ^ modes } 
then 'A(s,o) = modes • 
Gasser [GASS,1988] states that functions must be regarded as atomic, i.e. that they are 
indivisible and uninterruptible. Specified state changes happen at once, without the 
passage of any time 'during* the transition. This is very important when modelling 
multiprocessor systems with multiple queued requests to the CSS. 
Step 4: Prove the transition functions 
For each function, we require to prove 
Invariant and Function imply 'Invariant 
This is generally accomplished by the application of rules of formal logic, see section 
4.6. and Chapter 6. 
Step 5: Define the initial state 
Mathematically, the initial state is expressed as a set of initial values of all the state 
variables of the system. 
{So,0«,acl^,tok^,cont„,subjj 
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With the framework of a formalism, the initial state is expressed in a set of axioms^ see 
section 4.6. 
Step 6: Prove the initial state 
In order to ensure that the initial state is secure, we must specify constraints on the 
values. Constraints on transitions are also required for several reasons: 
1. non-secure transitions: the old and new values of variables must maintain 
a secure relationship; 
2. control on subjects: subjects should not be allowed to invoke certain 
operations under certain conditions; 
3. controls on information: a model that restricts modification of information 
must control transitions capable of modifying that information. 
4.3.3, Non-Secure Transitions 
By way of example, we can rewrite the create_object function slightly so that it allows 
the token of an existing object to be changed. 
create_object (o,c) 
*tok(o) = c; and 
if o ^ O then *0 = O U {o}; and 
for all s e S, 'Afs.o) = 0 D 
As before, access to the changed or created object is removed for all subjects, so the 
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function satisfies the invariant. But the function now allows a severe security violation -
the possible downgrading of the token of an object. 
The reason is that the original security policy as defined in the properties said nothing 
about the possibility that tokens of objects might change. We therefore need to augment 
the properties with constraints. 
Let us specify property (c) as 
Property (c): "The token of an object cannot decrease". 
Because downgrading involves a state transition, converting property (c) into a 
mathematical statement requires a constraint rather than an invariant. 
Constraint 7: For all o E O, 'tok(o) > = tok(o) 
This constraint stales that the token of an object is only allowed to increase or stay in 
the same state. 
4.3.4. Controls on Subjects 
Other constraints on transitions restrict the operations that subjects are allowed to 
invoke. For example, within the context of the CSS, a constraint is required that 
prevents subjects from changing the tokens of objects to which they have no access. 
Indeed, we may wish to restrict this operations only to the system management subjects. 
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Property (d)\ "A subject may modify another subject's access to an object 
only if the first subject can read the object" 
Constraint 2: For all o € O, 
if r ^ A(subj,o) 
then for all s e S,'A(5,o)^A(s,o) 
set_access as specified does not satisfy this constraint as yet, so the proof of security 
would fail. 
4.3.5. Controls on Infomiation 
The major limitation of the theory presented so far is that the rules and constraints only 
change access rights to information. They do not control changes to the information 
itself. This would be satisfactory if the purpose of the model were merely to formalise 
a security policy, rather than the functions of the system itself. But suppose that we 
wish to model an operation on the data contents of an object, such as 
wrlte_object (o,d) 
if o E O and w E A(subj,o) 
then 'cotu(o) - d U 
write_object does not change any variables mentioned in the invariant or in any of the 
constraints specified, so it is secure according to the model. The model is insufficient 
because it only expresses the potential access of subjects to objects (as represented by 
the access matrix), and does not consider the information either read or written. We can 
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add the constraint 
Constraint 3: for all o G O 
if w ^ A(subj,o) 
then 'cont(o) - cont(o) 
4.3.6, Information Flow models 
One deficiency in the classical proof techniques used for state machine models cannot 
be solved by adding invariants and constraints. This deficiency involves the flow of 
information, rather than the control of security attributes of subjects and objects. 
Consider the following operation 
copy_object (from,to) 
if from 6 O and to G O and w G A(subj,to) 
then 'cont(to) = contffrom) • 
This function copies the contents of one object into another, if the subject has write 
access to the destination object. The function is NOT secure because, in failing to check 
the read access in the from object, the to object may be written with information to 
which the subject has no access, and the subject may later read the written object. It has 
been asserted [GASS,1988] that it is impossible to contrive an invariant or constraint to 
overcome this. 
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4.4. Formal Specifications 
In the previous section, a brief overview of some mathematical techniques for the 
definition of a security model of a system were discussed. It is important, however, to 
distinguish between the process of writing a formal model and the process of writing a 
formal specification. Formal specifications are required only for systems that must 
maintain the highest degree of security. The CSS presented in this thesis is such a 
system. 
The purpose of a formal specification is to describe the functional behaviour of the 
system in a manner which is precise, unambiguous, and amenable to computer 
processing. The purpose of the computer processing is to carry out various forms of 
analysis on the specification with the minimum chance of human (or machine) error. 
The primary goal of the analysis is to prove properties about the specification. Within 
the context of formal logic, the analysis is carried out by the proving of theorems about 
security within a logically self-consistent axiomatic framework by means of a 
propositional calculus. Proving that the specification conforms to the functions, 
invariants and constraints of the model is the first step in the formal verification of the 
system, the final step being the proof that the implementation adheres to the formal 
specification. 
4.5. Methods of Decomposition 
The major problem with the choice of a level of formalism is one of extremes. It is 
possible to write a highly abstract specification which closely resembles the model, but 
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in such instances the task of convincingly demonstrating correspondence between the 
final code and the specification is enormous. Conversely, it is possible (at least in 
theory) to produce a specification so detailed that the formalism closely matches the 
visible operations of the system function for function and parameter for parameter. 
Clearly, neither approach is satisfactory in practice; it is necessary, therefore, to devise 
methods of decomposition whereby the formal verification proceeds by stages from the 
most abstract to the most detailed, each stage being a logical consequence of the 
previous one. 
4.5.1. Data Structure Refinement 
The data structure refinement method employs a refinement of detail at different levels 
of abstraction. Each layer of the specification is a state machine that completely 
describes the system. The topmost layer is highly abstract and combines multiple data 
types, variables and functions into a number of simpler functions. The second layer 
adds more detail, dividing generic functions about subjects and objects at the top layer 
into specific functions about specific types of objects and so forth. Once the second 
layer is written, it is shown to satisfy the mapped invariants and constraints (and hence 
the same security properties) as the top layer, and subsequently, the top layer is no 
longer needed. 
Similarly, more detail may be added at each successive lower layer, the mapping 
correspondence demonstrated, and the higher layer discarded, until the bottom layer is 
reached. This lowermost layer (closest to the implementation) will correspond very 
closely to the variables and functions of the code, making a very precise and detailed 
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description of the interface to the system, and a specification from which a number of 
designers could write systemsacross a number of platforms which would be functionally 
equivalent. 
4.5.2. Algorithmic Refinement 
In contrast to the previous technique, whose lowest layer specification presents the 
external view of the system, the algorithmic refinement technique allows the specification 
of some of the internal structure of the system. The approach views the system as a 
series of layered abstract state machines, each machine making available a set of 
functions for use by the machine above. The implementation of each function in a 
machine consists of an abstract program that calls functions in the machine below. The 
lowest level machine provides the most primitive functions; those that cannot be further 
decomposed. 
The agent concept used in the Comprehensive Security System is similar in approach. 
The security fimctions are provided by a number of security services, sequenced under 
the control of the Security Services Agent, which in turn calls the hardware and software 
security mechanisms under the control of the mechanism agents. 
4.5.3. Procedural Abstraction 
The technique of procedural abstraction directly models the way a system is 
implemented, that is, as a set of nested procedure calls. (Although this assumes a pure 
software implementation, it is also applicable to hardware, where the functionality is 
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controlled by firmware in Read Only Memory, for example). As in the algorithmic 
refinement technique, each function in the model is equivalent to a function in the 
implementation, but with the important difference that the technique does not require the 
system to be built in layers. Procedural abstraction describes how a function 
manipulates its arguments, not how the function affects the global state of the system. 
Because the model produced by this technique is so close to the code of the 
implementation itself, it can be regarded more as a program-proving system than a 
specification system. Indeed, it is the basis of a PASCAL-Iike pseudocode, as well as 
the foundation of formal language tools such as Z, developed jointly by Oxford 
University and the IBM (United Kingdom) Laboratories in an early attempt to deal with 
formal analysis of large software systems [McMO,1989]. 
4.6. Methods Using Formal Logic 
4.6.1. Introduction to Formal Logic 
The concept of a formal logic consists of a formal language and a deductive apparatus. 
This provides a way of generating and manipulating abstract strings of symbols. If the 
system is to be useful, however, the strings in the formal language must be ascribed 
some meaning, or semantics. This is achieved by providing an interpretation for the 
formal system. 
A formal language comprises two parts, its alphabet which specifies what symbols are 
to be found in the language, and its syntax which specifies how these symbols may be 
put together. An alphabet is specified by writing down the symbols in curly brackets, 
{ . . . } , separated by commas, with conventional shorthand notations where there are many 
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ordered symbols such as {a,b,...,z}. This piece of notation is part of a metalanguage, 
used for describing the formal language. By way of example, two alphabets are given 
which correspond to two common formal languages: 
1. A language for expressing the real numbers: 
{0,1,2,3,4.5,6,7,8,9,.} 
2. A language for expressing musical notes: 
{A,B,C,D,E,F,G,} t ,b , l i } 
It is possible for two languages to have the same alphabet. For example, the alphabet 
belonging to the formal language used for the section numbering scheme in this thesis 
is exactly the same as that used for the real numbers in example (1) above. The factor 
that differentiates the languages is that the syntax of each allows different strings to be 
formed in the two languages. For example: 
1. Acceptable section numbers: 3.2. 1.2.3. 3.6.1. 
2. Unacceptable section numbers: .7 3. .5. 
3. Acceptable real numbers: 23.7 12 6.75 
4. Unacceptable real numbers: 3.6.1 
An acceptable string in a formal language is called a well fanned farmula or wff 
(pronounced 'woof) of that language. The formal language itself is nothing more than 
just the collection of all its well formed formulae. Exactly what specifies a wff is 
defined by the syntax (sometimes known as grammar in some books) of the language. 
To give the syntax, a metalanguage is required for expressing the rules. This can be a 
natural language such as English, or another formal language. For example, 
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The language i£ has as its alphabet { * . O } , and its syntax 
is given by the rule "A wff in X is any finite string of 
zero or more * symbols, followed by between one and 
four O symbols, or a string of one or more * symbols 
with no O symbols following". 
The following are examples of wffs in S?: 
********ooo 
**#*oooo 
o o 
The following are not wffs in £J6 
* * * O O O * 
O O O * 
Note that we do not seek at this stage to ask what the wffs mean, since no meaning has 
yet been assigned to the wffs. The important question is whether the given string is a 
wff of the formal language. If we are using English as the metalanguage, even this may 
not be easy to answer, because natural language descriptions of things are often very 
hard to reason about accurately. It is precisely for this reason that computer software 
specifications written in natural languages are so difficult to verify rigorously. One of 
the main applications of formal languages is in the exact specification and hence accurate 
verification of computer systems, see Chapter 6. 
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The next stage is to give the formal language some semantics, by specifying the meaning 
of each wff admitted by the syntax. This is achieved by giving the language an 
interpretation which assigns a value from some domain of interest to each wff. We say 
that this value is the meaning of the wff under the particular interpretation. To extend 
the previous example, let, 
* denote 5 
O denote 1 
and let the placing of one symbol next to another indicate that their values under the 
interpretation are to be added together. So 
O O O denotes 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 
* * * O O denotes 5 + 5 + 5 + 1 + 1 = 17 
So the interpretation 9, of language ^ assigns to each wff of £^ a value from the domain 
1,2,3,... As a shorthand for the statement 'in the interpretation 9f, O O O denotes 3' 
we will write the notation 5, (O O O) = 3. 
This is, of course, only one interpretation of the language. Had we assigned a different 
interpretation and put 
2^ ( * ) = 10 
3 2 ( 0 ) =2 
with the same addition rule as above, then this interpretation 2^ ^signs to each wff in 
S2 a value from the domain 2,4,6,8,.... 
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It is the ability to use pieces of formal notation to denote different things under different 
interpretations that makes the mathematics so powerful. 
Having achieved the stage where a formal language may be defined in terms of 
meaningless strings of symbols from an alphabet, meaning then being assigned to the 
strings, we can describe things in the formal notation. The final stage is to add to this 
descriptive ability a facility to manipulate the strings in a formal manner by analysis of 
their syntactic shape. The consequences of this are extremely powerful because it allows 
inference of facts about the system that were not known at the outset. One of the most 
powerful features of this idea is that it is not necessary to know the meaning of the 
strings being manipulated, it is merely sufficient to follow the rules. The mechanism 
by which inference is performed is called the deductive apparatus, and the complete 
framework is called a formal system. 
The most important requirement of a deductive apparatus is that it makes no reference 
to any particular interpretation. If it did, the usefulness of the apparatus would be 
destroyed because the apparatus would be application-specific and the generality would 
be lost. To give an example, in the formal system called arithmetic, it is possible to add 
two numbers without concern about what they stand for. They could represent apples 
or cars or even just the abstract notion of 'number'; the interpretation in no way affects 
the deductive apparatus. 
The two components of a deductive apparatus are: 
AXIOMS - wffs which can be written down without reference to other wffs in 
the language; 
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I N F E R E N C E R U L E S - rules which allow the production of wffs in the language 
as an immediate consequence of other wffs. 
It is very important to note that the axioms are written down at the start as statements 
about the system which are believed to be true. If they are true, then the wffs which are 
inferred from them will also be true, but since the axioms themselves do not originate 
from other *meta-truths' they cannot be guaranteed to be true. Consider the following 
formal system: 
ALPHABET { * . O , o } 
GRAMMAR sentence = string of stars," O", string of stars, " o", string of 
stars] 
where string of stars = " * string of stars, " * "; 
AXIOM * o * o * * 
R U L E "If aOboc is z given wff, where a,b and c are string of stars, 
then a O b * o c * is an immediate consequence of it". 
So to show that * o * * * * o * * * * * is an immediate consequence of the wff 
* 0 * * * o * * * * , w e c a n identify ayb and c. 
a b c 
so that applying the rule we get 
a b c 
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To give this formal system a possible interpretation, let 
3 ( * ) = 1; 
3 ( * * ) = 2; 
3 ( * * * ) = 3; 
etc. 
9f(0) = + (addition); 
9f(o) = = (equals); 
The sentences in the language now take the semantics a -\- b = c, which can either be 
true of false. The'axiom now takes the interpretation 1 + 1 = 2 , which is true. As a 
consequence, the inference rule can be thought of as expressing that 
IF a b = c THEN a + (/? + 1) = (c + I) 
which is a sensible result. Note that this result is only 'correct' because of the meaning 
ascribed to the symbology. Had the subtraction operation (-) been assigned to O instead 
of addition (+) then the result would not fit into our intuition regarding arithmetic. 
Having laid the groundwork for a formal system, it is now possible to address the 
concepts of theorems and proofs. A proof \n a formal system <^is a finite sequence of 
wffs in the associated formal language, each of which is either an axiom of ^ or an 
immediate consequence of one or more preceding wffs, as determined by the inference 
rules of the system. A wff which can be proved within ^ i s called a theorem of By 
definition, all axioms of ^ a r e also theorems of Using the alphabet, syntax and 
interpretation of the previous example, let 
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THEOREM * 0 * * * * o * * * * * 
PROOF * O * o * * (axiom) 
* 0 * * o * * * (inference rule applied to 
axiom) 
* 0 * * * o * * * * (inference rule applied to 
previous wff) 
> i c O * * > f * o * * * 4 t 4 c (inference rule applied to 
previous wff) 
Q.E.D. 
Note that in proving the required result, other theorems have been discovered on the 
way, namely * 0 * * o * * * and * 0 * * * o * * * * . Ascribing the meaning 
of the previous example, it has been formally proven that, given the truth that 1 + 1 = 
2, then 1 + 4 = 5 . 
4.6.2. Mathematical Proofs of Correctness 
Mathematical proofs of correctness build on the ideas of formal logic to produce a 
formal system known as predicate calculus. This formalism allows reasoning about 
statements which are much more complicated than the simple theorems discussed in the 
last section. The predicate calculus achieves this by adding more expressive power to 
the formal language and additional rules to the deductive apparatus. For the benefit if 
the reader unfamiliar with these ideas, a summary can be found in Annex 4. 
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4.6.3. The Method of Hantler and King 
One interesting early approach to the verification of software by a formal method was 
described by Hantler and King [HANT,1976]. Their method is a formal system using 
abstraction at quite a high level to yield a methodology based on 'correctness assertions' 
about software statements. Of course, their methodology is only an attempt to prove the 
correctness of execution of the program. It cannot verify that what the program is 
executing is secure - the aim of the verification methodology described in Chapter 6. 
Their method is, however, important in laying the foundations for the verification of the 
CSS. 
They begin by defining a very simple Pascal-like programming language, within the 
framework of which the software to be verified is written. This corresponds very 
closely to the fonnal system discussed in detail in the last section. The programming 
language has an alphabet of permissible statements such as {DECLARE, PROCEDURE, 
INTEGER, END, . . . } and so forth. Having defined the language, the meaning of 
'correctness' of procedures is discussed. In particular, the constraints on inputs to a 
procedure and expected relations between inputs and outputs are expressed as assertions 
over the program variables. An input assertion is of the form 
ASSUME ( < Boolean > ) ; 
and usually appears immediately after the PROCEDURE statement. For example, the 
input assertion ASSUME (Pi > 0 ) ; asserts that the value of variable p, is assumed to be 
positive on entry. By contrast, an output assertion is of the form 
PROVE ( < Boolean > ) ; 
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and usually appears immediately before the final RETURN statement of the procedure. 
For example, the output assertion 
PROVE ((X = Y ' ) & (Y = X*)); 
indicates that the values of the variables have been interchanged. This relationship 
between inputs and outputs would only be satisfied by a correct interchange procedure. 
A procedure is said to be correct, therefore, i f the truth of its input assertion ensures the 
truth of its output assertion. A simple example is the ABSOLUTE function, which is 
required to return the absolute (i.e. no sign) value of its argument: 
1 PROCEDURE ABSOLUTE (X); 
2 ASSUME (true); 
3 DECLARE X . Y : INTEGER; 
4 I F X < 0 
5 THEN Y *- -X; 
6 ELSE Y *- X; 
7 PROVE ((Y = X ' IY = - X ' ) & Y > 0 & X = X ' ) ; 
8 RETURN (Y); 
9 END; • 
In this case, no assumptions need to be made about the argument, so the input assertion 
is set to true. The output assertion must specify that, when the return statement is 
executed, the value of procedure variable Y is the absolute value of the initial value of 
parameter X. This example is so simple that the correctness can be verified by 
inspection. The paper then considers the situation i f the procedure is too complex for 
direct inspection. 
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Central to the development of the methodology is the notion that a proof o f correctness 
for a program is a proof over all program inputs. Clearly, it is impractical actually to 
test the procedure exhaustively by using all possible inputs as arguments, so the proof 
must be made with a statement about 'all inputs'. This approach involves the 
mathematical technique discussed in the last section of inventing symbols to represent 
arbitrary program inputs, and then attempt a formal proof involving those symbols. I f 
no special properties of the symbols (other than those expected to hold for program 
inputs) are necessary for the proof, then the proof is valid for each specific input. This 
abstraction to the general case is a very powerful feature of the formalism, as 
demonstrated in the examples of the last section concerning ducks. 
The paper proceeds to demonstrate the effect of executing the ABSOLUTE procedure 
with an input value of of. The ASSUME statement is always deemed to be true, and so 
places no constraint on the actual value of a. Proceeding to the I F statement, it is now 
necessary to examine the range of possibilities. 
I f a < 0 then the IF test would produce (rue and would proceed to the T H E N clause. 
Here, Y becomes the negative of X (i.e. -a). Arriving at the PROVE statement, it is 
necessary to show that the present value satisfies ((Y = X ' | Y = - X ' ) & Y > 0 & X 
= X*). Since Y = -a and X = X* = a, this becomes 
(-Of = a I -a = -a) & -Of > 0 & a = a 
which simplifies to -a > 0 or more simply a < 0. Therefore, establishing the truth of 
the PROVE statement reduces to showing that a < 0. But by assumption, a < 0 so 
the proof is trivial, and for the case a < 0 the program functionality is correct. 
98 
I f a > 0 then the IF test would produce false and would proceed to the ELSE clause. 
Here, Y becomes the negative of X or a. Arriving at the PROVE statement, it is 
necessary to show that ((Y = X ' | Y = - X ' ) & Y > 0 & X = X ' ) is frwe when Y = a, 
X = X ' = a. That is, to show that 
( a = a | a = - Q f ) & a ^ O & a = a 
or simply a > 0 is true. Again, the proof is trivial since by assumption a > 0 and 
again the program functionality is correct. By the nature of the I F statement, these two 
cases are exhaustive and therefore the program is correct. 
This analysis may be expressed symbolically in a symbolic execution tree, see Figure 
4.1 . 
y. - a 
verified (T) 
« - a = a l - a = - Q ) & (-o>=0> fi. <a=a> 
p c i x r u e 
pc> a>=0 pc> o<0 
true False 
y. a 
( ^ v e r i f i e d 
<Ca=alo=-a) % (o>=0> % a=a 
8^ 
return a 
8 
return a 
Figure 4.1. Symbolic Execution Tree for ABSOLUTE Procedure 
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The numbering of the nodes corresponds to the line numbers in the program, and the 
abbreviation pc stands for path condidon. This is the collective set of values taken by 
the parameters as execution progresses symbolically down the tree. I t is possible for a 
symbolic execution tree to be either finite or infinite. Clearly, in the case of an infinite 
tree, the symbolic execution never stops, and so the final conditions cannot be tested. 
It is therefore important to construct the program so that the symbolic execution tree wi l l 
be finite. 
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4,6,4. A Formal Proof of Euclid's Algorithm 
The method is now applied to a formal verification of Euclid's algorithm, an important 
building block in the cryptographic mechanisms to be described later in the thesis. 
Euclid's algorithm, which is used to determine the greatest common divisor of two 
numbers, may be written in the formalism as follows 
1 PROCEDURE CCD (M,N) ; 
2 ASSUME ( M > 0 & N > 0 ) ; 
3 DECLARE M , N , A , B INTEGER; 
4 A ^ M ; 
5 B - ^ N ; 
6 DO W H I L E (A ?i B); 
7 I F A > B 
8 THEN A ^ A - B; 
9 ELSE B ^  B - A; 
10 END; 
11 PROVE (A = (M.N)); 
12 RETURN (A) ; 
13 END; 
We now assign the input assertion. Note that it is possible to assign the value false to 
the ASSUME statement. In this case, the symbolic execution tree is finite (indeed, it 
is empty), but guaranteed to be correct! As this case is of no interest, let the ASSUME 
statement be true. The symbolic execution tree is now non-empty, but infinite in extent, 
see Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2. Symbolic Execution Tree for Euclid's Algorithm 
The reason for the infinite extent of the symbolic execution tree is due to the DO 
W H I L E statement. Unless additional constraints are placed on the input values, for 
example, one made a fixed multiple k of the other, there is no way to determine how 
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many times the DO W H I L E statement wil l loop. The imposition of the condition 
mentioned would constrain the system to k loops, but would destroy the generality of the 
analysis. The solution to the problem is similar to that employed in the analysis of 
closed loop transfer functions in control theory. The loop 
is broken at some point, and i f the point chosen is not an ASSUME statement, an 
ASSERT statement is introduced to make additional assumptions about the system on 
exit from the loop. The resulting symbolic execution tree is called a cut tree. Applying 
this to the previous example, we can insert two cuts at line 2, where an ASSUME 
statement already exists, and at line 7, where no ASSUME statement exists and so an 
ASSERT statement is required: 
1 PROCEDURE CCD (M,N) ; 
2 cut2 ASSUME (M > 0 & N > 0); 
3 DECLARE M , N , A , B INTEGER; 
4 A M ; 
5 B ^ N ; 
6 DO W H I L E (A 7^ B); 
7 cut-j ASSERT ((A,B) = (M,N) & A B); 
8 I F A > B 
9 THEN A *- A - B; 
10 ELSE B ^ B - A; 
11 END; 
12 PROVE (A = (M,N)) ; 
13 RETURN (A); 
14 END; 
The cut trees for these cut points are shown in Figure 4.3. and Figure 4.4. respectively. 
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Figure 4,4. Cut Tree for Euclid's Algorithm at cut, 
Note how the cut prevents the tree becoming infinite in extent - as soon as a cut point 
is reached, the tree terminates and the path conditions can be evaluated at that point. 
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4.7. Limitations of Conventional Debugging Techniques 
Debugging is the conventional method of looking for faults or *bugs' in software by 
stepping through the code using a software tool known as a debugger. Generally, a 
debugger allows the execution of the code one line or instruction at a time, and the user 
can examine the values of variables and parameters after each step to see where the 
errors are occurring. It is generally a very painstaking and time-intensive task, even i f 
the code is linear, that is, has no loops or recursions. Pure linear code is very rare 
indeed in real applications, and the existence of loops and recursion can make 
conventional debugging almost impossible, as at each branch point a decision has to be 
taken as to which path to follow. When that selected path has been traced, the 
alternatives also have to be explored. Consider the following short module of recursive 
pseudo-code: 
PROCEDURE A; FORWARD; 
1 PROCEDURE C 0; 
2 CALL PROCEDURE_A; 
3 END; 
4 PROCEDURE D Q; 
5 CALL PROCEDURE_A; 
6 END; 
7 PROCEDURE E Q; 
8 CALL PROCEDURE_A; 
9 END; 
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10 PROCEDURE B (M); 
11 CASE N OF 
12 1 : C A L L PROCEDURE_C; 
13 2 : C A L L PROCEDURE_D; 
14 1 : C A L L PROCEDURE_E; 
15 END; 
16 PROCEDURE A (N); 
17 FOR I : = 1 TO 12 DO 
18 CASE N OF 
19 1 : C A L L PROCEDURE_C 
20 2 : C A L L PROCEDURE_B 
21 1 : C A L L PROCEDURE_E 
22 END; 
23 END: 
The paths through the module are illustrated schematically in Figure 4.5. 
This is a very simple piece of code, and with only 12 iterations through the module, the 
number of unique paths through the code is over 3 trillion. Clearly, following each path 
to look for possible sources of error is out of the question. As demonstrated in section 
4.6.3., the requirement to debug can be largely eliminated i f more powerful 
mathematical techniques are applied instead. 
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Figure 4.5. Limitations of Conventional Debugging 
4.8. Limitations on Current Analysis Methods 
The software analysis and verification methods described in this chapter deal with the 
semantic correctness of software and, as applied to security system software, are very 
important in the verification of the code. They do nothing, however, to ensure the 
fimctional correctness of the system. Clearly, the difficulties in verifying the former 
alone are fraught, and to ensure the latter as well by similar means would be very 
difficult indeed. The major limitation of the current analysis methodologies described 
is one of scale. The methods are well suited to small-scale analyses of code fragments 
where the variables, which together comprise the global state of the system, may be 
specifically enumerated. By way of example, consider a very simple system with one 
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Boolean variable F. The variable F may by definition assume only one o f two possible 
states, true or false. Because F is the only system variable, clearly the global state of 
the system is also constrained to one of two states. I f the system is now extended to two 
boolean variables, F and G, where each may assume two states, the number of 
possibilities for the global state is now four: 
F = false AND G = false 
F = true AND G = false 
F = false AND G = true 
F = true AND G = true 
I f a byte variable is now added, taking any value from a range of 256 possibilities 
(0..255) then the number of global states expands to 1024. As more variables are 
added, especially those with very large possible ranges (or even those with virtually 
infinite possibilities such as reals) then the number of possible global states rapidly 
increases past the point where it is no longer feasible to enumerate them explicitly. For 
a system such as the CSS, there are several hundred variables. Although each variable 
is carefully declared with the smallest range compatible with functionality (that is, i f a 
variable only requires say 200 different states, it is declared as a byte (0..255) as 
opposed to a word (0..65535), the number of possible global states is enormous. The 
important point about these states, however, is that the vast majority should never arise 
in the normal functioning of the system, although there is generally nothing actually to 
prevent them from doing so. This is the source of the software bug - the system has 
taken on a state which the programmer did not intend should arise (or was not even 
aware could arise!). The aim of well written software, especially in the commercial 
arena, is to include sufficient error detection and fault recovery routines to detect 
possible situations where the system attempts to take on a state outside the small subset 
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of permissible states, and return the system to one of the permitted states. Failure to do 
this wil l often result in the system 'hanging up', a common criticism of early or poorly 
written software. For example, a routine to read in a numeric argument from the user 
(via the keyboard, say) should include error checking to ensure that the input string 
contains no non-numeric characters. I f this check were not present, meaningless data 
could be presented to a function which expects only numeric arguments, causing the 
system to enter an unknown state. Of course, the check wi l l not detect the entry of 
syntactically valid but contextually incorrect numerical data. 
In the vast majority of systems, the number of permissible states is a very small subset 
of the number of possible states. The vast majority of the unwanted states wi l l probably 
result in random and harmless system crashes, although in some time-critical applications 
loss of processing time may be considered to be harmful. While this is also true for a 
security system, it may also be possible for the system to end up in a state where 
security is compromised. Although the probability of this happening purely by chance 
is small, the possibility of an attack being devised specifically to bring this situation 
about cannot be dismissed. 
By way of example, consider the limitations of the analysis described in section 4.6.3. 
I f this is applied to a statement which takes the values true or false, the symbolic 
execution tree branches into two at that point. I f it were applied to a system containing 
a CASE statement on a word variable, however, the symbolic execution tree would 
expand into a possible 65536 new branches. Clearly, the analysis flounders due to the 
number of possibilities, many of which may be redundant. I f it is possible to produce 
a system whose entire design philosophy is based upon careful constraint of the global 
state to a carefully selected and rigorously analysed subset of the large number of 
possible states, then a formal analysis based on the permitted subset may be possible. 
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The Comprehensive Security System to be described (in Chapter 5) is an attempt to 
implement a security system based on the above design philosophy. Furthermore, due 
to the rigorous design methodology, formal analysis is further simplified by a reduction 
technique which can further limit the number of possible global states which need to be 
considered in the formal analysis (see Chapter 6). 
I l l 
5. A NEW APPROACH 
5.1. A Comprehensive Security System 
5.1.1. Security Policy 
Within an Open Distributed Processing environment, involving the transfer of 
information between remote end-user systems, the provision of a generic security 
function can be conceived in terms of a security policy, rigorously enforced upon those 
entities who are subject to that policy. The security policy represents the overall set of 
measures adopted to ful f i l the desired security function and covers every aspect of the 
business of implementing an effective security system. It w i l l involve: 
1. provision of physical, hardware and software security mechanisms, such 
as locked and guarded buildings, protected terminals, encryption and so 
2. definition of protocols for all data transfers within the system, either 
embedded within existing OSI protocols, or interfaced to them; 
3. enforcement of the fundamental principles of access control, user 
identification/authentication; 
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4. provision for effective system resource protection and optimisation of use. 
This includes such measures as Integrity of Resources, Confidentiality of 
Use of Resources, Assurance of Service, Accountability of Usage of 
Resources, Audit Trail etc; 
5. provision for monitoring, logging and analysis of the security system at 
all times, for both optimisation of system resources, and detection of 
possible subversive activity. 
The security policy is formulated and dictated by an authority, which is ultimately 
responsible for the overall performance and effectiveness of the system. 
5.1.2. Security Domains and their Administration 
Before describing the CSS model, we define some of the terms used. These terms have 
precise meaning within the context of the CSS and cannot be used loosely or 
interchangeably. Our definitions have been dictated by the security considerations of the 
architecture. While every effort has been made to ensure that they coincide with similar 
definitions used in the OSIRM, this has not always been possible. Where ambiguity has 
arisen, this is due mainly to conflicting requirements or the vagueness and lack of rigour 
with which the definitions in the OSIRM are made and applied. 
The authority delegates the implementation of security policy to a system administrator. 
(Some attributes of an administrator correspond with those of a system manager). In a 
large network, there may be a number of administrators responsible for rigid observation 
of the security policy. The purview of a security administrator is known as a security 
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domain, A security domain is defined as a bounded group of security objects and 
security subjects to which applies a single security policy implemented by a security 
administrator. 
The security domain is a managerial/control concept that defines the scope o f a particular 
security policy. Where the number of security subjects and objects is large, they may 
be formed into subgroups for ease of management [ D T I , 1989]. Such a sub-group is 
referred to as a sub-domain. Normally, the policy of the overall domain wi l l apply to 
all sub-domains. Thus, a domain covers all or part of a given distributed system. 
One authority wi l l dictate policy for one domain, and another authority wi l l dictate 
policy for another domain. A successful association should only be possible i f the 
security policies, services and mechanisms of both end systems are compatible. 
Although there is no logical difference between local activities and remote activities, a 
local activity may be assured of compatibility within a security policy local to the 
domain, whereas a remote activity may require inter-domain 'translation' protocols to 
ensure effectiveness of an overall security policy, especially when operating as a 
mutually suspicious system, see section 2.9. This may lead to incompatibility between 
domains. In this event, the incompatibility is arbitrated and resolved by reference to a 
higher authority. These higher authorities may take the form of regional and then 
national committees, that must meet given codes of practice, contractual specifications, 
or the ISO standards. Any authority dictating policy, not conforming to these standards 
wil l by default exclude itself from connectivity within the complete open security 
framework. 
Within each domain, the security administrator is responsible for the implementation of 
the domain security policy and for assuring its continued effectiveness. This 
114 
responsibility includes the installation of trusted hardware and software, hardware and 
software functionality, monitoring day to day operations, and recovery in case of breach 
of security or fault conditions. 
A logical model can be constructed with a defined hierarchy where each entity within 
the model wi l l have specific tasks to perform under the purview of its superior. Within 
this model, any user entity or application entity that is allowed by the security policy to 
access the security services can obtain/provide information securely to other authorised 
users within the ODP environment. A user entity may request the access of an object 
or service in normal (insecure) mode either accidentally or intentionally, but i f this 
object or entity is itself subject to the security policy, then that policy wi l l force the 
security services to be invoked for this activity, or access wi l l not be possible at all. 
This approach maximises the system's ability to account for both human error and 
attempts at criminal misuse of the system. 
5.1.3. Conceptual Model of the CSS Processor 
The CSS is conceptualised as a collection of communicating and cooperating agents. An 
agent is defined to be a logical component of the security system, designed to implement 
a particular function or group of functions. These functions are combined in order to 
provide security services. The agents are independent of each other so that any 
combination of agents may be used. The same set of agents may provide various 
services by being combined together in different orders. In order for agents to cooperate 
they must communicate. Cooperating agents send messages to each other in the form 
of protocols. The component agents of the CSS are carefully chosen along lines similar 
to the criteria for the choice of layers in the OSI model. The criteria for the choice and 
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number of agents are: 
1. not to create so many agents as to make the systems engineering task of 
describing and integrating the agents more difficult than necessary; 
2. to create a boundary where the description of services can be small and 
the number of boundary interactions minimised; 
3. to create separate agents to handle functions that are manifestly different; 
4. to collect similar functions in the same agent; 
5. to create agents of easily localised functions; 
6. to create boundaries between agents where at some time the interface may 
be standardised; 
7. to create an agent where there is a need for a different level of abstraction 
in the handling of the data; 
8. to allow changes of functions or protocols without affecting other agents. 
Essentially, the CSS coexists with the application entities it is to protect. Within the 
context of the Open Systems Interconnection model, the CSS wi l l reside within the 
Application Layer as another application entity. The CSS has access to both the calling 
application and the application user to request information when required and these in 
turn have access to the CSS to invoke functions when required. 
The CSS offers the application or user entity a number of security services, which the 
entity must access through a standard Application Program Interface (API) to the CSS. 
The API is provided by the CSS and generally depends on the system environment upon 
which the CSS is hosted. Application entities must provide the correct format of data 
to meet the requirements of this interface in order to take advantage o f the CSS as a 
value added service. The interface consists of a set of service and associated parameters 
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used by the application and CSS. 
While it is considerably easier from a conceptual point of view to imagine the CSS 
purely in local terms, it is important to remember that the CSS as a whole is a 
distributed entity. While this is no way affects the logical operation of the agents, they 
cannot be considered as being 'in one place*. It is possible that part of an agent may 
reside on one processor and another (or even duplicated) part may reside on another. 
In a fully distributed implementation, components of agents wi l l be duplicated many 
times. This is similar to the OSI application F T A M described in Chapter 3 where part 
of the application resides on the initiating end system and another part on the responding 
end system. Neither can work without the other, but the physical displacement of the 
components in no way affects the logical functionality. 
In practice, the local components of the CSS may comprise a trusted, tamper-proof 
hardware module, and associated software [WEIN,1987]. Such an implementation 
would give a very significant improvement in physical security over the equivalent 
software-only system, especially with regard to the security of locally held SMIB data, 
upon which the integrity of the system critically depends. The protection of local agents 
within the module also eliminates the requirement for encrypted protocols between them 
due to the inaccessibility of the internal data bus. It is straightforward to construct a 
module using battery-backed RAM for the SMIB. which is powered down on detection 
of intrusion, destroying the data in the SMIB. This would prevent the compromise of 
the users* secret keys and other data which would allow an assailant to defeat the 
system. Of course, the CSS as a whole is a distributed application entity, and so those 
agents which are remote from each other must use secure protocols for communication. 
The conceptual model of the CSS is shown schematically in Figure 5 .1 . 
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Figure 5.1. Conceptual Model of the CSS 
5.1.4. Security Services Supported by the CSS 
Although the CSS is implemented as an application entity, it offers a fu l l OSI-wide 
flexibility due to the interface architecture. It is very important both from the conceptual 
and practical points of view, to appreciate the 'vertical' structure of the proposed 
interface. An advantage of this system is the potential flexibility due to the possibility 
of the CSS functions being called by other than operations in the Application Layer. 
The CSS API, which could take the form of a software interrupt, for example, is 
accessible from any of the OSI layers, not just the Application Layer. It is quite 
permissible for the Transport Layer, for example, to request data encryption services 
from the CSS. This conforms with the recommendations of OSI, which states that while 
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the majority of security functions can be carried out at the Application Layer, there are 
a few which may need to be implemented in different layers. 
The CSS supports, among others, the following security functions: 
1. invocation; 
2. identification; 
3. authentication; 
4, key generation; 
5. key distribution; 
6. encryption; 
7. decryption; 
8. signature; 
9. verification; 
but the ful l range of OSI recommendations in [ISO,7498-2] should be possible. 
In summary, many different security needs can be met by the concept of a common set 
of security agents provided externally to the application processes. The functional 
modularisation of the system in this manner makes possible the general definition of a 
flexible security architecture. These agents wil l be involved with the interactions 
between users and applications, and the interaction of applications. These agents, their 
interaction and management are central to the concept of the Comprehensive Security 
System to be described. In the practical realisation of the CSS concept, a security model 
comprising ten such agents is suggested. 
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5.2. The Agents of the CSS 
5.2.1. User Agent (UA) 
Since the CSS can select which interface wi l l be utilised, either the Application interface 
or the CSS user interface itself (dependent on the state and requirements o f both the user 
and the CSS), the User Agent (UA) of the CSS comprises *hair the interface to the CSS 
as seen by the user entity. This wil l occur when the application has requested a 
security service from the CSS, and the CSS requires some information directly from the 
user, such as a password, etc. The main functions of the User Agent are: 
1. to interface between the user entity and the Security Service Agent (SS A) 
of the CSS; 
2. to maintain a library of user entity request statements, via which the UA 
will determine request/response validity, and suitable responses to the 
user entity according to a strict set of rules, thus limiting the number of 
possible user actions; 
3. to interpret all data from the user entity and ensure its validity before 
presenting it to the Security Services Agent (SSA), and to determine the 
location and nature of errors, and inform the SAA accordingly. Also, to 
process all data from the SSA into a form suitable for interpretation by 
the user entity before presentation to the user entity; 
4. to accept a request from the SSA when the service requested requires 
further information from the user, and to act upon this to interrogate the 
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user in a suitable manner for this information. 
The UA is conceived as a separate entity from the SSA because the U A must be capable 
of interfacing with many user entities, thus freeing the SSA from the complexities of 
multiple interfaces. 
5.2.2. Security Services Agent (SSA) 
The CSS Security Service Agent (SSA) is the central control agent of the CSS. It is 
responsible for: 
1. accepting and checking the validity of all CSS service requests from the 
External Environment Agent (EEA). This is an important function which 
is necessary to prevent invalid calls from trying to confuse or subvert the 
CSS into performing functions which are not permitted by the security 
policy. This validation is accomplished by the SSA checking all requests 
for security services against the user entity capabilities and privileges 
stored in the SMIB and the logical state of the sequence of operations 
carried out to that time (see Chapter 6). Any request not expressly 
permitted for that user entity by the SMIB wi l l be refused; 
2. selecting the appropriate service mechanisms pertinent to the function to 
be performed under the supervision of the SMIB via the SMIB Agent 
(SMIBA), passing the relevant sub-function control data to the service 
mechanism agents, and sequencing the service mechanism agents correctly 
to perform the requested security service; 
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3. ensuring the correct routing of the information data to and from, and in 
the correct sequence among, the security mechanisms. It is possible to 
implement two completely different security services with the same set of 
security mechanisms by merely using them in a different order. For 
example, two security mechanisms implementing a compression (hash) 
function such as DES in block chaining mode, and an RSA 
encryption/decryption scheme could be used for (1) a hybrid file 
encryption system for a confidentiality service, (2) file and message 
signatures for non-repudiation and integrity checks and (3) checking 
signatures for authenticity and integrity ; 
4. checking with the SMIB the capability of the user entity, and determining 
whether the user entity has the privilege to execute the requested service; 
5. switching between Application UA and CSS UA. 
Secuftky 
5.2.3. Sorvico Mechanism Agent (SMA) 
The Service Mechanism Agent wi l l : 
I . accept control commands from the SSA, and select and control the 
security mechanisms to perform the service requested, including sub-
function selection of multi-function mechanisms. For example, a DES 
card could perform normal block encryption, block chaining mode 
encryption and so on; 
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return to the service agent status information including details of function 
performed, status of operation (success, failure) and other data resulting 
from the process. 
5,2.4. SMIB Agent & SMIB (SMIBA) 
The Security Management Information Base (SMIB) is the 'heart' of the CSS and is the 
most important unit from the security point of view, and must be protected to the 
highest level of security. The SMIB wil l comprise the repository in which the CSS 
maintains all data pertinent to the security function, including such data as identifications 
of authorised users, authentication data, user entity capabilities and privileges, and so 
forth. The SMIB Agent (SMIBA) wil l be responsible for interfacing the SMIB to the 
other CSS agents, including accepting and processing all requests from the service agent 
for information from the SMIB, including such data as user entity identity checks, user 
entity authorisation, user entity capabilities and privileges, object entity validity, object 
entity authorisation, object entity security status. 
The SMIB holds the following information: 
System User Entity Data 
This comprises of information concerning the users' rights to access the system and their 
capabilities and privileges within it and includes: 
1. a user system-wide name (unique identifier); 
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2. a hashed version of the user ontitioa password, for use during 
authentication. The user entity therefore enters his password, which wi l l 
be hashed via a one-way function before comparison. This renders 
compromise of the SMIB usemame/password file useless, as it is 
computationally infeasible to invert the hash function and hence to 
reconstruct the password; 
3. further data known only to the user that may be used for further 
authentication in the case of highly privileged operations or possible 
uncertainty of identity (this may be used in a future semi-intelligent 
system which takes account of users habits. I f a user habitually uses the 
system only in the mornings, then suddenly uses the system one night, the 
CSS may require further proofof identity than just the normal password); 
4. a capability token summarising the users' rights and privileges to perform 
certain operations. This token is passed to the SSA when it needs to 
validate a user request. 
Security Function Sequencing Data 
As the CSS can perform a number of functions with a limited number of security 
mechanisms, in order to ensure that security services are correctly performed in 
accordance with security policy, the SSA wi l l control the Security Mechanism Agents 
strictly in accordance with sequencing data held in the SMIB. This wil l prevent 
irregular requests (which may have been specifically constructed ambiguously as an 
attack on the system) from being accepted by the SSA. Details of the sequencing 
operation are given in Chapter 6. 
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Temporary Data Store 
For a full-duplex connection, or with a multi-user arrangement associated with the 
encryption functions, chained or feedback vectors wi l l be required for the two different 
transmission directions, and possibly for a number of simultaneous connection 
conditions. This information must be stored until the relevant data arrives. Also, it is 
possible that the CSS will be interrupted from processing I/O to service a request from 
another local user entity. Should the CSS be about to encrypt a sensitive piece of data 
which is still in plaintext, it will store this data within the SMIB to ensure that it is safe 
until the CSS has time to process it. Similarly, incoming data may also be stored here 
until it is processed. 
System Objects Data 
The SMIB is likely to hold data on the general security status of objects within the 
system (files, databases etc) in the form of tokens. When a user subject entity wishes 
to access a system object entity, the user entity is authenticated against his SMIB data 
as described. The capability of the user entity is also matched against the classification 
of the object entity to ensure that the user entity privilege is equal or higher. 
5.2.5, Security Administrator Agent (SAA) 
The Security Administrator Agent (SAA) is responsible for allowing only the 
administrator to provide modifications to the existing system. There must be very strict 
protocols and authentication for this type of operation within the system. The SAA is 
also responsible for the strict imposition of system security policy upon the individual 
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operation of and interaction between, the other agents of the CSS. The main function 
of the SAA involves controlling the SMIBA to place information into the SMIB, or 
modify existing information as new users are added to the system, existing users 
removed, security policy updated, user capabilities and privileges modified, and 
adding/modifying mechanisms and services. 
5.2.6. External Environment Agent (EEA) 
The External Environment Agent is responsible for: 
1. accepting security service requests across the API and interpreting, 
validating and routing the requests to the Security Service Agent. 
Application software packages without the necessary API w i l l not be able 
to call the CSS in the first place. Those packages with the API which 
make CSS request calls in error wil l be returned an appropriate error 
code by the EEA. (See example under SSA for the likely types of 
information and control data to be distributed); 
2, ensuring that all output from the CSS, including control and information 
data, is routed back across the API into the same layer which originated 
the request and the control/information data, to prevent 'short-circuiting' 
of layers. 
It should be noted that this agent could be specific to, say, an OSI implementation of the 
CSS and this is reflected in Figure 5.1. where the EEA is referred to as the Open 
Systems Agent. In general, however, the agent wil l provide the interface to whatever 
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underiying network architecture is in use. 
5.2.7, Monitoring Agent (MA) 
The primary task of the Monitoring Agent (MA) is ensuring that the sequencing of the 
state-machines that generate the security mechanisms and protocols, under the control 
of the SSA and SMA, is correctly carried out. The M A is also responsible for accepting 
and processing all data gathered by the SSA and recording it, including such data as 
security service requested, date and time, calling user id, calling process, status (success 
failure) etc. It is envisaged that the MA wi l l itself internally request one of the CSS 
encryption services, to encrypt the log ready for storage. The only entity with access 
to the log will be designated levels of system administration, who wi l l possess the 
decrypting keys allowing managerial access to the log for the preparation o f audit reports 
for security management and resource optimisation purposes. Such access rights wi l l 
be stored in the SMIB. 
The M A could be an Al-based module that wi l l detect problems and even likely 
problems before they occur, and take the necessary action for preventative or remedial 
measures. 
5,2.8. Recovery Agent (RA) 
The Recovery Agent (RA) is responsible for all system fault protection and CSS error 
recovery. Faults and errors may be caused either by hardware failure of units both 
within the CSS and external to it, and also by certain combinations o f situations with 
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which the CSS cannot cope, due to ambiguity of requests for example. The RA wil l 
perform the important task of detecting these errors, and placing the CSS into such a 
state as to maintain the security integrity of the system, so that the CSS is not left in a 
state where it is vulnerable to attack. 
Faults outside the CSS could in certain circumstances also produce system errors. For 
example, an incorrectly constructed or incomplete data structure could be ambiguous, 
and the CSS may 'hang*. Internal error recovery routines wil l automatically re-request 
the data, but in the absence of response, the CSS wil l place itself into a stable, secure 
state. The CSS has in effect, recovered 'internally' from the error, but cannot, of 
course, influence events outside the CSS. ('Inside' and 'outside' the CSS refer to 
software modules within the CSS kernel and those outside the kernel respectively.) 
Obviously, in a distributed security system, the boundaries cannot be clearly defined. 
The external error must be recovered by the run-time library of the application package. 
In the case of a fault developing with either the SMIB or the SMIBA, the CSS protocols 
must be designed such that the CSS Recovery Agent (RA) always returns fatal errors 
to the EEA for A L L requests. Thus, failure of the SMIB terminates all security activity 
on the local terminal. This differs from faults which may develop with other CSS 
components, which will not return severe errors, but merely limit the operational 
effectiveness of the system to those functions not requiring the damaged facility. 
5.2.9. Association Agent (AA) 
The Association Agent (AA) is responsible for the security control of the association 
between remote end user entities throughout the duration of the connection. It is 
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responsible for sending the appropriate data when the connection is set up, such as keys, 
vectors, time stamps and so on, for exercising supervisory control during the connection, 
and for clearing down the association from the security facility aspects. In addition, 
detection of denial of service attacks would be possible with this agent by the sending 
and receipt of random supervisory packets, subject to the current quality of service 
conditions. 
5.2.10. Inter-Domain Communication Agent (IDCA) 
The connectivity of entities within a domain is assured, as all communicating entities are 
subject to a common security policy. Inter-domain communication, however, presents 
a special problem. The communicating entities in the two domains require the use of 
'translation' protocols to ensure a seamless continuity of security around the association. 
The Inter-Domain Communication Agent (IDCA) is responsible for recognising inter-
domain associations, and invoking additional protocols as necessary. Inter-domain 
translation may or may not be possible. 
For example, the remote entity may be using a form of encryption unknown to the local 
entities CSS processor. In this case, translation is impossible. The IDCA wil l note that 
decryption by the local security mechanisms is not possible, and wi l l flag the appropriate 
error. The RA will return the appropriate flags to the calling application, which wil l 
then either terminate the association, or re-request the remote entity to communicate in 
another secure mode. 
I f the remote entity, however, is using security functions which are capable of 
interpretation by the local system after translation, then communication is possible 
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providing the data is translated appropriately. The IDCA is responsible for requesting 
the appropriate mechanisms via the SSA to attempt the translation. Dealing with these 
kinds of incompatibilities is difficult, but is representative of the sort of problems that 
wil l be encountered when connecting diverse real networks. 
5.3, Centralised Control 
The most common reaction to the requirement for an organisation to implement security 
is to centralise control of all the information flow within the organisation in an attempt 
to gain complete control over the distribution of data and resources within the 
organisation. This is typified by military establishments where all confidential 
information is held in a central registry, and users requiring access to such data must go 
through the registry to obtain it. This is a powerful approach for small systems where 
the number of users and the quantity of data is such that one control centre can 
effectively manage the information database. 
A centralised approach is useless, however, for large systems because the quantity of 
data to be stored and managed is too great. Access time to the database becomes 
prohibitive and effective management is impossible. Once control over the access to the 
data is lost or becomes ineffective, the whole purpose of the control is destroyed and the 
security is easily violated. The world telephone system can be used as a convenient 
analogy. It would clearly be impractical for the entire telephone network to use one 
exchange. Not only would access times render the system useless, but the effective 
control of the exchange would be impossible. Instead, the telephone network uses a 
distributed approach to management, whereby a large number of controlling exchanges 
are used, and a limited number of users are hosted on each exchange. This cltdstering 
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technique is a powerful approach to reducing the size of the problem, and is the basic 
idea underlying the concept of the Security Management Centre. 
5.4. Security Management Centres 
As mentioned when discussing the conceptual model, the security processor for a large 
distributed system wil l not physically reside in one location, but wi l l be itself distributed 
throughout the system. Indeed, such an arrangement may be advantageous. One 
approach is to adopt the concept of a Security Management Centre (SMC), which acts 
as a central security 'exchange' analogous to packet-switching centres in data networks 
and which will be responsible for the management and control of secure activities on the 
network. This wi l l include duties such as third-party provision and verification of public 
keys, notarisation, registration and certification services and association policing to 
ensure the integrity of a secure communication between two users throughout the 
duration of that association. In section 2.3. the reasons for the denial of service problem 
having been largely ignored in the past were suggested. The introduction of the SMC 
as a trusted third party goes a long way towards solving this problem, because the 
association may be supervised dynamically to allow for changing quality of service 
throughout the duration of the association. In a large system with users hosted on a 
local SMC, the SMC authenticates the local CSS processor and the local CSS processor 
authenticates the user. The control of the system in this way by the SMCs develops a 
trusted path across the system from SMC to end user, thus ensuring that system misuse 
is minimised or eliminated with the advantage that peripheral hardware and software 
need not itself be trusted, see section 2.6. Should the SMC supervisory functions detect 
that the association has been disrupted beyond that attributable to poor service quality, 
then it may be reasonable to infer that a possible denial of service attack may be in 
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progress. Under these conditions, the SMC wil l clear down the association in a 
controlled manner, conducting what amounts to a damage limitation exercise. At worst, 
therefore, the availability of the system wi l l be compromised and not its integrity. 
A l l operations within the network that involve security wil l be controlled by the local 
SMC(s) and direct association with them be made via the local CSS hardware and the 
OSI channel. Each SMC fully controls a number of user terminals hosted upon it, 
determining authentication, general user access rights and privileges which the SMC 
holds in its Security Management Information Base (SMIB). Secure communication 
across the network would involve: 
1. protocols linking each end user terminal to the host SMC; 
2. protocols linking SMC to SMC. 
The system would provide full flexibility of services irrespective of the location of the 
user within the network. 
Since the agents comprising the CSS need not physically reside in one location but may 
be distributed throughout the system, fully distributed implementations require additional 
encryption services to protect data between remote agents or parts of agents. In purely 
local systems where the entire CSS resides in a tamper-proof module, such additional 
protocols are not necessary. Figure 5.2. shows an example of the SMC concept. 
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Figure 5.2. The SMC Concept 
5.5. The Protocols between Agents 
The agents of the CSS described earlier communicate amongst each other by means of 
protocols. By their nature, these protocols must be as secure as the functions of the 
agents they facilitate communication between. One of the main problems associated with 
security models is the existence of the coven channel. A covert channel is a conceptual 
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or logical path for information that can only be observed in the sense that it may be 
possible to duplicate their operation, but they cannot be explicitly monitored. The most 
promising way to overcome these difficulties lies wiih^use of cryptographic protocols. 
As described in section 5.4. the protocols are used to build up a trusted path between 
end users. The protocols of the CSS may be considered to form a three layer hierarchy: 
1. Global protocols between SMCs; 
2. Local protocols between the local SMC and the hosted users; 
3. Internal protocols between agents of the CSS. 
This distinction is purely logical and in practice all protocols are, of course, inter-agent 
protocols. The hierarchical approach, however, makes the description o f the protocols 
easier in the same way that a high-level discussion of security services can be carried 
out without reference to the underlying mechanisms that facilitate their operation. The 
research described in this thesis covers (b) and (c) above. There are a number of 
protocols, but many are common to all agent interactions. 
The fundamental protocol of the CSS is authentication. A l l transactions between agents 
require authentication before data exchange can commence because each agent must be 
assured that it is in fact communicating with a genuine user or peer and is not being 
deceived by an impostor. Many protocols for authentication have been described in the 
literature [SEBE,1988] and have been tried with varying degrees of success. The 
authentication protocol chosen for authentication between agents in the CSS and its 
formal analysis are discussed fully in Chapter 6. 
Other protocols used by the CSS include those for key distribution, which allows end 
users confidently to share a secret session key and hence set up a secure association 
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between themselves (supervised by the SMC). This protocol is also described along 
with a formal validation in Chapter 6. 
Conceptually, the CSS protocols are generated in exactly the same way as the security 
mechanisms. Indeed, the provision of the underlying cryptographic functions is the main 
application of the security mechanisms. A confidence in the security of the 
cryptographic algorithms used, however, is no guarantee of the strength o f the protocol. 
It is alarmingly easy to devise protocols based on very secure ciphers whose logic is 
faulty and which are all but useless in practice. While it may be possible to detect 
glaring errors by inspection, the more subtle loopholes wi l l nearly always remain 
undetected unless a rigorous analytical tool can be applied to verify all the logical 
security aspects of the protocol. This is the purpose of the formal system described in 
Chapter 6. 
5,6. Basic Implementation 
Using the ideas developed in connection with the concepts, agents and protocols of a 
Comprehensive Security System, a practical system has been implemented using a Novell 
Ethernet L A N comprising three IBM Personal Computers configured as an SMC and two 
user nodes. This minimum configuration is sufficient to model and test: 
1. the cryptographic algorithms; 
2. the user to SMC protocols; 
3. the inter-agent protocols; 
4. the communications interface. 
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It does not provide for a demonstration of SMC to SMC protocols. It is envisaged that 
future research would include the connection of the L A N to a remote end system, 
possibly via a national W A N , so that these protocols could be tested as well. The basic 
communication paths within a local CSS processor are shown in Figure 5.3. 
5.6.1. The CSS Hardware and Software 
The CSS hardware for the demonstration system is quite simple but very effective. The 
purpose of the secure hardware is to force the terminal to boot into the CSS software 
system and prevent any attempts to disable this occurrence. The design of the PC 
firmware allows for the existence of extension ROM adapters which can initialise certain 
system operations during the power on self test (POST) sequence. This sequence is 
automatic and cannot be aborted and takes place before any disk drives are addressed or 
even recognised by the system. The normal use of the ROM adapters is to allow for the 
replacement of default system hardware such as video drivers by upgraded units to allow 
for system enhancement. The CSS hardware uses this facility for a novel purpose. 
The unit comprises of an installable ROM adapter memory mapped into the 8086 address 
space at segment $D800 which is unused by the vast majority of PCs. The circuit 
diagram of the hardware and source code of the ROM firmware is given in Annex 1. 
Due to the formal of the ROM firmware header, during the POST sequence the ROM 
is located and execution is passed to it. The ROM then carries out several actions, 
namely it: 
1 issues a title banner proclaiming that the computer is under the control of 
the CSS; 
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2. disconnects all the floppy disk drives in software by redirecting the 
appropriate interrupt vectors and installing a hardware based interrupt 
handler which simply flags disk read errors and returns; 
3. forces boot from fixed disk. 
When the system boots from the fixed disk, the CONFIG.SYS is executed; again, this 
process cannot be aborted. The first command in the CONFIG.SYS file is to a device 
driver that requires a password to be entered before boot wil l continue. When the 
password is successfully entered, the interrupt vectors hooked by the ROM hardware are 
rechained, restoring the functionality of the floppy drives. In this way, the CSS 
hardware/software has authenticated the user and so a trusted path exists between the 
CSS and the user. 
When user authentication is complete, the CSS kernel is executed, again via a device 
driver, and system startup continues to the familiar C : \ > prompt. The installation of 
the local CSS software module cannot therefore be circumvented without physically 
opening the computer and removing the card. 
5.6.2. The API for the PC System 
As stated in the discussion of the conceptual model, the specific design of the 
Application Program Interface (API) is largely dependent on the host system. In the PC 
implementation, the host operating system is MS DOS and the API was designed 
accordingly. The API is complex and the complete software interface is included on the 
floppy diskette accompanying the thesis. 
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The CSS was written as an application layer memory-resident software module in Pascal 
and 8086 assembler with interrupt vectors controlling requests to operating system 
functions. In addition, the CSS monitors its own interrupt, which is used for passing 
security oriented requests to the CSS kernel. This distinction is necessary because the 
API of the CSS is designed so that the CSS can be invoked in one of three ways: 
1. the user can press a hot-key combination to activate the CSS directly. In 
this mode, the user can request a number of services directly, such as 
authentication at the start of a secure session on the terminal, or direct 
encryption of a file he wishes to transfer to floppy disk and send through 
the post; 
2. the foreground application can request security services o f the CSS via 
a software interrupt reserved for the purpose. This would be used, for 
example, in part of a secure e-mail package which required the services 
of encryption mechanisms under the control of the CSS; 
3. the CSS monitors all system requests for operating system services which 
may affect the security of the system. These include such services as file 
I/O, port control and execution privilege. 
It is important to note that the first two modes are voluntary, that is, the security 
services are available purely on a request by request basis, with no requirement to 
actually make use of the services offered. The third mode is compulsory and cannot be 
circumvented by the system. 
For example, in the demonstration system, all files have additional attributes specifying 
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their security level as logical system objects. A l l file I/O requests are monitored by the 
CSS. Should an application, such as a text editor, attempt to open a file, the CSS 
intercepts the DOS request and determines whether the user has sufficient privilege for 
the operation. It can determine this in one of two ways. Firstly, i f the application is 
purely local, access authorisation data to the object may be held in the local SMIB. I f 
so, the CSS can check the capabilities of the subject user and grant access without 
reference to external authority. I f the data is not held locally, however, the local CSS 
processor establishes contact with the SMC via the L A N , where the main SMIB is held. 
The CSS consults the SMIB which holds the rights and privileges of all the system 
subjects. I f the capability of the subject is equal or superior to the classification of an 
object then the operation is permitted. I f not, the operation is denied. The above 
description assumes that the user has voluntarily accessed the CSS at the start of the 
terminal session, and identified and authenticated himself to the system. I f he has not 
done this, then on the first occurrence of identification/authentication being required, the 
CSS wi l l suspend execution of the foreground application, and open a window requiring 
the user to identify/authenticate himself. Connection is then made with the SMC and 
SMIB as before, and authentication proceeds. I f the user is accepted, the CSS closes the 
window and resumes execution of the foreground task. It is possible that the relevant 
data is not held in the SMIB of the local SMC. This may occur as a result of the user 
normally being hosted on another SMC and being a guest on the local system. In this 
case, the local SMC would request the necessary data from the remote SMC via an SMC 
to SMC protocol, although such protocols are not implemented on the demonstration 
system. 
The PC CSS API is implemented as a series of interrupt handlers to monitor software 
interrupt activity. In this way, calls to the operating system can be monitored as well 
as providing a convenient, address independent way of calling functions directly from 
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the CSS itself. These are: 
1. INT $E0 which is an unallocated interrupt, and is used to pass voluntary 
requests from application processes to the CSS kernel for security 
services. The parameters associated with the request are built into a 
formalised data structure, and the service request code is placed in the 
A H register in accordance with 8086 software interrupt calling 
conventions. Software interrupt SEO is then called, and the CSS, 
monitoring the interrupt, intercepts the request and acts accordingly; 
2. INT $09 which is the keyboard hardware interrupt is monitored for the 
hot-key combination. I f the user has pressed the hot-key to invoke the 
CSS voluntarily, a window is opened to receive user data; 
3. INT $21 which is the MS DOS function despatcher. The CSS monitors 
the A H register on entry for operating system service requests of interest, 
and acts accordingly upon them. Requests which are not of interest are 
to 
simply passed on the operating system. The monitoring o f this interrupt 
is the compulsory component of the CSS activity and in effect categorises 
this aspect of CSS activity as a security kernel standing between 
applications and the operating system. 
By way of example, the code for one of the INT $21 handlers is shown overleaf with 
detailed comments. The source code for the CSS is large and the rest o f the code may 
be found on the floppy disk bound within the master copy of this thesis. 
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(* Set up memory requirements for interrupt handlers *) 
{$V-} 
{$M 20000,0,0} 
{ $ F + } 
(* Watch for any operating system requests for the FILE OPEN Junction, This Junction 
is always the precursor for any Jile read/write operations under MS DOS *) 
PROCEDURE Int210pen (VAR IntRegs : IntRegisters); 
begin 
WITH Intregs DO 
begin 
(* get the filename to be opened from the DS:DX reg pair *) 
OFile : = " ; 
i : = 0 ; 
REPEAT 
OFile : = OFile + char (Mem [DS:DX + i ] ) ; 
Inc (i); 
UNTIL Mem [DS:DX + i] = $0; 
end; { with Intregs do } 
end; 
This is the main Int $21 Handler which traps ALL DOS operating system lO requests. 
The handler checks the operation for''security-oriented implications, and calls CSS 
services as appropriate *) 
PROCEDURE Monitor (BP: word); INTERRUPT; 
VAR \ 
IntRegs : IntRegisters absolute BP; 
begin 
InterruptsOff; 
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r This part of the handler looks for DOS function $3D which is file open. If the handler 
is awake and the user has not already authenticated himself to the CSS then 
authentication services are required and called *) 
IF (IntRegs.AH = $3D) AND (Awake) A N D (NOT Already Authenticated) THEN 
begin 
OurlntStackPtr : = ©OurlntStack [SizeOf (OurlntStack)]; 
SwapStackAndCall (@Int210pen,0urIntStackPtr,IntRegs); 
end; 
rechain to the old INT $21 vector after use *) 
InterruptsOn; 
Chainint (IntRegs, ISR_Array [MonitorHandle].OrigAddr); 
end; 
{$F-} 
5.6.3. Management of the SMIB data 
In the demonstration system, the SMIB data is held at the SMC which is the network file 
server. We have chosen to require the system manager to be physically present at this 
machine when amending or updating data in the SMIB. It is common practice to keep 
the network file server in a physically secure and conducive environment, such as a 
locked, air-conditioned compartment. While it would be quite simple to allow a higher 
level of system privilege at one of the user workstations to allow the system manager to 
log on with system privileges and amend the SMIB data remotely, this was not done as 
the additional security afforded by the physical access constraints to the SMC is 
consistent with the high security status of the system. 
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5.6.4. Secure Communication across the L A N 
The PC implementation encrypts data over the L A N using the Quadratic Residue Cipher 
(QRC). A detailed exposition on the operation of this cipher can be found in 
[SHEP, 1990a] and a copy of this paper is bound into the thesis for convenience. 
Realistic security is used with large integer arithmetic being carried out by carefully 
optimised assembler routines. Even allowing for the fast software however, the cipher 
is slow, taking around '/4 second per character for 200 digit keys. Factoring such 
numbers is way beyond the capability of current technology (on the order of 15 million 
years) and can be considered quite safe for all practical purposes, see section 6.4. A 
hardware module is being developed which will implement the fundamental arithmetic 
operations in hardware, and will serve as a general-purpose 'cryptographic engine'. I t 
is expected that use of this hardware and wi l l considerably speed up the ciphering 
operations [SHEP, 1990a]. 
The CSS communication software is written in a modular form to allow easy amendment 
for different network systems. The Ethernet card in a PC can be considered as 
providing the OSI stack up to layer 3 but with some of the transport functions of layer 
4 as well. The CSS itself is an application entity and its only interface with OSI is with 
the presentation layer. Clearly, in a completely homogeneous system such as a PC 
L A N , there wil l be no syntactical differences in data representation across platforms and 
so normal data tra/Tsfer takes place across the presentation layer (see section 3.3.3.). 
Thus, in order to preserve the integrity of the OSI model, the CSS contains null 
presentation and session layer modules and in fact passes data via these to the transport 
layer interface of the Ethernet card. The internal data communications o f the local CSS 
processor are shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3. Agent Communication within a Local CSS Processor 
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5.6.5. Other Security Measures 
The system also implements the following features: 
1. timeout after a pre-determined period wi l l clear down the connection with 
the SMC, and place the CSS kernel in a dormant mode. This avoids the 
possibility of a user logging onto a terminal, making a successful 
association with the SMC, and then inadvertently leaving the terminal 
unattended, allowing an unauthorised person to carry out operation for 
which he is not privileged; 
2. an audit file of system activity is maintained at the SMC for system 
integrity auditing purposes; 
3. the association is continually supervised by the SMC. A brief research 
program into the identification of users from their individual typing 
characteristics was carried out. Although an analysis of a short fragment 
is inconclusive, it is possible to make a continuous assessment of the style 
of typing, and hence possibly identify a change of user part way through 
a session. The preliminary results of this research are detailed in 
[SHEP, 1990b]. 
5.6.6. Limitations on the PC Demonstration System 
The system as currently implemented suffers from the following shortcomings: 
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1. the agents functions in the CSS software were written for procedural 
convenience and are not completely functionally divided into separate 
modules as recommended in the conceptual model. This makes changing 
the function of a particular agent more difficult than it u^ould be in a 
totally modularised implementation, but allow a substantial reuse of code 
and hence a less memory-hungry system. Memory requirements of 
resident software are very important with the limited menriory available 
in a PC and the size of modem foreground applications. In a realistic 
system, presumably written and maintained by a large number of 
programmers, it is very important to modularise the software as described 
to allow independent function development and maintenance; 
2. the encryption/decryption times would need to be significantly improved, 
as sending a large file with the present system would be prohibitively 
slow; 
3. in a completely secure system, it would be necessary to monitor and 
control other interrupts as well. For example, the system timeout is 
dependent on the data read from the real-time system clock. To 
circumvent the timeout function, a user could keep resetting the clock 
every few minutes, to deceive the CSS into believing that no time had 
passed. It would be necessary to monitor and control interrupt $1A, 
which controls the setting and reading of the real-time clock. The CSS 
would then make resetting the clock a privileged operation. (The notion 
of timeliness and the systems beliefs about time are critical for the 
analysis described in Chapter 6); 
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the demonstration system comprises only of a single SMC and two users. 
The system cannot therefore demonstrate and validate inter-SMC 
protocols. 
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6. A NEW ANALYSIS M E T H O D O L O G Y 
6.1 . The Need for a Problem Reduction Technique 
As discussed in section 4.8. the major difficulty with any analysis of a large system with 
many parameters and variables is the scale of the problem. To define precisely the 
system state at any time in terms of every possible variable presents problems of 
combinatoric complexity which are impossible to overcome. In any case, analysis of this 
sort is not very useful for the CSS application. By way of a loose analogy, it is possible 
(in theory) to define the thermodynamic state of a closed system by recording the 
position and momentum of every particle, but it is far easier and more useful just to 
record the temperature! 
The security analysis methodology described in this thesis, therefore, is based 
fundamentally on the ability to reduce a very complex sequence of operations to a much 
simpler set of parameters which are capable of measurement and analysis. 
The basic design principle which wil l admit the sort of analysis described is based on 
the decomposition of the entire CSS software into a few very small units. A l l the 
security aspects of the CSS wil l be capable of being built up from these units, albeit 
large numbers of them. Each unit is based on very simple mathematical functions which 
are combined to yield other functions with secure properties, trapdoor functions. Each 
of these functions is rigorously analysed in terms of security, based upon the complexity 
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underlying certain problems in number theory currently believed to be intractable, When 
each is validated, it is placed in a conceptual 'library' where it can be called when 
required. Any functions built out of the validated units wi l l themselves be secure, and 
thus a layered approach to the construction of the security functionality can be taken. 
The security functionality comprises two parts. The validated units are combined to 
produce: 
1. Data Manipulation Mechanisms (DMM) such as encryption algorithms 
to allow security transformations to take place on the data; 
2. Protocol Generation Mechanisms (PGM) such as authentication 
protocols to allow the agents of the CSS to communicate with each other 
in a secure manner. 
The analysis methodology to be described therefore also comprises of two parts: 
1. a recursive logic is used to monitor and supervise the sequencing of the 
validated D M M and PGM units which generate the security functionality; 
2. a modified Hoare logic is used to validate the security o f the protocols 
generated as a result of the operations described in (1). 
Each aspect of the CSS security functionality is firstly decomposed into functional 
blocks. This is carried out for each security function the CSS wi l l be called upon to 
be 
perform. Many of the blocks wi l l - t^ common to most, i f not all, of the functions and 
hence a very efficient and compact system results. When the blocks are determined, 
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they are placed in a secure function 'library'. This may be a true software library in the 
case of a pure software implementation or may comprise of physical hardware 
mechanisms in the case of a hardware implementation. To add a new function to the 
CSS, it is merely necessary to decompose the function and add the new blocks to the 
library, although in practice all the necessary blocks may already be present. To 
implement a function, the blocks are sequenced in the correct order. In this way, both 
mechanisms and protocols can be generated. The sequencing is very important to the 
security of the CSS and so the sequencing data is held in the SMTB. The approach to 
the design and analysis is illustrated schematically in Figure 6.1. 
CSS Func-tlonallty 
functional 
blocks 
I volrda'ted, 
Secure 
Function 
Library 
SEQUENCING SYSTEM 
Selection oF 
functions 
DATA MANIPULATION PRDTDCDL GENERATION 
T 7 
Valida-ted by RECURSIVE LOGIC Valida-ted by MODIFIED HDARE LOGIC 
Figure 6.1. Approach to the Design and Analysis of the CSS 
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6.2. A Problem Decomposition Methodologv 
The problem decomposition methodology used for the CSS relies on breaking down the 
security functionality into layers of state machines. Each layer comprises of nodes 
which are the roots of trees in the layers beneath. The correct enforcement and 
monitoring of the sequencing of these machines is critically important to the analysis 
methodology. Unless the rules of n-ary tree structures are rigidly observed, the analysis 
breaks down. From these simple trees, all the mathematical functions and software 
control structures required by the CSS can be derived, and hence the zmalysis can be 
applied not only to the semantic correctness but also to the functional correctness of the 
system. These structures, as they apply to the <malysis methodology, are now 
introduced. 
6.2.1. Binary Tree Functional Decomposition 
Consider a general abstract function that can be functionally separated into two parts, 
fM = g(x).h(x). This may be represented by the binary tree shown in Figure 6.2. 
It may be that one of the component functions, say h(x) can itself be logically broken 
down into two functions, say l(x)J(x). The tree would then take the form shown in 
Figure 6.3. The vertex of the tree is conventionally called the root and the end nodes 
are ccilled the leaves. Note that a tree can only branch out, and can never branch 'back 
together*. Figure 6.4. shows some arrangements which are not trees. In a tree, every 
subordinate node is drawn below its superior, that is, there are no horizontal lines in the 
diagrams. A branch is described as entering a node i f it comes from above. I t is 
described as leaving i f it goes to a subordinate node. I f a branch leaves node A and 
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enters node B, node B is referred to as the offspring of A. Node A is the parent of B, 
A node of one tree may be regarded as the root of another tree - a tree within a tree. 
The tree of which an intermediate node is the root is called a subtree^ see Figure 6.5. 
RDDT 
BRANCHES 
L E A V E S 
Figure 6.2. A Simple Binary Tree with Two Leaves 
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RDDT 
LEAVES 
Figure 6.3. A Simple Binary Tree with Three Leaves 
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Figure 6.4. Binary Combinations which are not Trees 
SUB-TREE 
Figure 6.5. A Tree Containing a Sub-Tree 
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6.2.2. n-ary Tree Functional Decomposition 
There is no reason why, in general, a tree should be restricted to only two branches per 
node. It is possible to have trees where each node has n branches, or even the most 
general tree where each node can have an arbitrary number of branches, see Figure 6.6. 
Null n o d e 
Figure 6.6. A General Tree with Arbitrary Numbers of Branches 
Note that it is possible for the tree not to actually 'branch out' at a node, but simply 
have one branch entering and one branch leaving. In this research, such a node is 
designated a null node. It is upon the structure and properties of this general tree that 
the CSS design is based. 
Each node in the general tree can represent a /unction of arbitrary complexity. A 
function has one or more arguments as its input and one or more returns as its output. 
In keeping with standard mathematical notation, the input argument or arguments are 
written on the right hand side of the function; the output result or results are written on 
the left of the function, for example: 
y 
return 
SQUARE ROOT OF 
function 
X 
argument 
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This idea, as applied to trees, is illustrated in Figure 6.7. 
FUNCTIDN 
RETURN 
•UTPUT 
FUNCTIDN 
ARGUMENT<S) 
INPUT 
Figure 6.7. Conventions for Arguments and Returns of Functions 
The importance of the notation is its generality. The function may be a programmed 
algorithm, a statement in a non-procedural language, a program or subroutine 
specification, or a broad general set of requirements such as 
CURRY PREPARE-MEAL (Ingredients, Utensils) 
Using general trees, the complex sequences of data transformations that comprise the 
functionality of the CSS are broken down into simpler functions. This process is 
repealed until the functions cannot be simplified further. At this stage we say they are 
atomic, and the very basic units are called atoms, see section 6.3.1. Once the 
functionality has been totally decomposed into atoms, the design can be implemented 
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from the bottom-up. Recalling that the atoms are combined only in ways that can be 
shown to satisfy security constraints, a layered set of secure functions can be constructed 
that wil l carry out the required functionality in a rigorous manner. 
6.2.3. Control Structures and Dynamic Graph Representation 
The decomposition of a function into sub-functions (or offspring) is achieved in a 
rigorous manner by means of control structures [MART, 1982]. Three structures are 
defined, called join, include and or. Each of these serves a different purpose, depending 
on how the function lends itself to decomposition, and are illustrated in Figure 6.8. 
together with the dynamic graph representation of the structure. The graph is a 
projection of the tree representation, and may be annotated with timing information and 
so forth. While the tree diagram shows how the function is decomposed, the graph 
shows the order and chronology of the decomposition. 
JOIN 
Let f(x) be a function that requires two operations that must be performed sequentially 
on the argument, and that the order is important. This is commonly found in such cases 
as: 
y = ix-\- 3)2 
It is the brackets which denote the order of the two operations. The addition must be 
performed first, then the squaring performed on the resulting sum. I f the squaring is 
done first, the result is always x + 9. 
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INCLUDE 
In this case, let f(x,y) be a process with two arguments and two returns, but which are 
independent of each other. This may involve adding a quantity to one and squaring the 
other. Dynamically, this kind of function cannot be performed sequentially, because 
both operations would be performed on both arguments. Conceptually, the operations 
happen independently and in parallel, and in practice could be implemented on separate 
processors in a parallel architecture machine. 
OR 
This final control structure takes account of functions where the operation to be 
performed is conditional upon the value of one of the arguments. 
The three simple control structures considered so far can be combined into four 
somewhat more complex control structures, which offer greater flexibility in the 
decomposition process. The additional structures, again following the notation of 
[MART, 1982], are called CO-JOIN, CO-INCLUDE, CO-OR and CONCUR. The 
architecture of these four structures is shown both in tree form and in dynamic graph 
form in Figure 6.9. 
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Figure 6.8. The Join, Include and Or Control Structures 
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Figure 6.9. The Co-Join, Co-Fnclude, Co-Or and Concur Control Structures 
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6.2,4. Recursion and Loops 
Consider the evaluation of a factorial, written n\. 
n! = n{n- l ) (n - 2) 1, where n > 0. 
We can use the following recursion for the calculation: 
Factorial (n) = n. Factorial 
The function y = Factorial (/z-1) can be expressed in the tree diagram notation as 
shown in Figure 6.10a. To create the recursion, however, we require a stopping 
condition, that is, when n = 0. (If n = 0 then 0! = 1 by definition). An OR 
expression may be used as the control structure to stop the recursion, see Figure 6.10b. 
Combining the simple function with the control structure yields the complete 
decomposition of the factorial function as shown in Figure 6.11. In this way, software 
constructs which are recursive can be expressed in the notation, and the element of 
control required for rigorous analysis of their execution can be expressed through 
combinations of the seven control structures described in the previous section. 
In addition to recursion, programs commonly contain two types of loop. These are the 
DO W H I L E and REPEAT U N T I L constructs. A DO W H I L E loop tests whether a 
particular condition is true at the start of the loop, whereas a REPEAT U N T I L loop 
tests whether a certain condition is true at the end of the loop. In many applications, a 
particular requirement can be programmed using either construct, but the important 
difference between the two is that the REPEAT U N T I L loop wil l always be executed 
at least once, because the condition for looping is not tested until exit f rom the loop. 
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Some applications require the possibility of executing the loop zero times, and in these 
cases the DO W H I L E construct is the only possibility open. 
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Figure 6.10a. Tree Representation for the Factorial Function 
n = n-1 
1 
(n = 0) = f a l s e 
y = f (n) 
y = n! 
(n = 0) = t r u e 
y = 1 
Figure 6.10b. Stopping the Factorial Recursion 
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Figure 6.11. The Complete Factorial Function with Control Structure 
6.3. The CSS State-Machine Sequence Reduction Logic 
The reduction methodology described in the previous section can now be applied to the 
analysis of the CSS, using a hierarchical set of sequence definitions at a number of 
layers. The topmost layer within the CSS is the security service to be performed, while 
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the lowest layer is comprised of the atoms, which are a small number o f fundamental 
mathematical operations which can be performed on data, supplemented with a hardware 
real-time clock and any other non-mathematical hardware functions such as DES as 
required. Between these extremes, a number of other layers are defined. The complete 
hierarchical structure is defined as follows, 
LAYER 1 SERVICES 
LAYER 2 MECHANISMS 
LAYER 3 COMPONENTS 
LAYER 4 ATOMS 
(Conceptually, a layer OconXd be included to represent the overall security management 
function. This is embodied in the security policy from which the need for security 
services are determined.) The central idea behind the reduction technique is that of a 
bonom-up approach. By starting at the lowest layer, the atom layer, with a small 
number of provably secure data operations, the proof of security can be abstracted at 
higher and higher levels until the security service itself is shown to be secure. 
Outside the physical boundaries of the CSS itself, the analysis can be extended from the 
security services to the security policy, and that policy provably analysed. The layers 
within the CSS are described in turn, starting with the lowest layer. 
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6.3.1. The Atom Layer 
Ultimately, every operation performed by the CSS can be constructed entirely from a 
small number of basic atoms. These are: 
1. a real-time clock; 
2. an implementation of five basic mathematical operations: 
(a) Addition ( + ) ; 
(b) Subtraction (-); 
(c) Multiplication (*); 
(d) Integer Division to leave the remainder (MOD); 
(e) Integer Division to leave the quotient (DIV); 
3. a number of non-mathematical functions such as the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES), the Fast Encryption Algorithm (FEAL) and so forth i f 
required, implemented in either software or hardware. 
The five basic mathematical operations are combined to form the modular exponentiation 
(MOD-EXP) function 
f(a,m,x) = fl* (mod m) 
This function may be efficiently implemented in software using the repeated squares 
method [KOBL,1987,p.22], or may be even more efficiently implemented in hardware 
by other methods [MORI, 1989]. 
166 
6.3.2. The Component Layer 
The modular exponentiation operator (MOD_EXP), together with the five basic 
mathematical operators, hardware real-time clock and other hardware/software atoms, 
are used by the Security Mechanism Agent (SMA) to construct a number o f components: 
1. time stamp generation, using real-time clock; 
2. prime number generation by Rabin's algorithm [KNUT,1981], using 
MOD-EXP and basic function primitives; 
3. random number generation by mod n generator [ B L U M , 1986], using 
MOD-EXP; 
4. Euclid's algorithm [RIES,1987], using basic function primitives; 
5. Euclid's extended algorithm [KNUT,1981], using basic function 
primitives. 
While this list does not exhaustively cover all the algorithms which may be constructed 
from the primitives, it contains all the necessary and sufficient algorithms required to 
implement the services performed by the prototype CSS. 
6.3.3. The Mechanism Layer 
These five components are combined by the Security Mechanism Agent to produce the 
security mechanisms required by the CSS, which are: 
1. RSA [RIVE, 1977] Key Generation, using prime number generation and 
Euclid's algorithm; 
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2. block encryption with RSA, using MOD-EXP; 
3. block decryption with RSA. using MOD-EXP; 
4. QRC [SHEP, 1990a] Key Generation, using Prime Number Generation 
and Euclid's extended algorithm; 
5. stream encryption with QRC, using MOD-EXP; 
6. stream decryption with QRC, using MOD-EXP and Euclid's extended 
algorithm; 
7. digital signature with RSA, using MOD-EXP; 
8. hash (digest) [ISO,X.509] with X.509, using MOD-EXP; 
9. encryption with symmetrical algorithms such as DES, FEAL. using the 
hardware/software atoms directly. 
Again, this list is not exhaustive, but covers all the mechanisms used by the CSS. 
6.3.4. The Service Layer 
The SSA uses the mechanisms to provide the services required of the CSS. These 
include those services recommended in 7498-2 and include, 
1. confidentiality; 
2. authentication; 
3. non-repudiation; 
4.. integrity; 
5. access control; 
6. denial of service. 
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Note that (6) is an exception. It is only possible to detect denial of service attacks; it 
is not possible to stop them. 
6.4. The Fundamental Security Assumptions 
The reference point for the logical analysis of the formal security proofs is the set of 
initial beliefs about the system to be analysed. Implicit in these beliefs are certain 
assumptions which are made concerning the strength of the encryption and other data 
transformation functions used by the security services. Because these (and every other 
mechanism within the CSS) are constructed from sequences of atoms, certain 
assumptions concerning the security of the atoms from which the entire security 
framework is ultimately constructed are also crucial to the security analysis methodology 
of the CSS. The zmalysis relies on a combination of physical security (which is, in turn, 
a function of the implementation), the accepted validity of algorithms such as DES which 
have been exhaustively tested, and most importantly, two central problems in number 
theory which are curremly believed to be intractable. These are the factoring problem 
and the discrete logarithm problem, and both apply to the important MOD_EXP atom, 
which is the most important building block of most of the mechanisms. These two 
problems and other closely related ideas are discussed under the general subject of trap-
door functions [YAO, 1982]. A trapdoor function is one where the computation of the 
function is trivial, but computation of the inverse function is intractable without 
knowledge of a secret parameter, the so-called trapdoor. In the case o f MOD-EXP, it 
is trivial to calculate y = y{fl,m,;c) = a* (mod m) but intractable for large arguments to 
calculate the inverse. It is important to gain an idea of the theoretical time complexity 
estimates for the running times of algorithms which may be constructed to pose an attack 
on the security of the CSS. 
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It must be emphasised that, in common with all security systems using public key 
ciphers and other devices relying on these number theoretic problems, the absolute 
security of the encryption can never be guaranteed, because while no-one has yet 
published a polynomial-time factoring algorithm, no-one has succeeded in proving that 
no such algorithm exists. I f such an algorithm were ever discovered, one of the 
fundamental beliefs about the system would be shown to be false, and therefore any 
conclusion drawn about the system security may also be false. It is imjjcrtant to note 
that this in no way undermines the analysis methodology, the main aim o f which is the 
extension and abstraction of notions concerning beliefs about the initial system state to 
draw valid conclusions about the final system state, see section 6.9. 
Individually, the dependence of the atoms, components and mechanisms on these 
principles is: 
1. a real-time clock circuit encapsulated within a tamper-proof hardware 
module; 
2. the RSA cipher relying upon the intractability of both the factoring 
problem and the discrete logarithm problem; 
3. the QRC cipher relying only upon the intractability o f the factoring 
problem [BLUM,1989]; 
4. the X.509 digest relying upon the difficulty of both the factoring problem 
and the discrete logarithm problem. 
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6.4.1. The Factoring Problem 
The factoring problem defines the vast apparent difference between the amount of effort 
involved in multiplying some (prime) numbers together, compared with the effort 
involved in factoring the resulting product back into its prime factors. There are many 
factoring algorithms known which range from very simple but highly inefficient methods 
such as trial division through to highly sophisticated, special-purpose algorithms which 
rely on deep concepts in higher algebraic number theory. 
The fastest general-purpose factoring algorithm so far devised is the multiple polynomial 
quadratic sieve (mpqs), which holds the record for the largest general factorisations so 
far carried out using a Cray XMP at the Sandia National Laboratories [DAVI,1985]. 
The expected heuristic running time of this algorithm is [POLL, 1989] 
O {exp [cV{ln N Inln N)]} 
where a bound on the value of c is not known. Given the fact that a 75 digit number 
can be factorised in about 10 hours with this algorithm (on the Cray), i t is reasonable 
to conjecture that the factoring time for a 100 digit number would be around 2 months, 
and that for a 200 digit number to be around 75 million yearsl 
Certain special purpose algorithms have been devised which can factor numbers of 
special form very much more rapidly than the general purpose algorithms. These 
include Lenstra's Elliptic Curve method (ecm) [LENS, 1986] which exploits the very rich 
group structure of elliptic curves, and Pollard's Number Field Sieve (nfs) [POLL, 1989] 
which uses complex ideas of algebraic integers over suitably extended fields whose 
degree depends on the structure of the integer to be factored. The expected heuristic 
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running time for the elliptic curve algorithm is exactly the same as that for the mpqs. 
Indeed, theoretical consideration of the distribution of primes and corollaries of the 
prime number theorem had led to the widely held belief that it was not possible to 
improve on running times of this order [POLL, 1989]. 
The significance of the number field sieve, which is suitable at present only for numbers 
of the form r ' ± j for r and s sufficiently small, is that Pollard has shown it to have 
an expected heuristic running time of 
O {exp [c + e(/n Nf'^Qnln N)^' ']} 
where the value of c is around 1.526. This is considerably faster than hitherto thought 
possible, and effectively disproves the previously believed lower bound. Work is 
currently underway to try to extend the nfs to general integers [ADLE,199I] . I f this 
proves possible, and the running time remains of the same order, then a significant 
advance will have been made in this area. The running time is, however, still 
exponential, and could be defeated simply by increasing the key size. The amount of 
extra work involved in using the larger keys grows only polynomially, but the factoring 
effort grows exponentially. It is thus always possible to 'outrun' an exponential 
algorithm by increasing the size of the problem instance. 
It is clear that with the current knowledge of number theory, the factoring problem may 
be regarded as intractable for sufficiently large N, and hence that the belief in the 
security of mechanisms based on this problem is sound. 
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6.4.2. The Discrete Logarithm problem. 
A logarithm is generally defined as the power to which it is necessary to raise a base in 
order to obtain a specified quantity. Within the field of real numbers, it is not 
appreciably more difficult to evaluate x = \og^ y than to evaluate y = c". The discrete 
logarithm extends this idea to finite (discrete) fields, and the discrete logarithm problem 
defines the vast apparent difference between the amount of effort involved in raising a 
number to a power in a finite field as compared with the effort involved in determining 
the power given the discrete logarithm. That is, it is easy to calculate 
3^  = fl" (mod g) 
given a,x and q (for prime q and a a primitive element of the field), but very difficult, 
given y,a and q to evaluate x. 
Uq= p" is an odd prime power which is k bits long, experience suggests that the order 
of magnitude of time required to solve an instance of the discrete logarithm problem in 
¥ \ is comparable to that required to factor a k-bil integer [KOBL,1987]. That is, from 
an empirical point of view, the discrete logarithm problem seems to be about as hard as 
the factoring problem (although no-one has been able to prove a theorem to this effect). 
It appears, therefore, that the discrete logarithm problem, for sufficiently large integers, 
may be considered a secure device, and again, any beliefs concerning the security of 
mechanisms based on this problem are sound. 
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6,5. Hierarchical Sequence Structure 
Essentially, every security service can be broken down into a long sequence of simple 
operations on data variables. As described, these sequences are divided into different 
layers. The sequences defined within each layer may be regarded as finite state 
machines, which may call finite state machines in the layer below (as procedures or 
functions, with or without arguments), and be called by finite state machines in the layer 
above (again, as procedures or functions, with or without arguments). As long as the 
sequences defining the security services are carried out properly (that is, in the correct 
sequence and within specified time constraints) then the CSS can be shown to securely 
implement the desired security service. 
The sequencing data for each of the services capable of being carried out by the CSS is 
stored within the Security Management Information Base (SMIB) of the CSS. Upon 
receipt of a service request across the API, the External Environment Agent (EEA) wi l l 
route the control data header to the SSA and the process data to the CSS internal data 
bus, see Figure 5.3. The SSA will consult the SMIB via the SMIBA to determine the 
sequence of operations which need to be called in order to achieve the desired service, 
i f allowed. At the start of the service, the status registers of the state machines will be 
cleared. As each operation is called in turn and completed successfully, the completion 
status bit is set in the status register. The M A supervises the sequencing by comparing 
the SMIB sequencing data with the status registers to determine the progress of the 
service, and to verify its correctness at each stage, see Figure 6.12. 
Some examples of the flow sequences used to generate various security mechanisms and 
protocols are given in sections 6.7. and 6.8. respectively. 
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Security service 
request f ron 
application 
f ron EEA 
Sequence dato 
f o r SSA to 
control 
nechanisns K SMIBA 
Security Managenent Infornation Bose 
(SMIB> 
Sequencing doto For secur i ty 
nechonisn and protocol generation 
Al A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 .... 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B& B7 B8 B9 
CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 .... 
Sequence dota f o r MA 
to ver i fy c o r r e c t 
execution of sequence 
Security Service Agent (SSA) 
Monitor Agent <MA) 
R«Qu)r«d s v M n c * data fran n i B 
L o n p o r i s o n o f v e c t o r s 
i | i | i h l o | o | o | o | o | I 
Figure 6.12. Verification of Sequence Execution Correctness 
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6.6. Notation 
The analysis of this system is facilitated by means of a special notation, see Figure 6.13. 
® ^ ^ ^ 
Bl B2 B3 B4 6n oP Integer I <= s <= N 
Bl' Ba' 63 B4' Bn of boolean 
I <= s <= N 
Figure 6.13. A State Machine Representation within the SMIB 
Let state-machine A, be represented by the sequence of state-machines B , . . B N , let A|(s) 
176 
represent the sequence vector in the S M I B containing the sequencing data of A,, and let 
i4,'(s) represent the boolean status vector containing the status data, B ' , . . B ' N , of the 
success/failure of component state machines B , . . B N in A,. Then the security state of 
state-machine A, after m steps can be determined from the recursive function S(A,,m), 
FUNCTION S (A,, m : integer) : boolean; 
begin 
W H I L E m > 0 DO 
I F ( (A/[m]) AND ( S (A„m-1) ) THEN 
S := irue 
E L S E 
S : = false] 
end; • 
6.6.1. An Example 
• K UK 
[C3) 
UK OK OK • K fail 
C8) 
X X 
Figure 6.14. An Example of a Hierarchical Sequenced State Machine 
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Referring to Figure 6.14., suppose that 
and 
and 
and 
and 
3A, : = B , 
3A, : = B2 
3A, : /l.[3] = B3 
3A, : = B4 
3B, : «.[!] = c, 
3B, : B,[2] = 
3B, : = C3 
3Bj : = C 4 
38, : = C5 
3B3 : Bdn = c, 
3B3 : BA2] = C7 
3B4 : B,[l] 
3B, : B,[2] = c. 
3B, : B,[3] 
and that the sequence has progressed to the stage where 
= true 
B,'[2] = true 
Bz'Ll] = true 
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B^'[2] = true 
flz'P] = true 
B^'ll] = true 
fl3'[2] = false 
B,V] = X 
B/[2] = X 
B4[2] = X X = don't care state 
The security status of the system can be determined at any time by applying the status 
function, 
S ( A „ 4 ) = S (B,,2) AND S (B2,3) AND S (83,2) AND S {E^,3)\ 
At the point of failure, 
S (B„2) = true, 
S (B„3) = true, 
S (B3, l ) = true, BUT 
S (83,2) = false 
and, of course, S (B4,x) = false, but this is a 'don't care' state (indicated by 'x'). 
Therefore, by applying the recursive function S it is quickly determined that 
S (A,, l) = true, 
S (A„2) = true, BUT 
S (A„3) = false 
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The position of the failure is therefore located at S (A,,3) which is the first false result. 
And since 
A|[3] = B3 AND 
then C7 is the failed atom. 
Between each operation and the next, the CSS stores the result of the operation in the 
SMIB secure temporary data store. There is fault protection and error recovery built 
into the hardware/software to indicate failures. In practice, these will generally take the 
form of exception errors generated by the hardware, such as divide-by-zero interrupts 
or bounds violation interrupts. Error recovery allows the system to re-try operations, 
which might have failed due to a temporary problem such as power-supply transient. 
If on re-try the operation is successful then the sequence will continue. If, after a 
specified number of retrys, the error persists then the complete security service is 
aborted and the appropriate error flag return made to the calling application. 
The notion of timeliness is very important in determining the correctness of the execution 
of the CSS function sequences. (Timeliness within the context of the formal analysis of 
protocols is discussed in section 6.9.2.). The protected real-time clock atom is used to 
time the execution rate of the sequences. In the event of inactivity or failure of a 
sequence which cannot be reinitiated by the recovery agent, the monitor agent will 
inform the security services agent of the failure. The external environment agent will 
then inform the calling process of CSS failure and initiate a shutdown of security 
services. These include a clearing of the CSS sequencing temporary data stores and the 
SMIB temporary data stores to ensure that confidential data such as keys and partially 
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encrypted messages held in these stores cannot be externally accessed. 
6.7. Examples of Sequences for Data Manipulation 
Having established the general principle of the sequenced state machine, some examples 
of actual machines within the prototype CSS are now given. 
Assume that we wish to use the CSS to implement a non-repudiation of origin service, 
an important security service recommended in ISO 7498-2. The mechanisms required 
to accomplish the security service of non-repudiation of origin might be designed as 
follows: 
1. the sending party will need initially to generate an RSA key pair, placing 
the public key in the directory at the SMC, and keeping the secret key to 
himself in the local protected store in the SMIB; 
2. the sender will need to hash the document he wishes to effect non-
repudiation upon, using a public, system-wide hash function approved for 
the purpose. He will then sign the digest (the reduced data block 
resulting from a hash operation, similar to a C R C or checksum) with his 
secret key, including a time stamp to prevent replay attacks; 
3. the sender will then send the document plus the signed digest (possibly 
via different routes) to the recipient; 
4. the recipient will need to create a local copy of the document digest using 
the hash function; 
5. the recipient then 'unsigns' the received (signed) digest by using the 
senders public key (which he has received from the directory and certified 
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by the SMC); 
6. the recipient compares his local copy of the digest with the received 
digest he has just 'unsigned'. 
If the digests match, then the document must have been sent by the purported sender, 
because nobody else would be able to create a digest using the senders secret key (unless 
the secret key had been compromised). The sender cannot therefore deny having sent 
the document. If the digests fail to match, the recipient can reject the document because 
either: 
1. it was not sent by the legitimate sender, and hence the received, signed 
digest is incorrect; 
2. it has been tampered with in transit, in which case the local digest will be 
incorrect. 
6,7.1. Creating an RSA Key Pair 
The mechanism of RSA key generation involves the following components: 
1. the generation of three prime numbers, say /?, g and e, by means of 
Rabin's algorithm; 
2. determining the system modulus m — pq\ 
3. evaluation of the Totient function 4>{PQ) calculated from (p-l)(q-l); 
4. determining the decryption quantity d by performing Euclid's algorithm 
such that de = 1 (mod 4>{pq))\ 
5. output the key pair = {e,m} and S^  = {d,m]. 
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These components in turn are broken down into sequences of atoms. The component 
designated 'Rabin's algorithm' is given as an example of the use of atoms in the 
construction of a component in Figure 6.15. 
Figure 6.15- The Atoms used in Rabin's 
Algorithm for Primality Testing 
{SUBTRACT} 
{DO W H I L E LOOP} 
{ADDITION} 
{DIV} 
FUNCTION Test_Prime (num : s255) : boolean] 
begin 
num_l : = n - 1; 
q := num l ; 
k : = 0 ; 
W H I L E q MOD 2 = 0 DO 
begin 
k := k + 1; 
q := q D l V 2 ; 
end; 
Exponent_To_Binary (q); 
FOR trial count : = 1 TO trials do 
{ / passes of the algorithm = 1/4* probability of failure } 
begin 
Finished := false; 
str (Primes [trial_count - l],x); 
j :=0; 
y := Mod_Exp (x,n); { MOD_EXP} 
R E P E A T { R E P E A T UNTIL LOOP} 
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I F ( C = 0) AND (y = 1) ) OR (y = num_l ) T H E N 
begin 
Test_Prime := true; { G E N E R A T E CONTROL BOOLEAN} 
Finished := true; { G E N E R A T E CONTROL BOOLEAN} 
end 
E L S E 
IF (j < > 0) AND (y = 1) T H E N {OR} 
begin 
Test_Prime : = false; {GENERATE RETURN BOOLEAN} 
Exit; {END} 
end 
E L S E 
begin 
j : = j + 1; {ADDITION} 
y : = sqr (y) MOD n; {MULTIPLY and MOD} 
end; 
UNTIL (j = k) OR (Finished); 
I F 0 = k) AND (NOT Finished) T H E N 
begin 
Test_Prime : = false; {GENERATE RETURN BOOLEAN} 
Exit; {END} 
end; 
end; 
end; • 
The system modulus and its Totient function are calculated using the multiply atom. The 
decryption quantity is evaluated using the Euclid algorithm component, described in 
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Figure 6.16. Similariy, the file is hashed using the repeated square MOD n algorithm 
which in turn uses the MOD_EXP atom, and so forth. 
Figure 6,16. The Atoms used in Euclid's Algorithm 
FUNCTION C C D (nl,n2 : integer) : integer, 
begin 
r := nl; 
z : = n2; 
W H I L E z < > 0 DO {DO W H I L E LOOP} 
begin 
m : = r MOD z; {MOD} 
r : = z; 
z : = m; 
end; 
C C D := r; {RETURN} 
end; 
6.7.2. Creating a Q R C Key Pair 
The public/secret key pair for the QRC is much simpler to create than the key pair 
required for RSA. Rabin's algorithm is used to generate a pair of prime numbers, both 
of which are Blum integers (that is, they are congruent to 3 mod 4). This prime number 
pair comprise the secret key, and their product, calculated using the multiply atom, 
comprises the public key. 
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6.7.3. RSA Block Encryption 
RSA encryption just uses the MOD_EXP atom. The data is blocked according to the 
size of the modulus in use, and then each data block is raised to the power of the 
appropriate encrypting or decrypting exponent and reduced modulo the system modulus. 
6.7,4. File Integrity Verification 
File integrity verification uses the X.509 or similar hash function to create a digest of 
the file. This basically comprises a running block checksum of the data within the file. 
The file and its digest can then be sent as a pair to the recipient via independent routes. 
On receipt, the user also hashes the file to the digest and compares his result with the 
digest received with the file. If the two are identical, then he can assume that no 
modification of the file has taken place. If the digests differ, then he knows that the data 
within the file has been modified (either accidentally or deliberately) and he can reject 
the file. The method relies on the principle that it is computationally infeasible to 
construct two different files which would hash to the same digest. 
In a similar way, the rest of the functions can be constructed from the mechanisms, 
components and atoms of the CSS. 
6.8. Examples of Sequences for Protocol Generation 
As well as generating mechanisms for data manipulation, the layered sequence 
methodology is also used to generate protocols for secure communication between 
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agents. A protocol is defined as an algorithm for implementing a class of transactions. 
Protocols for even moderately sophisticated transactions involve a complex layering of 
processes and capabilities. 
The principle technique for implementing such a capability is the cryptographic 
concealment of the message. Until quite recently, research efforts on secure protocols 
have concentrated on the security of the underiying cryptographic transformations. The 
need has arisen for new protocols, however, whose security properties are not readily 
apparent. In these protocols, it is not only the security of the cryptosystem that plays 
a role but also the logic of the implementation. Even given the a priori assumption that 
the cryptosystem offers perfect concealment, flaws in the protocol logic, when 
undetected, are as damaging to overall security as a compromised cryptosystem. 
The protocol approach to communication offers a number of practical advantages. 
Firstly, protocols may be logically separated from the software and hardware which 
generate them. Secondly, protocols are generally high-level constructions which can be 
examined in detail. Thirdly, and of considerable importance in the CSS, protocols can 
be implemented using hardware or secure hardware-isolated software so that all 
communication channels are explicit and observable. This effectively rules out the 
possibility of covert channels discussed in section 4.2.2. 
Two examples are given, an authentication protocol and a key distribution protocol. The 
formal proofs of these two protocols are given later in the chapter. 
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6.8.1. An Authentication Protocol 
The authentication protocol used is due to Needham & Schroeder [NEED, 1978], 
The protocol definition comprises a sequence of five exchanges: 
1. A - * S M C : A, B, N. 
2. SMC - A: {N„ B, K ^ , {K,„ A}^,} 
3. A - B: {K.„ A} Kb9 
4. B - A: {N,} Kab 
5. A - B: {AN,)} Kab 
Only A makes contact with the SMC including a timestamp N„ which then provides A 
with a conversation key K ^ , together with a certificate {K^^,, ^}Kbs} encrypted with B's 
key. This conveys the conversation key and A*s identity to B. B decrypts this 
certificate and carries out a handshake with A to be assured that A is current, since the 
certificate might be a replay! A then returns to B a function of the timestamp (which 
could take the form of a hash function, for example). In the following protocol, 
examples are given as to how the agents interact to accomplish the various steps. 
Complete descriptions of these interactions are lengthy, repetitive and tedious and so are 
not given explicitly at every step. Clearly, the sequence of interactions for decryption 
is almost identical to that for encryption apart from the use of a slightly different 
mechanism under the control of the SMA. Only those interactions of significance or 
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which introduce a new agent are given to avoid repetition. Broken down, the protocol 
proceeds as follows: 
1. A sends a cleartext message to the SMC containing a timestamp N: 
(a) a request for a timestamp is passed across the API to the E E A ; 
(b) the E E A routes the control portion of the request to the SSA; 
(c) the SSA instructs the SMA to generate a timestamp; 
(d) the SMA controls the real-time clock to generate the time-stamp; 
(e) the time-stamp is passed back to the calling process via the E E A ; 
(f) the OSI communication channel is used to communicate with the SMC. 
Note that there is no need for a cryptographic protocol involving the public key 
of the SMC since this message is en clair. 
2. The reply from the SMC contains a conversation key K ^ . The CSS generates 
a random conversation key using the random number generator component via 
a sequence of agent interactions similar to those described in (1) above. The 
reply is encrypted with the secret key K„. The encryption is performed by the 
following steps: 
(a) a request for the message to be encrypted is passed across the API to the 
E E A ; 
(b) the E E A routes the control portion of the request to the SSA and the data 
portion (the message contents) to the CSS internal data bus; 
(c) the SSA instructs the SMA to initiate an encryption; 
(d) the SSA requests K„ from the SMIB via the SMIBA; 
(e) the SMA controls the hardware to generate the encryption algorithm; 
(f) the MA ensures that the sequencing for the encryption algorithm is 
carried out correctly; 
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(g) the encrypted data is passed back to the calling process via the E E A ; 
(f) the OSI communication channel is used to communicate with the A. 
3. A then decrypts the reply using the decryption mechanism, and A knows the 
message is not a replay due to the timestamp. 
4. A sends the part of the message intended for B to B. 
5. B decrypts the message to also obtain the same conversation key as A, using the 
decryption mechanism. 
6. A and B can now compare conversation keys to ensure that they are the same. 
7. A and B now believe that 
(a) the other party exists currently; 
(b) the other party has sent their message recently; 
(c) both parties are in possession of the same key. 
6.8.2. A Key Distribution Protocol 
The key management algorithm used by the CSS to establish secure exchange of data 
between two peer entities is due to [RAMA, 1990]. 
In the OSIRM architecture, REQUEST, INDICATION, RESPONSE and CONFIRM are 
the four basic service primitives used in the connection establishment, data transfer and 
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connection release phases respectively, see section 3.3. Each primitive carries with it 
parameters to convey various pieces of information to its peer entity at the other end 
system. During the connection establishment phase, the two peer entities negotiate a set 
of parameters to be used during the data transfer stage. In the CSS key exchange 
algorithm, the security parameters are also negotiated between the end systems during 
this phase. In particular, the receipt of the public key Eg of system B and the generation 
and distribution of the session key (SK) are carried out during the connection 
establishment phase. The session key is then used to secure user data during the data 
transfer stage, and at the end of data transfer, the connection is disconnected and the 
session key destroyed. 
As previously discussed, in a large system the SMC is responsible for the holding and 
distribution of valid public keys. The public key is only used for the exchange of a 
symmetric session key (such as DES) which is then used for the actual data security 
throughout the session due to greater efficiency than public key encryption. This is 
known as a hybrid encryption mechanism. To protect against the possibility that an 
impostor supplies the SMC with his own public key substituted for the genuine key of 
A, a certificate mechanism is used. In this mechanism, after registering the public key 
E A of user A in the public key directory of the SMIB, the SMC sends the following 
certificate to user A in ciphertexi form: 
SMC - A: C^ = DK (A, E ^ , T) 
where C^ is the certificate, E ^ is a copy of the public key of A as received by the SMC, 
D K is the secret key of the SMC, and T is a timestamp to ensure the fireshness of the 
certificate against replay attack (see section 6.9.). User A decrypts the certificate using 
the public key of the SMC, and verifies that the copy of his public key as stored by the 
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SMC in the public key directory of the SMIB is in fact genuine. Examples of the 
mechanisms for the generation of the keys and the encryption/decryption are given in 
section 6.7. 
The complete protocol as used by the CSS for the generation of public keys by users, 
the storage of the keys at the SMC, the distribution of public keys by the SMC and the 
exchange of symmetric session keys by users is now described. A formal proof of the 
security of this protocol can be found in section 6.9.6. 
CERTinCATION PHASE 
1. User A generates his own public key by the mechanism described in section 
6.7.1. He then transmits his public key in plain text to the SMC for registration 
and storage in the public key directory of the SMIB: 
A -* SMC: (A, E J 
2. The SMC registers user A's public key in the SMTB via the SMIBA and sends 
a certificate to A in enciphered form as described: 
SMC - A: C^ = DK (A, E ^ , To^) 
3. User A deciphers the certificate and verifies that the SMC has registered the 
correct public key: 
E K { D K (A, E^ , To^)} = (A, E ^ , To )^ 
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4. Similarly, user B carries out steps 1 to 3 above: 
B SMC: ( B , E B ) 
SMC - B: C B = DK (B, E B , TOB) 
E K { D K ( B , E B , TOB)} = ( B , E B . TOB) 
C O N N E C T I O N PHASE 
5. During the connection establishment phase, the service user at the n+1 layer at 
system A issues a CONNECT_REQUEST primitive to its service provider at the 
n layer, indicating that it wishes to establish a secure communication with remote 
system B. 
6. The n layer at A requests the certificates C^ and Cg from the S M C : 
A ^ SMC: (A ,B) 
and the SMC replies to A with: 
S M C - A : { D K ( A , E ^ , E ^ ( S K ) , T J , 
{ D K (B, E B , E B ( S K ) , T , } 
= ( C . , Co) 
where T, is now the timestamp indicating the current time at the SMC and SK 
is a randomly generated session key. 
7. End system A decrypts the certificates with the public key of the S M C to obtain 
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the contents. He verifies his own public key as being correct, notes the public 
key of B , and further decrypts the session key with his own secret key to obtain 
SK in plaintext. Now in order to provide both secrecy and authenticity, user A 
enciphers the session key as well as the current timestamp T2 using his own 
private key, encrypts the result with the public key of B , and sends the result to 
B : 
A - B : X^B = { ( S K , T2) D ^ } E B 
8. The n layer inserts the message ( C ^ , C B , X^B) into the variable part of the 
CONNECT-REQUEST (CR)-PDU using the parameter code, parameter length 
indication and parameter value fields as defined in the OSIRM, and transmits the 
resultant CR-PDU to the n layer of end system B . 
9. The n layer at B decrypts X^B using the information available in and Cg and 
obtains the session key SK. System B then issues a CONNECT-INDICATION 
primitive to its n+ \ layer. 
10. After processing the indication primitive, the service user in the n + l layer at 
system B now issues a CONNECT-RESPONSE primitive to its n layer. 
11. The n layer at B inserts the security parameter (C^, C B , X^D) into its variable 
part of the CONNECT-RESPONSE PDU and then transmits it to the n layer of 
system A: 
B - A: (C^, C B . XBA) 
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where XBA is E A { D B ( S K , T 3 ) } and T3 is the current time at B. It should be noted 
that is sent to A so that A can verify whether or not B has received the valid 
session key SK without modification. This also serves as an acknowledgement 
sent to A acknowledging the receipt of SK by B. 
12. The n layer at A decrypts the received message from B and verifies whether or 
not B has received the valid session key SK. It then issues a CONNECT-
CONFIRM primitive to its service user in the n + l layer. 
DATA T R A N S F E R PHASE 
13. Since both systems A and B now share the session key SK they can encrypt the 
user data portion of a PDU. The service user at the /iH-1 layer issues a 
DATA(DT)-REQUEST primitive to its service provider^! the n layer. Now the 
n layer at A encrypts the user data and transmits the resultant DATA(DT)-PDU 
to the n layer at B. On receipt, the n layer at B decrypts the user data portion 
of DT-PDU and issues a DATA(DT)-INDICATION primitive to its n+1 layer. 
In a similar fashion, B transmits its DT-PDU user data in encrypted form to A. 
CONNECTION R E L E A S E PHASE 
14. After data transfer, the / i+ l layer at A (or B) issues a DISCONNECT-
REQUEST (DR) primitive to its n layer. This DR primitive is transmitted to the 
n layer of the other system. The n layer then issues a DISCONNECT-
INDICATION primitive to its / i+l layer. At the end of the session, SK is 
destroyed. 
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6.9, A Formal Proof of Protocol Sequence Security 
In a distributed security environment, it is necessary to have procedures whereby various 
remote components of the system can communicate in a rigorous and secure manner. 
In the context of the CSS described, the agents of the CSS may be in physically remote 
locations, and yet need to convey information to each other concerning the security 
activities present on the network. These rigorous procedures are the communication 
protocols. Having established a methodology to prove the functional correctness of 
sequences built up from layers of finite state machines in a vertical sense, it remains to 
prove the security validity of the sequences themselves when used to generate the 
protocols which communicate between the agents in a distributed system. 
Following Burrows, Abadi and Needham [BURR, 1988], we use a formal logic to 
analyse the validity of the protocols between the communicating agents of the CSS. 
6.9.1. A Formal Dennition of Protocol Security 
The definition of protocol security as used in this formal analysis depends on the 
principles of belief and action. If a subject is trusted in a security sense, then this is a 
statement of belief on behalf of the system that any actions carried out by that subject 
within the system will fall within the security policy of that system. If a subject is not 
trusted, however, then the system must ensure that the subject behaves according to the 
security policy, and this may be achieved by making untrusted subjects submit to the 
jurisdiction of trusted subjects. In the CSS, the trust is placed in the Security 
Management Centres, one of whose security functions is the supervision and enforcement 
of system security policy. 
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6.9.2. Requirements of Proofs about Protocols 
Between agents of that part of the CSS which is completely contained within a local 
protected hardware unit, the need for many of the protocols is removed, because the data 
cannot be accessed or interfered with by an external influence. The design of the 
protected hardware suggested for use with the CSS does not allow access to any internal 
data bus, and in the event of physical violation, all internal data that would facilitate 
compromise of the system by the attacker is destroyed [WEIN,1987]. 
In a distributed computing system, however, the protocols between the distributed agents 
of the CSS must be highly resistant to compromise. A guarantee of absolute security 
is not possible, mainly due to the difficulty in adequately describing in formal terms 
what is meant by 'absolute security*. What can be said, is that given that certain 
subjects within the system are trusted, it is possible to develop protocols to ensure the 
extension of relative trust from these subjects to cover all the other subjects as required. 
The extension of trust in this way is called the development of a trusted path and extends 
the security perimeter to include as many subjects and objects as desired, see Chapter 
2 and section 5.4. 
The analysis of the protocols which provide the inter-agent communication in the CSS 
uses a formal logic specifically designed to define communication protocols in terms of 
security functionality. It is sufficiently rigorous to distinguish between the 
implementation of the protocol and the initial assumptions from which the protocol was 
developed, and to highlight properties of the protocol which may not be evident when 
initially conceived. These properties include such concerns as, 
1. does the protocol achieve the goal? 
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2. if not, is it possible to modify or extend the protocol to achieve the goal? 
3. what assumptions does the protocol require? 
4. does the protocol assume more knowledge than is actually available when 
claiming to meet the goal? 
5. does the protocol produce more knowledge than necessary to fulfil the 
goal? 
6. does the protocol do anything unnecessary which could be omitted without 
weakening the goal, for example, does the protocol encrypt data which 
need not be encrypted? 
7. does the protocol fail to do anything that is necessary to secure the goal, 
for example, does the protocol fail to encrypt critical data which needs 
encryption? 
Concerns such as these are important because, as stated earlier, well intentioned but 
flawed policy can lead to anomalies which can result in security 'leaks*. These 
weaknesses can be very subtle indeed, and almost impossible to detect without a formal 
analysis. In particular, covert channels may have inadvertently resulted due to minor 
oversights in the design of the system. These channels may be exploited by a 
sophisticated attacker to leak information from the system, although the information 
bandwidth of such channels is usually very small. Refinement of the protocols using the 
logic can result in the elimination of many of these shortcomings. 
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The initial requirement of all the inter-agent protocols is the ability for the agents to 
convince each other about the identity of the peer entity in the association. In the 
simplest sense, this authentication is the guarantee that if the two entities are really who 
they claim to be then they will end up in possession of a shared secret which will allow 
then to communicate with secrecy and integrity. Achievement of these two goals will 
preclude the possibility of an attacker from either gaining information about the content 
of the communication or being able to influence its content. 
A very important aspect which much of the literature does not address is the notion of 
timeliness of the protocol. If an identical protocol is used for every instance of a 
communication, then an attacker can simulate an genuine instance simply by replaying 
a previous communication, even if he has no idea whatever of its content. This is the 
classic replay attack scenario, which is very easy to mount in a computer 
communications environment. It is therefore very important to include the notion that 
a protocol must be timely in order to prevent attacks of this sort. In practical terms, this 
means the use of time stamps in all protocols that are vulnerable to replay attack, and 
the protected hardware real-time clock is included in the CSS for this purpose. 
Incorporating timeliness into the formalism, however, has proved difficult in previous 
attempts at logic of this sort. This analysis builds on the work of Burrows et al in the 
use of nonces which are expressions invented for the express purpose of being 'fresh'. 
As well as time stamps, other nonces can include the use of random numbers. If entity 
A invents a random number which has not previously been used in a communication and 
intimates this value to entity B, and entity A subsequently receives from B a message 
which fully includes the random number or a one-way function of it, then A can be 
assured that the message originated after the communication of the number to B, so long 
as the integrity of the message can be guaranteed. 
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Protocols are traditionally described by listing the messages sent between the 
communicating parties, showing in symbolic form the contents of the messages, the 
source, destination and any encrypting keys used. This conventional approach is not 
well suited to a formal analysis because the logic requires that an exact meaning be 
attached to certain elements of the messages, and this cannot always be inferred from 
the content. Each message is therefore translated into a logical formula before analysis, 
which is essentially an idealised form of the original message. Assertions are then made 
about each protocol in the same notation to describe the beliefs held by the various 
entities involved in the protocol. 
6.9,3. The Basic Notation 
Following Burrows et al [BURR, 1988], the basic formalism is built on a many-sorted 
modal logic. We recognise three type of entity, 
1. subjects; 
2. encryption keys; 
3. messages. 
In general, the symbols A, B, and S denote specific subjects, K ^ , and K^, denote 
specific keys and N 3 , N ,^ and N, denote specific statements. The symbols P and Q 
range over subjects; X and Y range over statements; K ranges over encryption keys. 
The only propositional connective is conjunction, denoted by a comma. Throughout, 
conjunctions are treated as sets. 
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In addition, the following are defined using a notation similar to that of Burrows et al: 
F \=\: P believes X or is entitled to believe X . The subject P may then act as 
though X is true. 
P - X : P once said X . The subject P sent a message at some unspecified time 
which included the statement X . It is not known whether the message is 
old (possibly a replay) or part of the current communication, but P 
believed X when he sent it. 
P =>X: P has jurisdiction over X . The subject P is an authority on X and should 
be trusted in all matters concerning X . For example, the SMC is trusted 
to supply authentic public keys. 
P <=>K Q- P and Q may use the valid key K to communicate. 
{ X } K : The statement X encrypted with the key K . We can extend this to { X } K 
signed P . 
P < X : P sees X . The subject P has received a message containing X and can 
read X (possibly after decryption). Clearly, P can repeat X in other 
messages. 
# ( X ) : the statement X is fresh, that is, X has not been used in a message before 
the current protocol. 
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6.9.4. Formal Proofs of Authentication between Agents 
As stated, the fundamental protocol which is always implemented between remote agents 
is an authentication protocol. {Confidentiality and integrity do not require formal 
protocols; they may be achieved by encryption alone.) In authentication, the 
fundamental concern is the distinction between past and present. The present epoch is 
deemed to start at the set-up time of the current protocol and all interactions later than 
this time are called recent. All communications before this time are deemed to be in the 
past, and the authentication protocol must be very careful to reject any of these past 
messages and not be subverted into believing them to be recent, and hence fall victim 
to a replay attack. In particular, 
1. a belief about a past communication is not carried forward into the 
present one; 
2. all beliefs held in the present are stable for the duration of the current 
protocol. 
Now the logical postulates can be described: 
The message meaning rule concerns beliefs about encrypted messages: 
p [= Q *=»K P. P < WK '^niplies that P - X 
The rule says that if P believes that a key K is shared only with Q, and he sees the 
message X encrypted under K , then P is entitled to believe that Q once said X. 
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The nonce verification rule states that if a message is recent then the sender still believes 
in it: 
P h #(X), P h Q ^ X implies that F \=Q \=X 
This says that if P believes that X is recent and that Q once said X then P believes that 
Q said X recently, and hence Q believes X. 
The Jurisdiction rule states that if P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X then P trusts 
Q on the truth of X. 
P | = Q = > X , P | = Q [ = X implies that P |= X 
In addition, we can heuristically observe that P believes a set of statements if and only 
if P believes each individual statement separately. Hence, we have the following three 
additional rules: 
P [=X, P |=Y implies that P f= (X,Y) 
P |=(X,Y) implies that F \=X 
p |=Q t=(X,Y) implies that P |= Q |= X 
And similarly with the operator - : 
p [=Q - (X,Y) implies that P H Q - X 
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If a subject sees a message, then he also knows the content statements, providing that 
if the message is encrypted, he knows the keys, 
P < (X,Y) implies that P o X 
P h Q <=^K P < WK implies that P <X 
By virtue of the message digest which ensures that no part of a message can be altered 
without discovery, if one statement of a message is known4be be fresh, then the whole 
message must be fresh. 
P |=#(X) implies that P t= #(X,Y) 
6.9.5. Idealisation of the CSS Protocols 
Conventionally, each step of a protocol is written in the form 
P Q : message 
which denotes that the subject P sends a message and that subject Q receives it. (Within 
the context of the CSS, confirmation of receipt may be assumed due to supervision by 
the CSS of possible disruption due to denial of service attacks against the security traffic 
on the network, discussed in detail elsewhere.) In order to express the meaning of the 
message, it is necessary to transform it into an idealised form which expresses the 
semantics of the message. For example A may wish to communicate a symmetric 
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session key to B for future use, using a public key encryption transfer under the 
assumption that only B knows the secret key Kb,, 
A B : { K ^ is to be used for communication between us} 
In terms of ideal formulation, this would be written 
A - B : {A <=>Kab B} Kbs 
When the message arrives at B, we can infer that B sees the message 
B < {A ^ K i , , B} Kbs 
and hence B becomes aware of the content of the message and can act upon it. 
The analysis of protocols is carried out in four steps: 
1. the idealised protocol is derived from the original idea; 
2. assumptions are made about the initial state; 
3. logical expressions are attached to protocol statements in the form of 
assertions about the state of the protocol after each statement; 
4. the logical postulates are repeatedly applied to the assertions in order to 
discover the beliefs held by the parties to the protocol on completion. 
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The whole procedure may be repeated as many times as required, as new assumptions 
are found to be necessary to ensure that the correct beliefs end up being held by the 
parties involved. 
Burrows et al have suggested the following three rules for the derivation of legal 
annotations to protocols, 
1. for single protocol steps, the annotation 
[ Y ] ( P - Q : X ) [ Y , Q < X ] 
is legal. All beliefs held before a message is sent hold afterwards, the 
only difference is that the recipient sees the message; 
2. for sequences of protocol steps, if 
[X]S,. . . . [Y] and [Y]S,' . . . . [Z] 
are legal, then so is 
[X]S,. . . . [Y]S,' . . . . [Z] 
Thus, annotations can be concatenated; 
3. the logical postulates used are 
(a) if X is an assertion (but not an assumption) in a legal annotation 
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(P, X' is provable from X, and 6*' is the result of substituting X' 
for X in 6*, then 6*' is a legal annotation. Thus, new assertions 
can be derived from existing ones; 
(b) if X is the assumption of a legal annotation (P, X ' is provable 
from X, and CP' is the result of substituting (X ,X' ) for X in (P, 
then (P' is a legal annotation. Thus, the consequences of the 
original assumptions can be written explicitly next to the original 
assumptions. 
Burrows et al are careful to point out that the power of this method stems from the 
ability to follow the evolution from the original assumptions to the consequences of those 
assumption in a rigorous manner, in other words, we can formally demonstrate the 
validity of final beliefs about the state of a system from the initial beliefs. 
As stated, the fundamental component of all the inter-agent protocols is authentication. 
Formally, authentication is complete between agent A and agent B if there is a K such 
that 
A |=Ao^,B 
B f= A <=*K B 
A 1= B 1= A <=>K B 
B [= A 1= A <=>K B 
While the first two of the above are essential, the last two results are no stronger than 
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merely desirable. 
In their paper, Burrows et al go on to give two examples of the application of their 
logic, and their results are worth repeating here. Initially, they consider the Otway & 
Rees authentication protocol [OTWA,1987]. Adopting the following symbology: 
A,B principal subjects 
K „ , K b 3 symmetric keys A <=> server, B <=> server 
N 3 , N b , M nonces 
K^ b secret session key A <=> B 
S authentication server (in our context, the SMC) 
Otway & Rees defined their protocol as comprising four messages: 
1. A ^ B : M, A, B, {N„, M, A, B} K u 
2. B ^ S : M , A , B , { N . , M , A . B } K „ , {N^, M , A . B } Kbs 
3. S - B: M, {N., K^,}^, {N„ K^) Kbs 
4. B -»A: M, {N., K ^ } Kfts 
The protocol requires that A passes to B some encrypted information only useful to the 
server (SMC), together with enough information for B to make up a similar message. 
B forwards both to the server, who decrypts the messages and checks that M , A, B 
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match in the encrypted parts. If so, the SMC generates the session key and embeds 
it into two messages, one for A and one for B, accompanied by the appropriate nonces. 
Both are sent to B who forwards A's part on to A. Then A, B decrypt their respective 
messages, and if satisfied, proceed to use the key K ^ . 
Transforming to the logic and using the abbreviation in place of M,A,B , we rewrite 
the protocol as follows 
1. A - B : {N., N J 
2. B - S: {N., N J ^ , {N„ N J Kbs 
3. S - B: {N., (A B), (B - K)}^, {N„ (A B), 
( A - N J I K M 
4. B - A: {N., (A B), (B - N,)} K u 
The assumptions made by the protocol are 
B |=B«KbsS 
S f = A « K « S 
S |=B«Kb,S 
S 1 = A « K ^ B 
A f = ( S ^ A « K . b B ) 
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B | = ( S ^ A « K ^ B ) 
A f= (S => B ~ X) 
B 1= (S => A - X) 
A H#(N.) 
B |=#(N,) 
A t = W 
The logical analysis now proceeds as follows: 
1. A -> B: B sees the message from A but cannot read it 
B < {N., N J Kas 
2. B generates a message of the same form, and passes both to S. 
3. S decrypts each part by the message meaning postulate, and can deduce that A 
and B have encrypted the nonce N^ . in their packets. 
S t= A ~ (N., NJ , S H B (N„ N,) 
N O T E that S cannot tell if this is a replay or not since nothing in the message 
tells him if the message is fresh! 
4. S emits a message containing two encrypted statements to B. 
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5. One part of the message is intended for A, and B passes this on. At this point, 
A and B have received a message from the SMC with a new session key plus a 
nonce. A and B sucxessively apply the 
(a) message meaning 
(b) nonce verification 
(c) jurisdiction 
postulates to emerge with the final beliefs, 
A t=(A^K.bB) 
A h ( B hN, ) 
B | = ( A « K . . B ) 
B f=(A H N J 
N O T E that the logic has exposed this as being a far from complete or reliable 
authentication protocol. It could be completed by handshaking between A and B, but 
the weakness is that the session key is never used by either party during the 
protocol, and so neither party can be assured that the other is in possession of the same 
key. In fact, A is in a slightly stronger position than B, in that A has been told that B 
emitted a message containing a nonce that A believes to be fresh. This allows A to infer 
that B sent the message recently, that is, B currently exists in the system. B, however, 
has only been told by the SMC that A has used a nonce, but has no idea if this is a 
replay attack or not! 
It is interesting to note that, in addition to the weaknesses exposed, the analysis reveals 
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that the protocol also contains some redundancy: 
1. two nonces are put up by A, but one would suffice. The verification 
using is just as easily done by and hence the nonce is redundant; 
2. Nb in the second message need not be encrypted. 
The above analysis leads to a quite different approach to the authentication problem. 
The following analysis concerns the Needham & Schroeder protocol [NEED, 1978]. 
The concrete protocol definitions comprise a sequence of five messages: 
1. A ^ S : A, B, N. 
2. S - A: {N., B, K ^ , { K ^ , \ } ^ , } 
3. A - B: {K.„ A} Kbs 
4. B - A: {N,} Kflb 
5. A - B: {/(N,)} Kab 
Only A makes contact with the SMC, who provides A with a session key together 
with a certificate encrypted with B's key conveying the session key and A's identity to 
B. B decrypts this certificate and carries out a nonce handshake with A to be assured 
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that A is current, since the certificate might be a replay! A then returns to B a function 
of the nonce (which could take the form of a hash function, for example). 
Transforming to the logic and using the same notation and substitutions as previously, 
S 
1. A ^fl: N. 
2. S - A: {N., (A B), #(A B), {A ^ ^ . b B } K b , } K u 
3. A ^ B : . { A « K . b B } Kbs 
4. B -» A: {Nb, (A B)}y^ signed B 
5. A - B: {Nb, (A «K.b B ) } K ^ signed A 
The additional statements about the key in (2), (4) and (5) are there to assure A that 
the key can be used as a nonce, and to assure A and B that the other believes that the 
key is good. (These statements can be included because neither message would have 
been sent in the first place had these beliefs not been held). 
The assumptions are 
A |=A«=»K;„S 
B [ = B « K b . S 
S | = A « K « S 
S | = B « K b , S 
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S |=A<=»K.bB 
A t= (S =^  A «^ K*b B) 
B H ( S = > A « K . b B ) 
A H (S =^  #(A B)) 
A 
B |=#(Nb) 
S | = ^ ( A « K ^ B ) 
The logical analysis now proceeds as follows: 
1. A sends a cleartext message containing a nonce. This is seen by the SMC who 
repeats the nonce in reply. 
2. The reply from the SMC also contains the session key K.i,. 
3. A then sees the entire message 
A < {N., (A <=*Kab B), #(A B), {A ^ ^ . b BlKb^K-, 
which A decrypts using the message meaning postulate. 
4. Since A knows N, to be fresh, he can apply the nonce verification postulate, 
giving 
A 1=S t = A ^ K . b B , A 1=S H#(A<=>K^B) 
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5. The jurisdiction postulate allows A to infer 
A N A ^ K ^ b B , A h # ( A « K - b B ) 
6. Also, A has seen part of the message encrypted under B's key 
A < {A B} 
This allows A to safely send the message to B. 
7. B can use the message meaning postulate and decrypt 
B = S — A <=>Kab B 
Unlike A, however, B cannot proceed without resort to the dubious assumption 
that 
B | = # ( A « K ^ B ) 
The assumption is dubious because B knows of nothing in the message which is 
fresh, and so cannot tell when it was generated. B has to assume that the 
message from the SMC is fresh. 
8. Using the extra assumption in (7), B can obtain the key 
B H A ^ K ^ B 
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via the nonce verification and jurisdiction postulates. 
9. The last two messages cause A and B to believe that 
(a) the other party exists currently, 
(b) the other party has sent their message recently, 
(c) both parties are in possession of the same key. 
B first encrypts his nonce and sends it to A, who can infer that B believes in the 
key 
A H B h A ^ K a b B 
because he has been guaranteed of the freshness of the key by the SMC. 
10. A then replies similarly, and B can infer that A believes in the key 
B |=A hA<=>KabB 
N O T E that the freshness of the nonce N^ is sufficient for B to infer this. It is 
not necessary to re-use the dubious assumption made in (7). 
11. The final beliefs with which both parties emerge are 
A l=(A<^Ka>,B) 
B | = ( A « K a b B ) 
A | = B h ( A ^ K . b B ) 
B H A | = ( A ^ K . b B ) 
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In fact, we obtain the even stronger 
B H A H B h ( A ^ K a b B ) 
This is a strong result, but is obtained at the expense of the extra assumption in 
(7). 
6.9.6. Formal Proof of the CSS Key Distribution Protocol 
A formal proof using the logic is now given for the key distribution protocol described 
in section 6.8.2. The symbology adopted is now: 
A,B principal subjects 
S security management centre 
E A , E B the public keys of A and B respectively 
C A , C B certificates of the public keys of A and B respectively 
D A , D B the secret keys of A and B respectively 
E K , D K the public and secret keys of the S M C respectively 
S K the session key 
Txx nonces 
The unadorned protocol takes the form: 
1. A - S : (A, E J 
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2. S - A : = D K ( A , E ^ , To^) 
3. B - S: ( B , E B ) 
4. S - B : C B = D K ( B , E B , TOD) 
5. A ^ S : ( A , B ) 
6. S - A : { D K ( A , E ^ , E ^ C S K ) , T , } , 
{ D K ( B , E B , E B ( S K ) , T , } 
(CA, CB) 
7. A - B : X^B = { ( S K , T J D J E B 
8. B - A : (CA, C B , X B J 
Transforming the logic as before, the protocol becomes: 
1. A ^ S : { A , A « E A S } 
2. S - A : C ^ = { A , f f { A S ) } 
3. B ^ S: { B , B « E B S } 
DK 
4. S -» B : C B = { B , ff(B S ) } DK 
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5. A -* S: ( A , B ) 
6. S - A : { { A , # ( A « E A S ) , # ( A «SK B ) } , 
{ B . # ( B « E B S ) , # ( A «SK B ) } } o K 
7. A - B : { # ( A « s K B W } EB 
8. B - A : { # ( A «SK B)„B} EA 
The assumptions at the start of the protocol are; 
A ^ A «=»EA.DA.EK.DK ^ 
B (= B <=>EB,DB.EK.DK S 
S [= A **EA.DA.EK,DK S 
S ^ B **ED,DB,EK,DK ^ 
S |=A«=»SKB 
A H ( S ^ A « S K B ) 
B | = ( S = > A « S K B ) 
A 1= ( S => # ( A « S K B ) ) 
B 1= ( S ^ # ( A «SK B ) ) 
S 1=#(TQA) 
S N#(TOB) 
S | = # ( A « S K B ) 
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The analysis of the protocol proceeds as follows: 
C E R T I F I C A T I O N PHASE 
1. A transmits his own identity and public key in plain text to the S M C 
A ^ S: {A, A S} 
2. This is seen by the SMC which sends a certificate to A in reply: 
S - * A: C^ = {A, HA^^S)} 
3. User A sees the message 
DK 
A < {A, #(A S)} DK 
which A deciphers using the message meaning postulate. He also applies the 
nonce verification postulate which allows A to infer that the S M C has registered 
the correct public key, and the registration is fresh. 
4. Similarly, user B carries out steps 1 to 3 above: 
B - S: {B, B <=>EB S} 
S - B : C B = {B, #(B«:»edS)} DK 
B < {B, ff(B S)}DK 
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COIVNECTION PHASE 
5. A requests the certificates and C B from the SMC: 
A ^ S: (A,B) 
6. The SMC replies to A with: 
S - A : {{A, #(A <=>^  S), #(A ^ s K B ) } , 
{ B , # ( B S), #(A B ) } } o K 
7. A sees the entire message: 
A < {{A, #(A <=>HA S), #(A B ) } , 
{ B . # ( B <=>ED S), #(A B)}}DK 
and applies the message meaning postulate to decipher the contents, the nonce 
verification postulate to infer that the certificates came recently from the SMC, 
and the jurisdiction postulate to infer the freshness of the session key. Hence 
A h S - #(C^, C B ) 
A ( = # ( A « S K B ) 
8. Now in order to provide both secrecy and authenticity, A enciphers the session 
key as well as the current nonce T2 using his own private key, and encrypts the 
result with the public key of B , and sends the result to B : 
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A - B : {#(A B ) ^ J 
9. B then sees the message 
ED 
B < { / f { \ «SK B ) o J EB 
which he decrypu using the message meaning postulate. He now sees the 
contents 
B < {#(A <=>SK B ) D J 
and applies a further decryption. Application of the message meaning postulate 
and nonce verification postulate allow B to infer that the message originated from 
A and that it is recent. 
ft A 
10. /^echoes the contents back t o ^ 
B - A : W A O 3 ^ B W E A 
11. A then sees the message 
A < { # ( A «^sK B)DB}E» 
which he decrypts using the message meaning postulate. He now sees the 
contents 
A < { # ( A * * s K B)DB} 
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and applies a further decryption. Application of the message meaning postulate 
and nonce verification postulate allow A to infer that the message originated from 
B and that it is recent. 
DATA T R A N S F E R PHASE 
12. The final beliefs with which A and B emerge are 
A h(A<^sKB) 
B |=(A<=>SKB) 
A |=B h ( A « s K B ) 
B |=A |=(A<=>SKB) 
A f= S ^ #(A *:>SK B ) 
Once the public keys are registered, the protocol will normally be initiated by 
one party, say A, at the connection phase. Note that in a similar manner to the 
two authentication protocols previously analysed, B is again not in as strong a 
position as A in that B cannot be as certain of either the freshness of the session 
key, or that the SMC generated it. B is totally reliant on A for his information, 
and at no stage makes contact with the SMC himself. This weakness is not 
exposed in the analysis in [RAMA, 1990]. 
13. Since A and B now share the session key SK they can encrypt the user data 
portions of their PDUs. 
The analysis of the other protocols used by the CSS is carried out in an identical 
manner. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. A Review of Achievements of the Research 
This thesis presents new conceptual and practical work in the following areas: 
1. The aims and objectives set out in Chapter 1 have been achieved, and a 
demonstration distributed security system implemented using the 
principles developed during this research. A Comprehensive Security 
System (CSS) has been developed which conforms to many of the 
recommendations of the ISO Basic Reference Model - Security 
Architecture [ISO,7498-2], including: 
(a) implementation of the five basic security services of 
confidentiality, integrity, access control, authentication and 
detection of denial of service; 
(b) conceptualisation of the CSS as an Application Layer entity. 
While the prototype implements the majority of the security 
facilities at the Application Layer in accordance with 
recommendations, implementation at any of the seven layers is 
possible due to the vertical nature of the CSS Application Program 
Interface (API); 
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(c) the capability of the system to be fitted retrospectively to existing 
systems as a value-added service, providing that applications are 
written/rewritten to take advantage of the facilities offered by the 
CSS; 
(d) the logical division of the system into agents, which allows the 
system to be implemented in a distributed architecture 
environment. 
2. The system is capable of providing security services in a flexible and 
efficient manner due to the provision of all the required security services 
by a common set o f security mechanisms. These are realised as a 
hierarchical structure of finite state machines, sequenced according to data 
stored in the Security Management Information Base (SMIB) of the CSS. 
At the lowest level, data is manipulated by hardware/software performing 
only five basic mathematical operators (+,- ,*,mod,div) . In this way, a 
wide range of services can be provided, with little or no constraint on 
future expansion of services or modification of encryption algorithms. 
3. A new security analysis methodology has been devised based upon: 
(a) a monitored sequencing of the layers of finite state machines 
which generate the security mechanisms and inter-agent 
communication protocols required to fully implement the security 
functionality in a rigorous manner. The approach uses a recursive 
algorithm for the determination and verification o f the state of the 
CSS sequences at any given moment together with the notion of 
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lime-constraint to determine whether the system is subject to 
failure or possible attack by submission of invalid data; 
(b) a modified Hoare logic for the verification o f the protocols 
between agents of the CSS. The method develops the concepts of 
analysis through application of logical postulates to statements 
concerning beliefs about the global state of the system as a result 
of actions performed by subjects on objects within the system. In 
particular, the notion of timeliness is incorporated into the logic 
to cope with the possibility of replay attacks which are relatively 
easy to mount in an electronic communications environment. 
4. The analysis methodology is particularly relevant to the very latest 
European initiatives under the COSINE Eureka project, which involves 
the development and proving of security mechanisms within the OSI 
distributed processing environment. 
5. The concept of 'Security Management Centres' is introduced, which 
function as supervisory nodes for all security related traffic on the 
network. Their functions include supply and certification of public keys, 
supervision of peer entity associations, and session supervision to detect 
denial of service attacks against the system. In the event of such an 
attack being detected, the supervisory action may be to terminate the 
session or to determine the possibility of alternate connections. 
6. A practical implementation of many of the new ideas has been produced, 
running on an Ethernet L A N of I B M Personal Computers. 
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7.2. Limitations of the Research 
Although this research has gone some way to bringing about the realisation of the 
Extended OSI Security Architecture discussed in [MUFT,1992], several limitations 
remain: 
1. The problem of denial of service has not been overcome. The CSS is 
capable of detecting possible instances of such an attack and taking such 
action as necessary to clear down secure associations in a controlled 
manner but it cannot prevent such an attack from taking place. It is 
difficult to see how this could ever be achieved in practice. 
2. The formal logic used for the analysis of the protocols between agents of 
the CSS relies, like all formal methods, on the fundamental truth of the 
axioms. In the case of the CSS, the axioms are the initial beliefs about 
the state of the system. I f these are incorrect then the conclusions drawn 
as a result of the logic wil l be in error. The initial verification of the 
functional correctness of a system before modification by protocol activity 
is difficult. The existing software verification methods described in 
Chapter 4 are concerned mainly with modification of data by procedures. 
Verification of the initial slate is assumed in most arguments without 
justification. 
227 
7.3, Suggestions for Future Work 
Although a practical implementation of the CSS has been produced, many of the ideas 
presented in this thesis are more of a proposal than a description of proven technology. 
While the basic tools of encryption are well understood, the application of these 
principles to large systems is very much in its infancy. Considerable effort wi l l be 
required in defining an appropriate security model for a distributed system comprising 
multiple security domains and in defining the different servers that w i l l be required to 
support such a distributed architecture. It is hoped that the work described here wil l 
show what can be achieved, but it represents only one possible approach to the problem. 
The demonstration system comprises of one SMC and two hosted users. The work on 
the prototype CSS could be extended to a ful l software implementation for trials on a 
large scale network such as JANET. In addition, a complete hardware implementation 
of the local CSS processor including cryptographic hardware would be useful in 
demonstrating the strength of a ful l implementation. After the completion of the 
research described in this thesis, the use of the Cryptech PC Crypto Processor, a 
general-purpose number theory engine, is being investigated as a means of speeding up 
the cryptographic algorithms to a more realistic data throughput. The manufacturers 
claim a processing speed in excess of 12,600 bits per second for RSA encryption using 
a 512 bit modulus. Since the functions (addition, multiplication and modulo division) 
are individually accessible, however, it should be possible to program the card to 
implement the QRC cipher discussed in section 5.6. with possibly even higher data rates 
than for RSA. It is interesting to note that the American National Institute of Standards 
(NIST) have recently decided against adopting RSA, and this could give a boost to the 
importance of other public key ciphers such as QRC described in this research. 
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One of the major problems in rigorously predicting, enforcing and analysing the 
behaviour of software is that systems are increasing in complexity faster than new 
techniques are developed to cope with them. The fields of safety-critical and fault-
tolerant computing, however, may have something to offer in this area. I f the functional 
correctness of a security system cannot be guaranteed after an attack or mishap, it should 
at least be possible to ensure that the system 'fails safe' in that i t always reverts to a 
known state which would be designed to contain the damage as far as possible. In 
practice, this would mean a state in which minimum (and preferably zero) information 
was disclosed to the attacker. This was one of the aims of the CSS. 
The problem of covert channels has been briefly touched upon in section 4.2.2. and 
elsewhere. While integrity protocols can be devised to minimise this threat, the very 
mechanisms that can help to prevent this problem can be exploited to exacerbate it. In 
particular, the recent cryptographic concept of a subliminal channel [SEBE,1988] could 
be a difficult threat to deal with. This concept involves the notion of communication on 
'two levels' via an encoding mechanism. There is the 'overt' contents of the message 
for all to see, but buried within the 'noise' is another subliminal communication channel 
which exploits the unused information bandwidth of the overt channel. 
It is possible that artificial intelligence (AI) techniques could be employed, especially in 
the SMCs for intelligent supervision of the connections. This could allow potential 
problems to be predicted before they became serious and remedial action taken. 
Another recent development is that of zero knowledge. This is a mechanism by which 
it is possible to exchange secrets with neither party being able to discover the secret of 
the other parly until the exchange is complete. This eliminates the problem which can 
arise in the normal protocols where one party must transmit first. A t this stage, it is 
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possible for the other party to refuse to cooperate further, thus discovering the secret of 
the sender but not revealing anything in return. Some of the protocols used by the CSS 
require this two-way cooperation such as symmetric key exchange. The extension of the 
CSS protocols to use zero knowledge might provide an elegant solution to these 
problems. 
7.4. The Future of Distributed Systems 
The future of distributed systems is assured. The adoption of global information 
technology strategies is likely within the next twenty years and as the amount of 
potentially sensitive information carried increases (such as credit references, medical 
records and so forth) the need for security wil l be paramount. As security awareness 
grows among commercial users to the extent already prevalent among the financial and 
military communities the onus wi l l be on network providers to make available a security 
system which is of demonstrable validity. Failure to do this is likely to result in severe 
under-utilisation of the benefits and resources of the information technology revolution. 
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ANNEX 1: Circuit diagram of CSS Hardware and source code for ROM firmware 
The circuit diagram of the PC version of the CSS local hardware is given overleaf followed 
by the assembler source code for the ROM firmware. 
231 
to 
Aa 
A 3 
A 5 
A B 
A 7 
A S 
A 9 
A 1 O 
A 1 1 
A 1 2 
A 1 3 
A 1 ^ 
A 1 5 
A 1 • 
A 1 7 
A 1 • 
A 1 S 
A E = N 
M R 
D O 
o-t 
D 2 
D 3 
OA 
OS 
OB 
D 7 
44. 
4^ 
42. 
1 C 1 
1 A 1 y Y 1 
1 A 2 1 Y 3 
1 A 3 1 Y 3 
1 A . 4 1 Y 4 
a A 1 a Y 1 
2 A a 2 Y 2 
a A 3 a Y 3 
2 A 4 S Y ^ 
1 C 
2 G 
1 A 1 
1 A 2 
1 A 3 
1 A t 
a A i 
3 A 2 
2 A 3 
a A 4 
1 C 
ac 
1 Y 1 
1 Y 2 
1 Y 3 
1 Y i 
2 Y 1 aY2 
2 Y 3 aY-i 
7 4 H C 2 1 4 
1 A 1 
1 A 2 
1 A 3 
1 A « 
2 A 1 
a A S 
2 A 3 
2 A 4 
1 C ; 
2 C 
1 Y 1 
t Y 2 
1 Y 3 
1 Y 4 
H Y 1 aY2 aY3 
2 Y 4 
7 4 H C 2 < 4 4 
D 1 
oa 
0 3 
Q 4 
B 3 
• 8 
D 7 
QB 
A 1 
A 2 
A 3 
A 4 
A 5 
A S 
A 7 
A Q 
G 
D I H 
43. 
7 4 I - I C 2 4 3 
4 1 - ^ 
15 (^ P 
'0 /KA 1H AO 
4a. g A l l / T N f t i ^ 
7 A i g y ^ A i n 
^ " A 1 B 
1 A 1 7 
A 1 B 
7 4 H C O -
I c 7 a 
[> 
. C 7 0 
4£. 
A4 .A2. 
.AZ. 
i i 
A 1 Q S_L 
.AJ4 £ i 
7 4 H C 0 4 
J2J. 
A O 
A 1 
A 2 
A 3 
A 4 
A S 
A 6 
A 7 
A 1 0 
A 1 1 
A 1 2 
ca2 
• • 
O 1 
D 2 
0 3 
OS 
oe 
D 7 
44 43_ JUL 
4ii-
4 i . 
i i 
74t-«c3 a 
i c ? e 
7 4 I - I C D 4 
Qvh 
C 1 
1 O u P 1 O n F 
n 1 
2 7 0 
D 1 
L E O 
A L L T T L 
C H I P S 
M E M O H Y 
C M I P S 
Figure A l . l . Circui t diagram of the P C version of the local C S S hardware 
CSS S E C U R I T Y HARDWARE M O D U L E A S S E M B L E R SOURCE 
Simon J Shepherd 
CR equ Odh 
L F equ Oah 
cseg segment 
org 
byte public 'code* 
0 
assume cs:csegrds:cseg,es:cseg 
; Start the code segment 
; Zero origin 
start equ 
db 
db 
db 
055h 
OAAh 
03h 
; standard IBM ROM header 
; three 512 byte blocks 
CSS bios init proc far 
jmp code_start 
table: db *0123456789ABCDEF' 
msg_l 
db CR 
db 'NETWORK R E S E A R C H G R O U P \ C R , L F 
db 'Comprehensive Security System',CR.LF 
db C R . L F 
db 'Version 2.0 for IBM PC/XT/AT/PS2 + BIOS C O M P A T I B L E S ' . C R . L F 
db C R , L F 
db 'Department of Electrical Engineering',CR,LF 
db 'University of Bradford',CR,LF 
db 'Bradford U K . ' , C R , L F 
db ' +44 (274) 384052',CR,LF 
db C R , L F 
db 'This machine is fiilly controlled by the NRG Comprehensive',CR.LF 
db 'Security System. The system will only be permitted to ' ,CR,LF 
db 'boot from security device drivers in C : \ C O N F I G . S Y S ' , C R . L F 
db ' * • • BOOT FROM FLOPPY IS PROHIBITED * * * ' , C R , L F 
db C R . L F 
db 'Press a key to continue . . . ' , C R , L F 
code_start: 
mov 
mov 
mov 
lea 
ax,ss 
es,ax 
si,sp 
bx.cs: table 
; Get segment and offset of 
; caller from stack and 
; display 
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mov ah.Oeh 
mov 
int 
mov 
caU 
mov 
int 
mov 
call 
mov 
int 
a l . T 
lOh 
dx,es:tsi+2] 
write_word 
al / :* 
lOh 
dx,es:[si] 
writeword 
a i / r 
lOh 
mov 
mov 
ax.cs 
es.ax 
; ES:BP points to message 
mov bp, offset msg_l 
mov ax,l30Ih 
mov bx,004fh 
mov cx,offset code_start - offset msg_l 
mov dx.OlOlh 
int lOh 
; Write chr/attr T T Y 
; Page 0 White on Red 
; Length of message 
; GotoXY (1,1) 
mov 
int 
ah,0 
I6h 
; press a key... 
sub 
mov 
ax,ax 
es.ax 
; address zero segment 
; (vectors & ICA) 
mov ax,word ptr es:[4*40h] 
mov bx,es:[4*40h+2] 
mov word ptr es:[04fOh],ax 
mov es:[04f2h],bx 
mov ax,055AAh 
mov word plr es:f04f4h],ax 
get old int $40 vec offset 
& segment 
save offset at 0000:04*0 
save segment at O000:04f2 
signature 
store sig 
mov 
cli 
mov 
mov 
sti 
ax,offset int_40 
word ptr es:[4*40h],ax 
es:[4*40h+2],cs 
; load our int $40 handler address 
ret far return back to BIOS POST 
css_bios_init endp 
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handler_40 proc far 
int 40: 
mov 
stc 
iret 
ah.SOh 
handler_40 endp 
write proc near 
write_word: 
mov al.dh 
call write_hi_nybble 
mov al.dh 
call write_lo_nybble 
mov al,dl 
call write_hi_nybble 
mov al.dl 
call write_lo_nybble 
ret 
write_hi_nybble: 
mov cl,4 
shr al,cl 
jmp write hex 
write_lo_nybble: 
and al,Ofh 
write_hex: 
xlat 
int lOh 
ret 
write endp 
; fake a timeout error 
; back to BIOS bootstrap 
IF ($ - start) MOD 512 
org ($ - start) + 512 - (($ - start) MOD 512) 
ENDIF 
db 600 DUP (OOh) 
cseg ends 
end 
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ANNEX 2 
A General Solution to Primality Testing and the Integer Factoring Problem 
Reference: Bressoud, D . M . Factorization and Prunality Testing, Springer 
Veriag. NY. 1989. ISBN 0 387 97040 1. 
Groups 
Definition: A group, G is a set together with a binary operation, say d, such that 
1. The operation is closed. I f x and y are in G then xBy is also in G. 
2. The operation is associative. I f x, y and z are in G, then {xdy)dz = xd(ydz). 
3. G contains an identity, say e. For each x in G, xde = edx = x. 
4. Each element of G has an inverse. I f a: is in G, then there is a y in G such that 
xdy = ydx = e. 
The integers with addition form a group. Zero is the identity and -x is the inverse of x. This 
group is called Z. 
If n is any positive integer, the integers less than and relatively prime to n together with 
multiplication modulo n form a group. This group is called U(Z/nZ). 
The order of a group G, denoted by |G | , is the number of elements in G. 
Given a group G with binary operation 3, identity e, and an element jc in G, the powers of x 
in G are defined as follows: 
x#-l = the inverse of x, 
xm = e, 
x#l = X, 
x#2 = xdXy 
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jc#3 = xdxdx, and so on. 
and in general 
xm = xd(xm-\)) = (x#-l)a(;t#(/+l)). 
The order of an element jc in G is the smallest positive integer / such that 
e = xm 
If the group G has finite order, then every jc in G has a finite order, and if JC is an element of 
G then the order of x divides the order of G. 
G is a group modulo n if its elements are vectors of residues modulo n and its binary operation 
b is defined in terms of arithmetic modulo n. I f d is any divisor of n, then the restricted group 
modulo d, denoted G\d, is the group derived from G by reducing each coordinate modulo d. 
A General Approach to Primality Tests 
Let w be a candidate for primality and assume we have a group G whose elements are a subset 
of the residues modulo n or some subset of vectors of residues modulo n. Further assume that 
the possible orders of elements of G depend on the factorization of n in such a way that an 
element of order m can exist if and only if n is prime. I f we know the factorization of /«, we 
can prove that an element JC in G has order m i f we can verify that 
xfim = e and xff{m/p) ^ e 
for every prime p dividing m. Formalising this in a theorem, 
Theorem: Let / i be a suspected prime, and assume that there exists a group modulo n, say G. 
Let G|rf be the restricted group modulo d and lei e be the identity in G. I f we can find an 
element JC in G and an integer/n satisfying the following conditions, then n is definitely prime: 
I . The integer m is larger than the order of G l ^ would be for any prime q 
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dividing n and less than the square root of n, 
2. xf/m = e, 
3. For each prime p dividing m, some coordinate of xff(m/p) -els relatively prime 
to n. 
A General Approach to Factorization 
The following is a general solution to the factoring problem, and represents the underlying 
theory of most of the factoring algorithms in existence, including: 
Fermat*s Method gcd {x - y, n) 
Euler*s Method gcd {ad - be, n) 
Shank's SQUFOF gcd (/I,./ ± 7?, n) 
Morrison & Brillhart's Method gcd {x + y, n) 
Pollard's Rho gcd (Xzi - JC ,^ n) 
Pollard's p-1 gcd (b^' - 1, n) 
William's/?+l gcdib^' - 1, n) 
Legendre's Method gcd (x - y, n) 
Lucas Sequences gcd (Vj,, - 2, n) 
Kraitchik's Method gcd {x - y, n) 
Pomerance's Quadratic Sieve gcd (x - y, n) 
Lenstra's Elliptic Curve Algorithm gcd (x - y, n) 
Pollard's Number Field Sieve gcd {x - y, n) 
Let n be an integer known to be composite, and p be an unknown prime divisor of n. Let G 
be a group modulo n and G|p the restricted group modulo p. I f the order of G\p is 
considerably less than the order of G, then we can hope to find an element j in G and an 
integer k such that xf^(k\) is not the identity in G, but the corresponding computation in G\p 
does yield the identity of G|p. This means that there is at least one coordinate of xff{k\) - e 
which is not divisible by n, but all of the coordinates are divisible by p. Taking the greatest 
common divisor of n and the coordinate which is not divisible by n will yield a non-trivial 
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divisor of n. 
Of course, i f n is prime, the above approach will run for ever and produce only inconclusive 
results. Even if n is composite, there is no way of knowing a priori that the order of G \p will 
divide k\ for some prime p dividing n. We observe in addition that this approach also requires 
an efficient means of calculating at least one coordinate of xff(k\). 
Summing up this idea in a theorem. 
Theorem; Let « be a composite integer and let G be a group modulo n. Let p be a prime 
dividing n and let G|p be the restricted group modulo p. I f the order of G \p divides k\, then 
p divides each coordinate of xff{k\) - e. I f / i does not divide the r*^  coordinate of x#(^!) - e, then 
the greatest common divisor of n and the coordinate of xfi{k\) - e is a non-trivial divisor of 
n. 
Factorization Times 
The following table illustrates the expected time to factor various sizes of integers of no special 
form using a CRAY II supercomputer. 
DIGITS BITS TIME 
15 50 3 seconds 
50 166 1 minute 
75 250 10 hours 
100 332 2 months 
176 585 1 million years 
200 664 15 million years 
255 847 15 billion years (15 * lO') 
300 996 15 trillion years (15 * 10*^ ) 
500 1660 15 * 10^ centuries (150 billion trillion 
years) 
The current estimate for the present age of the universe is about 15 billion years, which 
corresponds roughly to the time required to factor a 255 digit number. This is the order of the 
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key size used by the encryption mechanisms in the CSS. 
Some keys generated by the CSS QRC Key Generator 
60 digit key 
= 21047754979673754543478202726855879255167357908757 
1155514269 
S,| = 79115453021138497575239 
S^ = 2660384814335841665315891966390795771 
100 digit keys 
= 10001509679053340702344207115108909674215089803237 
2749847253201995255414434149652861257283484425441 
S„ = 44306346841216415011486282093426358611 
= 2257353718395337873767965218168636108235636739161 
604315473531 
P, = 6456328955025732600901768839360622715953044907509 
9554891846887848519107414209061804992401536802877 
Sk. = 19407102709770001680177215003984139911 
S^ = 3326786616002944900223455061639174693460046723353 
447648788507 
180 digit key 
Pk = 56231048169461842154453183945054559436655899401113 
92774549637493001334874736683792770298866508348023 
25794856280342249679351025648365697483629682773535 
862847508119351607599645568209 
S„ = 68795365326949132093237486000865997241233651371299 
893723575958300103 
Sk2 = 81736680810145383549986337251603531293116722637991 
" 2 4 0 
86000534575123232552160576135322389400577983143044 
622607579303 
200 digit keys 
Pk = 27529629391493083271949844202075242699600701123227 
19856290275025195586459675229537846318441585847638 
60957247936200705406098926554618604902759111387772 
49440403691706709326706330050993014191539473777629 
S,, = 30932250113805811778757012199202741885275698136910 
8404949741456090111864903 
= 88999763322119083293455152349074573302883387702693 
95854819275900267497996880495580175697245767643118 
9418179437137016813715643 
= 11062149228898998505918983166254647000543307822872 
58147511513818118711542735206718616564274389444099 
19541197394923874561847893631086436409005332464949 
72630062285236189195544751841124291941686415754801 
= 19982264781855869999789558687431224364527302406360 
7834266413527717027085203 
= 55359837083850271638465552841068131727326890997939 
69993717549540671364527686272299297623488771851934 
9347502953926899453655467 
250 digit key 
Pfc = 25493167138607526311988918211048849847392554872720 
82139428191050897557320921554113363060166734786595 
79605465598321908644578575376161944823317657734488 
63430123179494554019455701247838406999529271731964 
98080509599473991501838989720165350503180262678193 
St, = 29902544272176037747513316548240492723898386928364 
22065757375502108156874723067644718147202318879502 
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7994302084134592928984I47 
= 85254174048087993361147598964095896407882541231053 
28667205682655993970216169507650744747499153857167 
16449I2032850232367450219 
255 digit key 
= 35997033893992544157448887437980433108136660483899 
21925535766962411515054366501927688156444884914517 
59218541270255525536998667250764838256113849450165 
49879053791636566188206462426819476668453319466279 
59034003389556370567743285062333658734869031224186 
4149 
Sk, = 50567646988756850813135730231478752930207488922499 
93898014962563919355113058138816509663294861008964 
362746920973790579375683483 
= 71185898568695674001871629425665213707472058103218 
57041699833148667243791836799750752869008855519630 
449977370689677731216813903 
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ANNEX 3: SOURCE CODE LISTINGS 
The complete source code listings of the Comprehensive Security System are supplied on 
floppy disk, bound within the master copy of this thesis. 
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ANNEX 4: INTRODUCTION TO PREDICATE CALCULUS 
Simple ideas, the truth of which can be captured in true or false, are called propositions, and 
are denoted by letters. For example, the proposition P, 
P : "Esmerelda is a duck" 
is either true or false. The formalism allows the capture of truth about propositions by 
providing some components of the formal language which map onto properties of the object. 
These are called predicates. The property of 'being a duck' can be captured, for example, by 
the predicate duck (x), where x is ^free variable, and can be filled by the names of suitable 
objects to create propositions. We can write, for example, duck(Fred) which will be true if 
Fred is a duck but false if Fred is a dog. The act of assigning an instance to a predicate to 
form a propositions is called instantiation. The predicate itself is not said to be truth valued, 
in other words, it cannot be ascribed the values true or false. It is only when the predicate is 
instantiated with an object that the resulting proposition can be truth valued. It is important 
to realise that the instantiation of general objects can lead to difficult philosophical problems. 
For instance, duck(hope) is difficult, because while the instantiation is valid, the 'duckness of 
hope' is a difficult concept to grasp! The predicate duck(x) is called a unary predicate, since 
there is only one place for an object to be instantiated. It is quite possible, however, to have 
/i-ary place predicates, such as father(x,y) where someone can clearly be the father of more 
than one other person. 
Applying the formalism, the rules of inference discussed previously can be applied to predicates 
to obtain inferences which are new. For example, starting with the propositions 
'Esmerelda is a duck' 
'Ducks like water' 
we can infer the result that 'Esmerelda likes water'. It is very important not to draw false 
inferences, however. If the two propositions were 
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*Sam is cold* 
'Sam is wet' 
the formalism does not infer that Sam is cold because he is wet. The concept of consequence 
is the result of far higher levels of abstraction of which the human mind is capable. 
We now extent the above formalism to include the notion of quantification, and now predicates 
can give rise to propositions in two ways. First, free variables can be instantiated with the 
names of objects as described above. Second, quantification can be used to effect the 
instantiation process itself. Quantification introduces two additional symbols to the formalism, 
V and 3. These symbols are used to capture the ideas of universal and existential qualification 
respectively. Universal quantification allows propositions of the form "every object has this 
property" or "for all objects of this form". By contrast, the existential quantifier captures the 
notion of 'someness', "there exists exactly one or more". When a quantifier is applied to a 
predicate with a free variable(s), the variable is said to be bound by the quantifier because it 
can no longer be freely instantiated. 
To give examples of these quantifications, the assertion 
\/x»duck(x) 
captures the (false) assertion that "every object is a duck". By contrast, the assertion 
^•duckfx) 
captures the (probably true) assertion that "there exists at least one duck". 
Finally, we are in a position to use the formalism to discover inferences about real situations. 
Let us explore the ways of capturing the notion "ducks like the pond", where pond is an 
identifiable object in the domain of interest. We choose duck(x) to denote the assertion that 
some object is a duck, pond to represent the pond, and likes(x,y) to denote x likes y. We now 
carefully abstract the semantics of what we are trying to say. The original notion could be 
rephrased "whatever value we choose for x, i f jc is a duck than x likes the pond". The 
IF..THEN idea has already been encountered, and is reflected by the symbol => in the 
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formalism. (Note that in Chapter 6 where a modified form of this logic is used, the => symbol 
is given a completely different meaning). This sort of reasoning leads to a sentence of the form 
y^x*(duck(x)=>likes(x,pond)) 
Clearly, if we do not instantiate this with jc = duck then the sentence will (probably) not be 
true. We need to try another approach. Let us try the phrase "there exists a duck that likes 
the pond". The major difference between this and the previous idea is that the notion that is 
now being expressed is that there is in our domain of interest at least one duck. Note very 
carefully that we are not thinking along the lines of " i f there is a duck then...", but along the 
lines of "there is a duck and...". Within the formalism we use the symbol A to represent the 
logical 'and' concept. With the benefit of this insight we construct the sentence 
^•(duck(x) A likes(x,pond)) 
This states that within our domain of interest there exists (at least one) duck, and that it likes 
the pond. But if we want to learn from this observation and obtain the possible (new) piece 
of knowledge that "ducks like water", it is necessary to progress the argument. We now need 
to say that not only do ducks like the pond, but that they also like any object that has the 
property of being made of water. (Note that when the pond was introduced, its existence was 
assumed, but now we cannot be sure i f there exist any objects which are wet). Let the 
predicate waterfy) denote that y has the property of being wet, and we wish to express the idea 
that " i f X is a duck and y is a wet object, then x likes y", and that this be true for whatever 
objects we choose for x and y. We can write 
>ix*>^y{{duck(x) A \vater(y))-^likes(x,y)) 
This sentence will be true even if there are no ducks and no water. 
Finally, we can use the formalism to eliminate ambiguities which arise as a consequence of 
natural language. The natural language sentence "there is a duck who likes every wet object" 
can be interpreted two ways. Firstly, it could mean that is one specific, water-loving duck who 
likes every wet object. Secondly, it could mean that for every wet object, there is a duck 
somewhere that likes it. Ambiguities such as these cannot arise in the formalism, because the 
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two formal sentences expressing the two possibilities would be quite different. 
The ideas discussed above can be extended much further to create large bodies of knowledge 
such as abstract set theory, theories of functions and specialised algebras. These can then be 
applied to software constructs to yield a representation of the software in a rigorous way. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACSE Association control service element 
A I Artificial intelligence 
API Application program interface 
ASE Application service element 
CCITT International Telegraph & Telephone Consultative Committee 
CRC Cyclic redundancy check 
CSS Comprehensive Security System 
DES National Bureau of Standards Data Encryption Standard 
DMM Data manipulation mechanism 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
DU Data unit 
EBCDIC Extended binary coded decimal interchange code 
ECIVi Elliptic curve method (integer factoring algorithm) 
ECMA European Computer Manufacturers Association 
EEA External environment agent 
EEC European Economic Community 
FADU File access data unit 
FEAL Fast encryption algorithm 
FPDU FTAM protocol data unit 
FTAM File Transfer, Access and Management 
IDCA Inter-domain communication agent 
lO Input/output 
ISO International Standards Organisation 
ISORM ISO Reference Model (refers to the OSI model) 
JANET British Universities Joint Academic Network 
LAN Local area network 
MA Monitoring agent 
MHS Message Handling System 
MOTIS Message Oriented Text Interchange System 
MPQS Multiple polynomial quadratic sieve (integer factoring algorithm) 
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NFS Number field sieve (integer factoring algorithm) 
NIST (American) National Institute of Standards 
NPDU Network protocol data unit 
ODP Open distributed processing 
OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
OSIRM OSI Reference Model 
PC Personal Computer (IBM compatible) 
PDU Protocol data unit 
PGM Protocol generation mechanism 
PSAP Presentation service access point 
QOS Quality of service 
RSA Rivest, Shamir & Adleman (Crypiosystem) 
SAA Security administrator agent 
SAP Service access point 
SASE Specific application service element 
SDU Service data unit 
SMA Security mechanism agent 
SMC Security Management Centre 
SMIB Security management information base 
SMIBA SMIB agent 
SS Session (layer) service 
SPDU Session protocol data unit 
SSA Security services agent 
SSDU Session service data unit 
TS Transport service 
TPDU Transport protocol data unit 
TSDU Transport service data unit 
UA User Agent 
WAN Wide area network 
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This paper presents an overview of a comprehensive sccurir)* 
architecture for use within, and as a value-added enhancement 
to, (he ISO Open System Interconnection model. The system is 
arranged basically as an application layer ser\'ice but can allow 
all of the ISO-recommended security facilities to be provided 
ai any layer of the model. It is suitable as an "add-on" service to 
existing arrangements or can be fully integrated into new 
applications. For large-scale, distributed processing operations, 
a network of "security' management centres" is suggested, that 
can help to ensure that system misuse is minimized, and that 
flexible operations are provided in an cfTicicnt manner. 
Keyufords: Security, Protocols, Computer nct\vorks. Security 
management. Policy. Agents. 
1. In t roduc t ion 
Open distributed processing (OOP) is the con-ceptual framework \^^tllin which systems o f 
diverse application and location can interact freely 
i f required. Because there may be many different 
components, operations, resources and entities 
involved in such an arrangement, a network con-
structed wi t l i i n tliis framework presents a very 
convenient target for various attacks and illegal 
operations, which means that protection o f the 
system resources and assets is becoming an increas-
ingly important factor in network design. 
The comprehensive security system (CSS) to be 
described involves the provision o f securit)' services 
for use at, and for the transfer o f data between, 
remote end user entities. W i t h i n the ISO model, 
there are potentially many different services and 
applicarions which w i l l benefit f rom a value-added 
sccurit)' system, but in general, each requiring a 
difTcrenr combination or sequence o f securit)' 
functions. 
Systems currently exist which have made some 
attempt to implement sccurit)' measures. In many 
cases, the most effective are those which were con-
ceived f rom the outset to offer securit)' as a prime 
function, and are t)'pical o f those used by govern-
ments, miiitar) ' and financial insritutions. 
The majori t) ' o f other communicarions systems 
which exist, however, were not originally con-
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ccivcd w i t h the sccuric)' function in mind, and 
make no provision for it other than allowing the 
execution o f specific applications which have 
sccurit)' measures bui l t into their facilities on an 
individual basis. A typical example is the J A N E T 
academic network, which does not provide encr)'p-
tion facilities, but may be used to send encrypted 
messages i f the appropriate mechanisms are pro-
vided by individual system users. A secure e-mail 
facility using the RSA algorithm has been imple-
mented in the Polytechnic and is used for secure 
correspondence w i t h collaborators at home and 
abroad. The disadvantage of this approach is that it 
is ver)' d i f f i cu l t to assess the overall strength o f 
such a system, where securit)' is provided on an 
individual "ad hoc" basis, owing to the absence o f a 
formal architecmre capable o f rigorous analysis. 
The concept of a CSS, which can be retrospectively 
added to an cxisring data processing system as a 
value-added funct ion provider, and t ic intcgrit) ' o f 
which can be demonstrated by formal models and 
methods of logical analysis, is ver)' attractive to 
owners and managers o f large, existing communi -
cation networks. New applicarions can be written 
to utilize die securit)' functions on offer, and exist-
ing applicarions can be modified or updated to use 
the system, but may involve substantial low level 
programming. 
2. The Security Function 
Generally, .securit)' refers to a complex o f measures, 
which may be broadly classified into 111 
• procedural; [e.g. selecting rrustwordiy personnel, 
changing passwords regularly, etc.) 
• logical; (ri^'. access controls and cr)'ptography) 
• physical; (e.g. vaults and doorlocks, screening 
against emanation o f interprerable emissions, etc.) 
which are aimed at the 
• prevenrion; 
• detection and indicarion; 
• correction; 
o f certain kinds o f system misuse, accidental and 
deliberate. 
Securit)' not only addresses attacks and threats 
external to the system, but internal attacks f rom 
known user cnrities. I f guarantees o f aurhenncarion 
can be provided, it is possible to devise a system in 
which all user cnnnes arc subject to strict access 
control, thus minimizing the internal threat. O f 
course, it is virtually impossible to stop a user 
passing information to an attacker directly, so user 
trust and strong enforcement procedures are also 
required. 
On ly audiorized users can obtain/provide informa-
tion which wi l l help to eliminate, as far as possible, 
misuse o f die system, such as eavesdropping on 
confidential data, abuse o f resources, fraudulent 
acrivit)'. forger)' o f messages etc. The recom-
mended range o f services which a securit)' system 
could provide is comprehensively addressed in ref. 
m . 
3. Common Security Measures 
Currently, if a parricular applicarion requires 
securit)' services, these are generally constructed by 
hardware/software means into the applicarion itself 
f rom conceprion. In a system where there are 
several normal (insecure) applicarions. and one or 
rwo secure services, this approach is quite s^ris-
faccor)'. 
By contrast, in a system where there arc many pos-
sible applicarions, as wi th ODP, a large number o f 
which may require securit)' faciliries, it is clearly 
wasteful for each applicarion to provide a complete 
set o f securit)' services for its own private use, when 
a majorit) ' subset o f the services could be common 
to most, i f not all, applicarions. 
A system was considered which attempted to over-
come this problem o f duplicated services, by scek-
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ing to intercept all input and output (both data and 
control) to and f rom applications^ and to impose 
security functions upon the application by redirec-
tion o f the data via a sccurit)' system kernel. 
In principle, all software application packages 
should be written to standardized specificarions. 
For example, applicarion layer enrities wi thin the 
ISO OSI seven-layer model should conform to the 
ISO reference model [2]. O n invesrigarion, how-
ever, this is far f rom the case in pracrice. Had all 
cxisring software adhered strictly to specifications, 
it may have been possible (albeit very rcdius) to 
implement such an I / O redirecoon system, wli ich 
could cope wi th the widely differ ing interface, data 
and control requirements o f all the various applica-
tions. Since the majority o f software applications 
are written as an amorphous entity, wi th no 
obvious interface standards, the concept was dis-
carded as impracrical. Even within the context o f a 
local area network o f personal computers, running 
MS DOS for example, the amount o f operating 
system interrupt handling to account for all DOS 
file I / O alone, proves to be an extremely dif f icul t 
task. 
The concept of providing a security system which 
is indepcn(3ent of, but available to, specific applica-
tions on request, is therefore only possible i f the 
applications themselves arc modified to include a 
standardized applicarion program interface (API). 
The requests for security services, control and data 
information and any other data must flow in a 
rigidly defined manner across the interface which 
shall enable analysis o f the data flow protocols for 
formal dcmonsrrarion o f the strength o f the system 
to be made. 
can be conceived in terms o f a security policy, 
rigorously enforced upon those enriries who are 
subject to that policy. The security policy repre-
sents die overall .set o f measures adopted to f u l f i l 
the desired security function and covers every 
aspect o f the business o f implementing an effecrive 
security system. It w i l l involve: 
(1) Provision o f physical, hardware and software 
security mechanisms, such as locked and guarded 
buildings, protected terminals, encryprion and so 
on; 
(2) Defini t ion o f protocols for all data transfers 
v\'ithin the system, either embedded w i t h i n existing 
OSI protocols, or interfaced to them; 
(3) An enforcement o f the fundamental principles 
o f access control, user idenrificarion/authcntica-
rion; 
(4) Provision for effecrivc system resource protec-
rion and oprimizarion o f use. This includes such 
measures as integrit)' o f resources, confidenrialit) ' 
o f use o f resources, assurance o f scr\Mcc, accounta-
bil i ty o f usage o f resources, audit trail etc.; 
(5) Provision for monitoring, logging and analysis 
o f the security' system at all rimes, for both op r imi -
zarion o f system resources, and detection o f pos-
sible subversive acrivit)'. 
The security policy is formulated and dictated by 
an authority, which is ultimately responsible for 
the overall performance and effectiveness o f the 
system. 
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4. Conceptual model of a comprehensive 
security system 
4.1 Security Policy 
W i t h i n an ODP environment, involving the trans-
fer o f informarion berween remote end-user 
systems, the provision o f a generic security funcrion 
4.2 Security Domains and their Administration 
The authority delegates the implementarion o f 
security poUcy to a system administrator. In a large 
network, there may be a number o f administrators 
responsible for rigid observation o f the securit)' 
policy. The purview o f a security administrator is 
known as a security domain. A security domain is 
defined as a bounded group o f security objects and 
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scciirif) ' subjects to which applies a single sccurit)' 
polic)' implemented by a security administrator. 
The security domain is a managerial/control con-
cept that defines the scope o f a particular sccurit)' 
policy |3] . Where the number o f securit)' subjects 
and objects is large, they may be formed into sub-
groups for ease o f management. Such a subgroup is 
referred to as a subdomain. Normally, the policy o f 
the overall domain w i l l apply to all subdomains. 
Thus a domain covers all or part o f a given dis-
tributed system. 
One authorit)' w i l l dictate policy for one domain, 
and another authorit) ' wi l l dictate policy for 
another domain. A successful association should 
only be possible i f the security policies, services and 
mechanisms o f both end systems are compatible. 
Ahhough there is no logical difference between 
local activities and remote activities, a local activ^t)' 
may be assured o f compatibilit) ' wi th in a securit)' 
policy local to the domain, whereas a remote 
activit)' may require intcrdomain "translation" pro-
tocols to ensure effectiveness o f an overall sccurit)' 
policy. This may lead to incompatibilit) ' between 
domains, in this event, the incompatibiiit) ' is arbi-
trated and resolved by reference to a higher 
aiithorit)'. These higher authorities may take the 
fo rm o f regional and then national committees, 
that must meet given codes o f practice, contractual 
specifications, or the ISO standards. Any authorit)' 
dictating policy, not conforming to these standards 
w i l l by default exclude itself f rom conncctivit)' 
wi th in the complete open securit)' framework. 
W i t h i n each domain, the securit)' administrator is 
responsible for the implementation o f the domain 
policy and for assuring its continued effectiveness. 
This responsibilit)' includes the installation o f 
trusted hardware and software functionalit) ' , mon i -
toring day-to-day operations, and recover)' in case 
o f breach o f sccurit)' or fault conditions. 
A logical model can be constructed w i d i a defined 
hierarchy where each entit)' wi th in the model wi l l 
ItoUcy 
AHi-iCHnriiJ 
u 
API 
API 
CES IHTTTTTH 
061 t<jT± 
Fxictini: 
1 1 1 n 
AjOlt 2 AfJTTt 3 
MschmijEil ttilviiisrC ffaiMniaia] 
Fit;. I- Sccuriry object hierarchy within securir>' tloniaiii (infor-
in.Trion data). 
have specific tasks to perform under the purview o f 
its superior, see Fig. I . 
W i t h i n this model, any user entit)' or application 
entit)' that is allowed by the securit)' policy to 
access the securit)' services can obtain/provide 
information securely to other authorized users 
wi th in the O D P environment. A user cntit) ' may 
request the access o f an object or scr\'ice in normal 
(insecure) mode (either accidentally or inten-
tionally), but i f this object or cntit) ' is itself subject 
to the sccurit)' policy, then that policy wi l l force 
the securit)' services to be invoked for this activit)', 
or access wi l l not be possible at all. This approach 
to security polic)' w i l l account for both human 
error, and attempts at criminal misuse o f the 
system. 
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5. Conceptual Model of C S S Processor 
Essentially, the CSS coexists wi th the application 
entities it is to protect. W i t h i n the context o f the 
OSI model, the CSS w i l l reside wi th in the applica-
tion layer as another entit)' (see Fig. 2). The CSS 
has access ro both the calling application and 
the application user to request information when 
required, and these in t i i rn have access to the CSS 
to invoke functions when required. 
The CSS offers the application or user entity a 
number o f sccurit)' services, which the cnnxy must 
access through a standard application program 
interface (API) to the CSS. Tl ie API is provided by 
the CSS and generally depends on the system 
environment upon which the CSS is hosted. A p p l i -
cation cntirics must provide die correct format data 
to meet the requirements o f this interface in order 
to take advantage o f the CSS as a value-added 
service. The interface consists o f a set o f service and 
associated parameters used by the application and 
CSS. 
In practice, the CSS may comprise a trusted, 
tamper-proof hardware module, and associated 
software. The sccurit)' processor for a large dis-
tributed system, need not physically reside in one 
location, but may be itself distributed throughout 
the system. Indeed, such an arrangement may be 
advantageous. One approach is to adopt the con-
cept o f a securit)' management centre (SMC), 
wliich acts as a central securit)' "exchange", and 
which w i l l be responsible for the management and 
control o f secure activities on the network. This 
APR) 
w i l l include duties such as third-part) ' provision 
and verification o f public keys; notarization, regis-
trarion and certification services, and association 
policing to ensure the integrit)' o f a secure com-
munication between two users throughout the 
duration o f that associarion. 
Securit)' in very large systems may be implemented 
and controlled wi th the aid o f distributed sccurit)' 
processors based in sccurit)' management centres 
(SMC), analogous to packet-switching centres in 
data networks |4 ] . Eacli SMC would f u l l y control a 
number o f user terminals hosted upon it, deter-
mining authcnricarion, general user access rights 
and privileges which the SMC would hold in its 
securit)' management information base (SMIB). 
Secure communication across the network would 
involve protocols l ink ing each end user terminal ro 
the host SMC, and protocols l inking S M C to SMC 
(sec Fig. 3). The system would proWde fu l l flcxi-
bi l i t ) ' o f ser\'ices irrespective o f the location o f the 
user wi th in the network. 
5.1 Security Services Supported by the CSS 
Although the CSS is implemented as an applicarion 
entit)', it offers a f u l l OSI-widc flexibilit)' owing to 
the interface architccmre. It is very important both 
f rom the conceptual and practical points o f view, 
to appreciate the "vcrrical" structure o f the pro-
C i r c u i t o i ( E d i c t 
Fig. 2. Kcladon ofrhc CSS to users and applicarions. Fig. 3. The use ofscciirir)- inanagciiicnr ccnrrcs. 
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posed interface. An advantage o f this system is the 
potential flcxibilit)' due the possibiiit)' o f the CSS 
funcrions being called by other than operarions in 
the applicarion layer. The CSS API, which could 
take the fo rm o f a software interrupt, for example, 
is accessible f r o m any o f the OSI layers, not just the 
applicarion layer. It is quite permissible for the 
transport layer, for example, to request data 
encr)'prion services f r o m the CSS. This conforms 
w i d i the recomniendarions of OSI. which states 
that while the major i t ) ' o f sccurit)' functions can be 
carried out at the applicarion layer, diere are a few 
which may need ro be implemciired in different 
layers. 
The CSS supports, among odiers. the fol lowing 
securir)' funcrions: 
(1) Invocarion 
(2) Idenrificarion 
(3) Autlicnricarion 
(4) Key gencrarion 
(5) Key distriburion 
(6) Encr)'prion 
(7) Decr)'prion 
(8) Signature 
(9) Verification 
but the f u l l range o f OSI recommendations in 
securit)' | 2 | should be possible. 
Many different sccurit)' needs can be met by the 
concept o f a common set o f sccuric)' agents pro-
vided externally ro the applicarion processes. An 
agent is defined to be a logical component o f the 
sccurif)- system, designed to implement a parricular 
funcrion or group o f funcrions. The functional 
modularizarion o f the system in this manner makes 
possible die general definition o f a flexible sccurit)' 
architecture. These agents w i l l be involved wi th the 
interactions between users and applicarions, and 
the interacrion o f applicarions. These agents, their 
interacrion and management are central to die 
concept o f the CSS ro be described. A securit)' 
model comprising ten such agents is suggested. 
The generic structure o f the CSS. showing the ver-
rical nature o f the API, and hierarchy o f the inter-
nal agents, is shown in Fig. 4. 
6. The Agents of the C S S (see Fig. 5) 
6.1 User Agent (UA) 
The user agent (UA) o f die CSS comprises "half" 
the interface ro the CSS as seen by the user cnrity. 
The CSS can select which U A wi l l be urilized, 
cither the applicarion U A or the CSS U A itself, 
dependent on the state and requirements o f both 
the user and the CSS. This w i l l occur when the 
applicarion has requested a securit)' service f rom 
the CSS. and the CSS requires some informarion 
directly f rom die user, such as a password, etc. 
The main funcrioiis o f the user agent (CSS) can be 
considered: 
tailicaticn 
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Session 
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Layer 
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Fig. 4. Generic model o f ihc CSS. 
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l-ig. 5. Interactions between tlic 10 agents of the CSS. 
(1) To interface berween the user cnrit)' and the 
securit)' service agent (SSA) o f the CSS; 
(2) T o maintain a library o f user enrity request 
srarcmenLs, via which the U A wi l l determine 
request/response validity, and suitable responses to 
the user cntit) ' according to a strict set o f rules, thus 
l imit ing the number o f possible user actions; 
(3) To interpret all data f rom the user cntit) ' and 
ensure its validit)' before presenring it to the SSA. 
and to determine the locarion and namre o f errors, 
and inform the SSA accordingly. Also, to process all 
data from the SSA into a form suitable for inter-
pretation by the user enrit)' before preseiuarion to 
the user cnrit)'; 
(4) To accept a request f rom the SSA when the 
scr\'ice requested required further informarion 
f rom the user, and to act upon diis to interrogate 
die user in a suitable manner for this informarion; 
The UA is conceived as a separate enrit)' f rom the 
SSA because the U A must be capable o f interfacing 
wi th many user entiries. thus freeing the SSA f rom 
the complexities o f multiple interfaces. 
6.2 Security Services Agent (SSA) 
The CSS securit)' service agent (SSA) is the central 
control agent o f the CSS. It is responsible for: 
(1) Accepting and checking the validit) ' o f all CSS 
service requests f rom die OSI agent (OSIA). This is 
an important funcrion which is necessary to pre-
vent invalid calls f r o m tr)'ing to confuse or subvert 
die SSA into performing funcrions which are not 
permitted by the securit)' policy. This validarion is 
accomplished by the SSA checking all requests for 
securit)' services against the user enrit)' capabiliries 
and privileges stored in the SMIJ3 and the sequence 
o f operarions carried out to diat time. Any request 
not e.xpressely permitted for that user entit)' by the 
SMLI3 w i l l be refused. 
(2) Selecring the appropriate ser^'icc mechanisms 
pertinent to the function to be performed under 
the super\'ision o f die SMIB via the SMI l i Agent 
(SMIBA), passing the relevant subfuncrion control 
data to the ser\'ice mechanism agents, and sequenc-
ing die service mechanism agents corrccdy to per-
fo rm the requested sccurit)'service. 
(3) Ensuring die correct rouriiig of the inforniarion 
data to and f rom, and in the correct sequence 
among, the securit)' mechanisms. I t is possible to 
implement two completely different securit)' 
ser\'ices w i d i the same set o f securirx' mechanisms, 
but merely used in a different order. For example, 
two securif)' mechanisms implementing a com-
pression (hash) funcrion such as DES in block 
chaining mode, and an RSA encr)'prion/decr)'prion 
scheme could be used for ( l ) a hybrid file encr)'p-
rion system for a confidenrialit)' ser\'ice. (2) file and 
message signatures for non-repudiarion and integ-
rit)' checks and (3) checking signatures for aurhen-
ricit)' and integrit)'. 
(4) Checking w i d i the SMIB die capabilit)' o f die 
user enrit)'. and determining whether die user 
cnrit)' has the privilege to execute the requested 
ser\'ice. 
(5) Switching ber^veen applicarion U A and CSS 
UA. 
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6.3 Service Mechanism Agents fSMA) 
The service mechanism agents musr. 
(1) Accept control commands f r o m the SSA, and 
select and control the sccurit)' mechanisms to per-
f o r m die ser\'ice requested, including subfuncrion 
o f mul t i func t ion mechanisms. For example, a DES 
card could perform normal block encr)'prion. 
block chaining mode encr)'ption and so on. 
(2) Return to the ser\'icc agent status information 
including details o f function performed, status o f 
operation (success, failure) etc. 
6.4 SMIB Agent and SMIB (SMIBA) 
The SMIB is die **heart" o f die CSS and is the most 
important unit f rom the securit)' point o f view, and 
must be protected to the highest level o f securit)'. 
The SMIB w i l l comprise: 
The repositor)' in which the CSS maintains all data 
pertinent to the securit)' function, including such 
data as identifications o f authorized users, authen-
tication data, user enrit)' capabilities and privileges, 
etc. 
The SMIB Agent w i l l be responsible for interfacing 
die S M I l i to die other CSS agents, including: 
Accepting and processing all requests f r o m the 
ser\'icc agent for information f rom the SMIB, 
including such data as user entit)' identit) ' checks, 
user entit)' authorization, user cntit) ' capabilities 
and privileges, object entit)' validit)'. object entit)^ 
authorization, object entit)' securit)' stams etc. 
The internal data contents of the SMLB arc sum-
marized in Table I . 
System User Entity Data 
The SMIB shall hold information on the users' 
rights to access the system, and their capabilities 
and privileges wi th in it. The data w i l l include 
( l ) User system-wide name (unique identifier). 
T A I i L E I 
SMll i internal lt>gical data structure 
Name 1 
Name 2 
Name 3 
Name N 
—Itiformarion on system users • 
# Password I Extra data Capabilirics 
# Password 2 Extra data Capabiliries 
# Fasswi>rd }> E-Xtra data Capabihtics 
# Password N Extra data Capabiliries 
Function # 1 
Function # 2 
Function # 3 
Function # 4 
-Scciuencing data for sccuriry functions-
Sequencing data 
Sequencing data 
Sequencing data 
Sequencing data 
Secure store-
Temporary store for 
sensitive tiata not 
yci processed by CSS 
Obj #1 
Obj # 2 
Obj # 3 
Token 
Token 
Token 
(2) An encr)'ptcd version o f the user cnrities pass-
word, for use during authentication. The user 
entity therefore enters his password, wi i ich w i l l be 
encr)'pted via a one-way funct ion before compari-
son. This renders compromise o f die SMIB user-
name/password file less useful to an attacker, as i t 
is computationally infeasiblc to teconscruct the 
password f rom the encrypted version. The file 
itself, however, must be protected to prevent guess-
ing attacks on the passwords, the planting o f 
known encrypted passwords wi th in the file, and 
possible software attacks such as *'worm" programs 
|5] . 
(3) Further data known only to the user that may 
be used for further authentication in the case o f 
highly privileged operations or possible uncertainty 
oi identit) ' (this may be used in future when the 
system is semi-intelligent and takes account o f 
users* habits. I f a user habitually uses the system 
only in the mornings, then suddenly uses the sys-
tem one night, the CSS may require further proof 
o f idcnrit) ' than just the normal password). 
Measures such as these w i l l be in conjuncrion with 
the more familiar "unattended session" defences 
such as timeout after absence o f activit)'. 
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(4) A capabilit)' token summarizing the users' 
rights and privileges to perform certain operarions. 
This token is passed to the SSA when it needs to 
validate a user request. 
Security Function Sequencing Data 
As the CSS can perform a number o f functions 
wi th a limited number o f sccurit)' mechanisms, 
then in order to ensure that securit)' services are 
correctly performed in accordance with sccurit)' 
policy, the SSA w i l l control the SMA strictly i n 
accordance wi th sequencing data held in the SMn3. 
This wi l l prevent irregular requests (which may 
have been specifically constructed ambiguously as 
an attack on the system) f rom being accepted by 
the SSA. 
Temporary Data Store 
For a full-duplex connection, or wi th a muln-user 
arrangement associated w i t h the encr)'ption func-
tions, chained or feedback vectors w i l l be required 
for the two different transmission directions, and 
possibly for a number o f simultaneous connecrion 
conditions. This information must be stored until 
the relevant data arrives. Also, i t is possible that the 
CSS w i l l be interrupted f rom processing I / O to 
service a request f rom another local user entit)'. 
Should the CSS be about to encr)'pt a sensitive 
piece o f data which is still in plaintext, it w i l l store 
this piece o f data wi thin the SMIB to ensure that i t 
is safe unti l the CSS has rime to process it. Simi-
larly, incoming data may also be stored here until 
they are processed. 
System Objects Data 
The SMIB is likely to hold data on the general 
security status o f objects wi th in the system (files, 
databases etc.) in the fo rm o f tokens. When a user 
subject entit)' wishes to access a system object 
entit)', the user enrit)' is authenticated against his 
SMIB data as described. The capabilit)' o f the user 
entity is also matched against the classification of 
the object entit)' to ensure that the user enrif)' 
privilege is equal or higher. 
6.5 Security Administrator Agent (SAA) 
The security administrator agent (SAA) is respon-
sible for allowing only the administrator to provide 
modificarions to the existing system. There must be 
very strict protocols and authentication for this 
t)'pe o f operation wi th in the system. The SAA is 
also responsible for the strict imposit ion o f system 
securif)' policy upon the individual operation o f 
and interaction between, the odier agents o f the 
CSS. The main funct ion o f the SAA involves con-
trol l ing the SMIBA to place informarion into the 
SMIB, or modify existing information as new users 
are added to the system, existing users removed, 
sccurit)' policy updated, user capabilities and p r i -
vileges modified, and adding/modifying mechan-
isms and services. 
6.6 AGENT for Interactions with other OSI 
Management Functions (OSIA) 
The OSI Agent is responsible f o r 
Accepring securic)' service requests across the API 
and interprcring, validating and routing the 
requests ro the SAA. Application software packages 
wi thout the necessary API w i l l not be able to call 
the CSS in die first place. Those packages wi th the 
API which make CSS request calls in error w i l l be 
returned an appropriate error code by die OSIA. 
(See example under SSA for the likely f)'pes o f 
information and control data to be distributed.) 
Ensuring that all output f rom the CSS, including 
control and information data, is routed back across 
the API into the same layer which originated the 
request and the control / infoniiar ion data, to pre-
vent "short-circuiting" o f layers. 
It should be noted that this agent is specific to an 
OSI system implementation o f the CSS. In general, 
the agent w i l l provide the interface to whatever 
underl)'ing network architecture is in use, and may 
be designated the external environment agent 
(EEA). 
7. L o g g i n g A g e n t (LA) 
The logging agent (LA) is responsible for: 
Accepting and processing all data gathered by the 
service agent and passing i t to the SMIB for 
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logging, including such data as securit)' ser\nce 
requested, date and rime, calling user id, calling 
process, status (success, failure) etc. It is envisaged 
diat the LA w i l l itself internally request one o f the 
CSS cncr)'prion ser\'ices, to encr)'pt the log ready 
for storage. The only enrit)' wi th access to the log 
w i l l be designated levels of system administrarion, 
who w i l l possess the dccrypring keys for the log. 
Al lowing managerial access to the log lor the pre-
paration o f audit reports for securit)' management 
and resource oprimizarion purposes. The system 
adniinistrarion w i l l possess access rights to the log 
data, and such access rights wi l l be stored in the 
SMIB. 
The LA could be an Al-bascd module that wi l l 
detect problems and even likely problems before 
they occur, and take the nccessar)' acrion for pre-
ventarive or remedial measures. 
8. Recovery Agent (RA) 
The recover)' agent (10\) is responsible for all 
system fault protection and CSS error recoveiy. 
Faults and errors may be caused cither by hardware 
failure o f units both wi th in the CSS and external ro 
i t . and also by certain conibinarions o f siruarions 
wid i which die CSS cannot cope, due to ambiguit) ' 
o f requests for example. The KA wi l l perform the 
important task o f detecring these errors, and plac-
ing die CSS into such a state as to maintain the 
securit)' integrit) ' o f the system, so that the CSS is 
not left in a state where it is vulnerable to attack. 
Faults outside the CSS could in certain c i rcum-
stances also produce system errors. For example, an 
incorrectly constructed or incomplete data struc-
ture coidd be ambiguous, and the CSS may "hang". 
Internal error recover)' rourines w i l l automarically 
re-request the data, but in the absence o f response, 
the CSS w i l l place itself into a stable, secure state. 
The CSS has in effect, recovered "internally" f rom 
the error, but cannot, o f course, influence events 
outside the CSS. "Inside" and "outside" the CSS 
refer to sofrware niodulcs wi th in the CSS kernel 
and those outside the kernel respectively. 
Obviously, in a distributed sccurit)' system, the 
boundaries cannot be clearly defined. The external 
error must be recovered by the run-rime librar)' o f 
the applicarion package. 
In die case o f a fault developing wi th cither die 
SMIB or the SMIBA, the CSS protocols must be 
designed such that the CSS recover)' agent (l<A) 
always returns fatal errors to the OSIA for A L L 
requests. Thus failure o f the SMIB terminates all 
securit)' acrivit)' on the local terminal. This differs 
f r o m faults wl i ich may develop wi th other CSS 
components, which will not return severe errors, 
but merely l imi t the operarional effccriveness of 
the system to diose funcrions not requiring the 
damaged facilit)'. 
9. Associat ions Agent (AA) 
The associarion agent (AA) is responsible for die 
security control o f the association between remote 
end user enriries throughout the durarion o f the 
connecrion. It is responsible for sending the appro-
priate data when the connecrion is set up. such as 
keys, vectors, rime stamps and so on. for c.vercising 
supervisor)' control during die connecrion, and for 
clearing down die associarion f rom die security 
facilit) ' aspects. In addirion. dctecrion o f denial o f 
ser\'ice attacks would be possible wi th this agent by 
the sending and receipt o f random super\'isor)' 
packets, subject to the current qualit)' o f service 
condirions. 
10. Inter-domain Communicat ion Agent 
(IDCA) 
The connecrivit)' o f eiiriries w id i in a domain is 
assured, as all conimunicaring enriries are subject ro 
a common securic)' policy. Inter-domain com-
municarion, however, presents a special problem. 
The communicaring enriries in rhe rwo domains 
require the use o f "rranslarion" protocols to ensure 
a seamless conrinuit) ' o f securit)' around the asso-
ciarion. The inter-domain commuiiicarion agent 
( IDCA) is responsible for recognizing inter-domain 
associarioiis, and invoking additional protocols as 
necessar)'. Inter-domain rranslarion may or may 
not be possible: 
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For example, the remote entit)' may be using a 
form o f encr)'ption unknown to the local enriries 
CSS processor. In this case, translation is impos-
sible. The IDCA wi l l note that decr)'ption by the 
local securit)' mechanisms is not possible, and wi l l 
flag the appropriate error. The RA w i l l return the 
appropriate flags to the calling applicarion. which 
wi l l then either terminate the association, or re-
request the remote enrit)' to communicate in 
another secure mode. 
I f the remote cnrit)', however, is using say an M - b i t 
algorithm, whereas the local processor is capable of 
decr)'pting only N-b i t code, then communication 
o Asxciatlm 
control 
E c c u r i t y PdiiniSLaHar 
o B\fKxas security 
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• l : t i l3 t : l . t : i : i :L i , <1. M 
is possible, providing the data is reblocked accord-
ing to the appropriate run length before encoding/ 
decoding. The IDCA is responsible for requesting 
the appropriate mechanisms via the SSA to attempt 
the translarion. The formal analysis o f this kind o f 
system is d i f f icu l t , but is representarive o f the sort 
o f real problems that w i l l be encountered when 
connecting diverse real networks. 
An Example 
A n example o f a very simple " f low" berween the 
applicarion and the agents and mechanisms o f the 
CSS wi l l help to clarify' die concepts. 
Consider Fig. 6. A r)'pical sequence o f component 
iiiteracrions may be as follows: 
The applicarion {c.{t. a secure F T A M or M H S 
module, see Fig. 7) calls a securit)' funcrion f rom die 
CSS (c.\^. user audienticarion. encr)'prion etc.) via the 
API and OSIA | # l | . T h e applicarion w i l l have set up 
the control data for the CSS request, along wi th the 
information data upon which tlie CSS wi l l act. The 
request for the ser\'ice wi l l be passed over die API 
(by means o f a system interrupt, for example), to 
the OSIA. The OSIA wi l l note the location o f the 
jSocuiity Soivu:oi|. 
Uectuniim Ageat I 
10 
SUIB Agont j(-p 
I Sccuiiiy Admin 
I AgOQl 
OSI InlGtaction 
Agom 
HDmtoTias 
ARont 
Hccovci; 
Ageni 
' I 2 i / 
Agent 
latcidoQUD 
Conns Agent 
Fig. 6. Agent coiiimunicitiou within the CSS. 
Fig. 7. Inrcracuoiis bt-mccn the CSS agents in the secure 
F T A M e.xaniplc. 
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origin o f die request [i.e. the layer where i t or ig in-
ated), and attempt to validate the request. Valida-
tion is performed at this stage only f rom the point 
o f view o f checking that the request is recognized 
by the CSS (via a look-up table) N O T to check that 
die request is permitted. (This is performed later by 
the SSA and SMIBA). It the data structure is not cor-
rccdy built , the I IA w i l l detect the error | # 2|. and 
initiate a request for a rebuild o f the data, and pass 
this back to the OSIA ( # 3 | for communicarion 
wi th the calling application. I f the data are accept-
able, the OSIA retrieves the information data and 
places i t onto the internal CSS data bus. The con-
trol in fo tmat ion parr o f the request is routed to the 
SSA. I # 4| The SSA examines the control data, and 
interrogates the SMIB via the SMl l iA | # 5 | | # 6] as 
to whether the request is (a) valid, (b) legal. 
I f the request is I N V A L I D for either reason, the 
SSA w i l l return the appropriate error code to the 
OSIA I # 7 ] . which w i l l in form the calling applica-
tion process accordingly. The LA wi l l note die i l le-
gal request | # 8] . I f the request is V A L I D , then die 
SSA wi l l interrogate the S M l l i via the SMIBA | # 9 ) 
I # 10] as to the correct sequence o f operation to be 
jcrformed to execute die requested funcrion in 
ine wi th securit)' policy. I f the SMIBA has 
informed the SSA that, for example, an addirional 
password is required f rom the user, then the SSA 
w i i i request this f r o m the U A [ # lOa, # lOb). The 
SSA wi l l select and sequence the appropriate SMA's 
| # 1 I) to f u l f i l the funcrion. passing each control 
data as necessar)', which in mrn wi l l select and 
sequence the appropriate security mechanisms 
( # 1 2| which w i l l act upon the information data on 
die bus which is to be processed. (The IDCA w i l l 
have also noted that this is a local operation, and no 
inter-domain activit)' is needed | # 12a|). Upon 
coniplerion, (signalled by each mechanism agent in 
turn to the SSA [ # 13|), the SSA w i l l indicate task 
status to die OSIA | # U | . and also i n f o r m the LA 
o f the funcrion performed (# 15], for whom, and 
the task status. The OSIA w i l l then retrieve die 
processed informarion data f rom the CSS bus. and 
return the processed data across the API to the cor-
rect calling locarion, along wi th the function status 
| # 1 6 | . 
W i t h i n the framework o f die ten-agent model, an 
implementation for the I B M PC has been written 
using Pascal and 8086 assembler. A file encr)'prion 
and transfer (FET) has been coded, and tested 
between machines via serial port communicarions. 
It is planned to extend this to an Ethernet L A N in 
the near future, w i t h several users making secure 
transfers simultaneously. 
11. Conclusion 
There is a need to extend OSI to meet the recom-
mended securit)' services and others being pro-
posed. The described system w i l l implement the 
security funcrion efficiently but requires some 
modifications to existing applications. The API can 
be defined for the general case, but interface details 
are highly implementation specific. 
The concept o f an existing network wi th security 
facilities managed by a number o f securit)' 
management centres seems appropriate for large 
networks and mobile users. T i e idea o f a number 
o f agents to f u l f i l the securit)' functions has been 
proposed for flcxibilit)' and ease o f imple-
mentation. 
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A B S T R A C T . Although of similar age, the Quadratic Residue Cipher (QRC) has been neglected 
compared with the publicity received by other public key cryptosystems, notably the R S A cipher. 
This paper attempts to redress the balance somewhat, explaining in expository form the principle 
of the Q R C , the advantages it offers over RSA and some experiences gained as a result of using 
the cipher. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Diff ie and Hellman published their famous paper [1] in 1976 which introduced the 
concept of a 'public key' cipher, cryptography has undergone a revolution. The possible 
elimination of the need to distribute pairs of secret keys between communicants, with the 
associated logistical and security problems, has led to wide interest in the use of public key 
systems. The benefits are especially apparent in large systems, where the quadratic explosion 
in the number of symmetric key pairs needed for a classical (symmetric) cipher system can 
be a security management nightmare. 
One of the first practical public key implementations was invented by Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman [2] and named after them (RSA). Their system has become by far the best known 
and most publicised of the public key systems. It is by no means the only one, however, a 
large number of others having been described in the literature, such as those by Rabin [3] 
and Merkle and Hellman [4]. These systems vary from elegant but useless mathematical 
curiosities, to those which are now in current use. One of the most potentially useful 
systems however, is the Quadratic Residue Cipher (QRC), which has received surprisingly 
little attention since it was first described by Blum, Blum & Shub [5]. This may be due in 
part to the limitation that it is a secrecy only system, whereas RSA can be used for both 
secrecy and authentication (digital signatures). In the context of a pure secrecy system 
though, it offers a number of significant advantages over RSA in both implementation and 
ease of use [6]. Of greater potential significance, is the recent proof [7] that the difficulty 
of breaking the QRC is equivalent to the difficulty of factoring. This is not the case for 
RSA, and some reports [6] even go as far as to suggest that RSA may have hidden 
weaknesses as yet undetermined. 
PRINCIPLE OF QRC 
The QRC relies upon the principle that it is easy to determine the square of an integer 
modulo n, but finding the square root of a (large) integer modulo n is intractable. Also, not 
all such integers have square roots. Those numbers having roots are known as quadratic 
residues and those which do not are known as quadratic non-residues. More formally, i f n 
is a positive integer, then o is a quadratic residue of n i f (a,n) = 1 and i f the congruence 
= a (mod n) has a solution. I f the congruence = a (mod n) has no solution then a is a 
quadratic non-residue of n. 
For example, to determine the quadratic residues of 11, we compute the squares of the non-
zero elements in the field modulo 11, i.e. the integers 1 to 10. This gives 
102 = 1 (mod 11) 
92 = 4 (mod 11) 
32 = 82 = 9 (mod 11) 
42 = 72 = 5 (mod 11) 
52 = 62 = 3 (mod 11) 
Although we have squared all ten non-zero elements in the field ( 1 . . 10), only 5 squares result 
(1,3,4,5,9). The quadratic residues of 11 are therefore 1,3,4,5,9 and the quadratic non-
residues of 11 are those numbers which are left (2,6,7,8,10). The fact that there are the 
same number of residues as non-residues is not a coincidence. It can be shown that i f p is 
an odd prime, then there are exactly as many quadratic residues as non-residues of p among 
the integers 1, 2 , . . . , / 7 - l . Proofs of this can be found in most books on number theory. The 
important point to note, however, is that in the field (designated Zp for prime p) where p = 
3 (mod 4) such as p = 11 in this case, only the quadratic residues have square roots one of 
which is itself a quadratic residue. This root is known as the principal root of the residue. 
In the above example, 4 has square roots 9 and 2 but only 9 is a residue with two square 
roots of its own. Of these roots, 3 and 8, only 3 is a residue and so forth. (In the case 
where p = 1 (mod 4) this is not always true. In Z ,7, the residue 16 has square roots 4 and 
13 both of which are residues with square roots.) 
Encryption 
To construct the QRC, we proceed as follows: 
The recipient R chooses two large prime numbers p and q using one of the many tests 
available [e.g. 8], subject to them both being congruent to 3 mod 4. This is in no way 
restrictive as it can be shown that half of all the primes of a given length wi l l satisfy this 
condition [9]. These two primes become R's secret key. R then multiplies p and q to 
produce his public key n, 
Public Key n = pq 
Such an integer which is the product of two primes both congruent to 3 mod 4 is known as 
a Blum integer. The public key (which the reader wi l l observe is simpler to produce than 
the RSA key pair) is made available and anyone wishing to send R a message proceeds as 
follows: 
The sender S chooses any quadratic residue in Z'^. (For composite n, the set of elements 
/ where / < A ; is designated Z^, and the subset of these which are quadratic residues is 
designated Z ' J . Although it is possible to test whether a given number is a quadratic residue 
(by quadratic reciprociry), the easiest way to obtain a quadratic residue is simply to pick any 
number relatively prime to n and square it, modulo n. This residue becomes the 'seed' Xo 
for the key generator which will be used to encipher the message. 
S adopts some pre-arranged scheme to assign binary values to the residues, such as writing 
a 1 when the parity is even, and a 0 when the parity is odd. To proceed, S writes down the 
appropriate key bit according to his first residue x^, and then squares this residue. S then 
writes down the next corresponding bit, and squares the resulting residue again, and so on. 
In this manner, a pseudo-random binary bit pattern is produced which can be used as a 'one-
time pad' to encrypt the message, providing of course, that the seed is not reused with the 
same modulus. The significance of a one time pad is that such a cipher is the only one 
providing complete theoretical security. 
The bit pattern produced by this type of 'square mod /?' generator has been shown [5] to 
exhibit very 'random' properties, and is cryptographically strong. (Tests of randomness 
usually require such sequences to pass certain statistical tests [8], such as the long-term 
frequency of O's and I's should be similar, and that the O's and I's should be 'well mixed'. 
However, statistical tests are not sufficient in all cases. An important property of 
cryptographically strong random sequences is that they should be unpredictable. A pseudo-
random sequence generator is generally defined [10] to be cryptographically strong i f the 
sequences it generates are not predictable in the sense that given an arbitrarily long sample 
of the sequence, it is not possible to obtain any more knowledge about the missing bit either 
to the right or to the left than could be gained by tossing a fair coin.) 
More detailed analyses [11,12] show that one can use more than the parity bit after each 
squaring operation. There is no apparent weakening of the resulting sequence i f the first logj 
/ least significant bits are used, where / is the bit length of the residue. For example, i f the 
residues were 8 bit words, then the logj 8 = 3 least significant bits could be added to the key 
stream from each residue reducing the number of squaring operations required by a factor 
of three. Since the key sequence will be used as a 'one-time pad', for security it is important 
that the sequence have as long a period as possible, certainly longer than the message to be 
encrypted. The period of the quadratic residue generator, however, is not easily determined. 
It is usually equal to X(X(n)), where \ is the Carmichael function [13]. This important 
parameter is discussed later and the conditions when it holds are defined. 
Having obtained the key sequence, the sender then simply exclusively OR's (XOR) the 
plaintext (in ASCII form, say) with the key 'one-time' pad and appends the final residue X f g . 
Decryption 
The legitimate recipient R can easily recover the plaintext, because knowing the two (secret) 
factors of the modulus he can compute the residue x^.i by taking the square root of the 
residue Xf,. , then the square root of x^., and so on right back to the residue X Q . Knowing the 
residues, R has the key sequence and can therefore recover the plaintext simply by XORing 
the key with the bit stream portion of the ciphertext. Taking square roots, however, is 
computationally intensive and of the same complexity as the modular exponentiation required 
by RSA. Using this simplistic approach gives little benefit over RSA in decryption. 
Fortunately, knowledge of the factors of n allows random access both forwards and 
backwards through the sequence. Knowing the final residue and using the following 
lemma, it is possible to take the 2*^  -th root directly and so obtain the initial seed residue X Q 
immediately. R then has no more work to do than S in recreating the key sequence. 
Lemma. Let p be an odd prime and (a,p) = 1. Then a is a quadratic residue i f and only 
ifflCP-i)^ = 1 (mod/7). 
Proposition. I f the prime p = 3 (mod 4) and a is a quadratic residue, the roots are 
^^(p+i)/4 j i ^g principal root will use the plus sign. 
Proof. (a^^'J'Y ^ a^ *^*" = = a (mod p). 
Corollary, By induction, i f p = 3 (mod 4) and o is a 2^ -th power, then the 2*^  -th root of 
a is 
The reason for the original constraint that the factors of n must be congruent to 3 mod 4 is 
now clear. Only \f p = q = 3 (mod 4) wil l the power be an integer when it can be 
immediately evaluated. 
An eavesdropper E, however, cannot decipher the message because E does not know the 
factors of n and calculating them is intractable. Without the factors, E cannot take square 
roots in Z\, and hence cannot recreate the key sequence. 
An example 
For the sake of clarity in our example we wi l l use very small numbers and a very short 
message. In practice, the numbers involved wil l be larger, on the order of 100-200 digits 
to discourage factoring, and the messages wi l l normally be correspondingly longer. 
Let R choose two primes p and remembering that they must both be congruent to 3 
modulo 4, say, 
p=U 
q = 23 
R multiplies these to give his public key n 
« = 11 * 23 = 253 
which is made available. 
S wishes to send R a message 16 bits long, say the letters 'QR'. The 8-bit ASCII 
representation of this is 
Plaintext = 0101000101010010 
S picks a random number (relatively prime to 253), say 20, and squares this modulo 253. 
This yields the first quadratic residue Xo = 147. This residue is successively squared until 
sufficient residues have been created to encrypt the plaintext: 
Xo = 147 
Xl = 104 
X2 = 190 
X3 = 174 
X4 = 169 
X5 = 225 
X6 = 25 
X7 = 119 
Xg = 246 
X9 = 49 
XiO = 124 
Xii = 196 
X i 2 = 213 
X l 3 = 82 
X j 4 = 146 
X i 5 = 64 
S then writes down the least significant bit(s) of each residue. The key sequence is therefore 
Key = 1000111101001000 
The key pad is then XOR'ed with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext: 
Key = 1000111101001000 
Plaintext = 0101000101010010 
Ciphertext = 1101111000011010 
Finally, the last residue (64 decimal = 1000000 binary) is appended to the ciphertext to 
produce the finished message. Alternatively, the residue may be sent via other channels. 
Ciphered message = 1101111000011010 [t/e/zw/Yer] 1000000 
The message can now be sent over public (insecure) channels to the recipient R , who 
proceeds to decipher the message as follows. 
First, R notes that the length of the message is N-l-1 = 16 bits. R therefore knows that the 
original seed residue X Q must have been squared N = 15 times to produce the final residue 
X N . N O W R could take successive square roots 15 times to produce each intermediate residue 
but, as we have stated, this is computationally excessive and access to any random point in 
the sequence is possible given the factors of n, R can therefore take the 2*^  -th root directly 
and obtain the seed residue Xo immediately. 
For completeness, we demonstrate both the simple approach using repeated square roots, and 
then demonstrate the more efficient 'direct root' method. Finally, we wi l l describe a cleverer 
algorithm which computes the 2"^  -th root directly, while considerably simplifying the 
computations. 
Algorithms for decryption 
Taking the square root of the final residue x ,5, that is, V(A (mod 2 5 3 ) , we compute using 
the prime factors of n 
64<'»+'>'^(mod 11) = 3 
64<23+»)/4 (j^od 23) = 8 
The required root x ,4 is therefore congruent to 3 (mod 11) and also congruent to 8 (mod 2 3 ) . 
We now use the Chinese Remainder Theorem (found in most texts on elementary number 
theory) to compute the value of the root which satisfies both these congruences (mod 2 5 3 ) . 
The answer is 146, which is the required root x ,4 (compare with the table on page 5 ) . We 
could now repeat this process a further 14 times to recreate the key sequence but as 
mentioned earlier, it is easier to compute the Qh)^^ -th power of the residue directly. 
We have from the previous corollary 
64 ^ (mod 11) = 4 
( m i ) " 
64 ^ (mod 23) = 9 
Applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem to these results, we find that the residue XQ is 147 
which is the required result, compare again with the table on page 5 . 
The clear disadvantage of this method is the problem of computing to the enormous powers 
involved. Even the use of efficient algorithms such as the repeated squares method [8] still 
results in inefficient computation. 
A great improvement lies in the observation that 
a** (mod m) = a** C " " " *(°^ » (mod m) 
This considerably reduces the amount of effort required provided that <t>{m) can be found. 
In our case though, m is prime whence <t>{m) follows immediately as it is simply equal to 
m-]. Using this principle, we can construct a very efficient algorithm [6] as follows. 
When setting up the cryptosystem the recipient R , knowing the secret factors p and q, uses 
Euclid's Extended Algorithm to precalculate two quantities a and b, such that 
qp -\- bq ^ 1 (mod n) 
On receipt of a message, knowing its length N + 1 and the final residue x^, R proceeds to 
compute 
a = [ ( p + l ) / 4 f (mod \p-\]) 
e = [ ( ^ + l ) / 4 f (mod [^7-1]) 
u = ( X N mod pY (mod p) 
V = (JCN mod qY (mod q) 
Xq = (bqu + apv) (mod n) 
Using this algorithm in our example, R would have found 
lla-\-23b = \ (mod 253) 
whence o = 21 and b = \. 
R knows the residue x^ corresponds to the 15-th squaring operation, so he computes 
a = [ ( l l + l ) /4 ] '5 (mod 10) = (mod 10) = 7 
e = [ (23+l ) /4 ]»5 (mod 22) = 6'' (mod 22) = 10 
u = (64 mod 11)^ (mod 11) = 9^  (mod 11) = 4 
V = (64 mod 23)»° (mod 23) = 18'° (mod 23) = 9 
xo = ((1 * 23 * 4) + (21 * 11 * 9)) (mod 253) = 147 
which is the required result! 
The algorithm has simplified and speeded up the calculation of, for example 
64<5") (mod 23) 
by replacing the computation with much more manageable quantities such as 18*° (mod 23). 
The efficiency is compounded as the numbers get larger and is indispensable with the 
realistically secure numbers used in practical systems. 
Calculation of the Key Periods of the mod N Generator 
The critical parameter of the QRC key generator is the period of the key sequence. In this 
expository paper we quote the important results without proof. For a complete treatment of 
the background, derivations and proofs of these results the reader is referred to the seminal 
paper of Blum et al [5]. 
For the convenience of the reader, we summarise a few basic number theoretic ideas that are 
needed in the derivation of the period. 
Universal exponents 
A universal exponent is a non-zero quantity U such that a" = 1 (mod m) for all a with {a,m) 
= 1. For example, the Euler Phi function <t>{m) is a universal exponent. The least positive 
universal exponent is called the Carmichael function of / N , written X(m). 
A definition [13] of the Carmichael function is as follows 
><(p^) = <I>(P1 if P=2 and a<2, orP>3 
Ml") = V2<S>{2') i f a > 3 
\{m) = lent [\(Pi')] otherwise 
where is the prime power factorization of m. Knuth proves [8] that X(m) is both the least 
common multiple and the supremum of the orders of the elements in Z* ,^. As a corollary, 
we have Carmichael's extension of Euler's theorem 
^Mm) = I (J^QJ whenever {a,m) = 1 
As staled on page 3, the period of the QRC generator is usually equal to X(X(n)) where n is 
the public key modulus. We quote the sufficient conditions for this later, but applying the 
expression to our earlier example we have X(253) = Icm [0(11),</)(23)] = Icm [10,22] = 
110. X(llO) = Icm [0(2),0(5),</>(ll)] = Icm [2,4,10] = 20. Therefore X(X(253)) = 20 and 
i f the sequence in the example is carried forward the residues indeed repeat with period 20. 
Primitive Roots and Orders 
I f {a,n) = 1 then the least positive ;c such that a'' = 1 (mod n) is called the order of a mod 
n and we write ord^ a = x. 
For example, to find the order of 2 mod 7, compute the powers of 2 mod 7 
2> = 2 (mod 7) 
2^ = 4 (mod 7) 
2^ = 1 (mod 7) 
2^ = 2 (mod 7) 
etc 
The smallest power congruent to 1 is 2^. Thus ord, 2 = 3. 
Lengths of Sequences Produced by the mod N Generator 
Let TT = 'jr(xo) denote the period of the key sequence with seed X Q . In [5] it is shown that 
if n = pg where p,q are distinct odd primes both congruent to 3 (mod 4) then ir|X(X(/i)). 
It is then shown that the sufficient conditions under which the converse is true, that is, when 
^(^W) I a n d hence when ir = X(X(n)), are when the following are met: 
1. Choice of modulus n (Theorem 7 of [5]) 
Choose n such that ordx(n)/2 (2) = X(X(n)). It is possible to contrive an n to fu l f i l l this 
requirement by setting p = 2p^ + \ and p, = 2p2 + 1, and similarly for q, and q j 
(Theorem 8 of [5]). In our earlier example 11 = 2 * 5 + 1 and 5 = 2 * 2 - 1 - 1 . 
Similarly 23 = 2.11 H- 1 and 11 = 2.5 + 1. 
Aside from being one of the conditions that ensures the period equals X(X(n)), this 
construction of n also allows us to calculate the period! Given a sufficiently large n 
without its factorization, evaluation of <t>{n) and hence X(n) is as intractable as 
factoring /z. Knowing pj and i / j , however, the period follows immediately. X(/z) = 
lent [2p„2<7,] = 2/7,</, and so X(X(/i)) = icm Vlp^^lq^ = 2/72^ 72-
2. Choice of seed X Q (Theorem 7 of [5]) 
Choose Xo such that ord^ Xo = X(n)/2. We can always find a residue to satisfy this 
condition. Specifically, the number of quadratic residues in Z\ that are of order 
\{n)l2 mod N is around O (n / (In In nY) [5]. 
When the above two conditions do not apply, there seems to be no simple method of 
evaluating the sequence length -jr. In these cases, the sequence length is always a divisor of 
X(X(/i)) and hence very much shorter than when the above conditions hold. Analysis of the 
lengths of these sequences is, however, of no practical importance from our point of view 
since these sequences are to be avoided for cryptographic purposes anyway. 
COMPARISON OF RSA AND QRC 
Recall that the RSA cryptosystem operates as follows: 
An intended recipient R chooses two large primes p,q and calculates their product n = pq, 
A preferred constraint on p,q \s that they are strong [14] in the sense that their product n is 
more difficult to factor than i f p,q were just chosen at random. Basically, this means 
ensuring that p ' and p" (where p' = p - I and p" = p' - \) both have at least one large 
factor, and similarly for q' and q". Knowing p,q, R can evaluate <t>(n) = (p-lXq-l). R then 
chooses a quantity e relatively prime to n and calculates a quantity d such that de = 1 (mod 
<t>(n)). R than makes the public key {e,n} available, and keeps the secret key d private. 
A sender S wishes to transmit a message to R. S encodes his message by a pre-arranged 
scheme such as A = l , B = 2 etc, and breaks his message up into blocks smaller than the 
modulus n, S computes the ciphertext from each plaintext block b, using 
C; = b^ (mod n) 
On receipt, R recovers the plaintext using 
bi = Ci** (mod n) 
We now compare and contrast some aspects of the RSA and QRC systems. Again, we state 
results here - for detailed arguments and proofs the reader is referred to [6] and the many 
excellent references contained therein. 
Implementation complexity 
The QRC key pair is simply {n} for the public part and {p,q} for the secret part, whereas 
the RSA key pair as shown above is somewhat more difficult to calculate. This slight 
disparity is offset by the fact that, in general, the key pair only need be produced once or at 
intervals. The actual encryption efficiencies in terms of number of arithmetic operations, 
however, are quite different. 
Consider an RSA cryptosystem using a 64 bit modulus and so each message block wi l l be 
no longer than 64 bits. Suppose that the encrypting exponent e is a 16 bit quantity chosen 
to be a prime, such as 2'^ -h 1 which is 10000000000000001 binary. This form of exponent 
maximises the efficiency of the encryption because where a zero occurs, the repeated squares 
modulo exponentiation algorithm only need perform one modulo multiplication but where a 
one occurs two such operations are required. For an optimum 16 bit exponent therefore, 
encryption of the block wi l l require 18 modulo multiplications. 
In a QRC cryptosystem, the encryption of the 64 bit message block wi l l require the 
generation of 64 bits of key. I f the modulus is again 64 bits long, log2 64 = 6 bits may be 
appended to the keystream from each residue. Each residue is generated by a single modulo 
multiplication. Therefore, only 11 modulo multiplications are required to generate sufficient 
key length to encrypt the block. 
Limitations on plaintext 
In RSA the message must be broken up into blocks smaller than the modulus in use. The 
QRC does not require this to happen, but the overall length of the message must be smaller 
than the period of the key. In RSA, therefore, messages of unlimited size may be encrypted 
simply by breaking them into suitable blocks. In the QRC, the message is limited to the 
period of the key. 
Encryption principle 
RSA is a deterministic cipher in the sense that i f an eavesdropper has a candidate for the 
plaintext (by guessing, say) he can easily verify his guess simply by encrypting it with the 
public key. The QRC is a probabilistic cipher in that an eavesdropper with a candidate for 
the message cannot verify his guess by encipherment because he does not know the starting 
residue used for the key sequence. 
Data Expansion 
In RSA, a message block the size of the modulus is encrypted to a block also the size of the 
modulus. The data therefore undergoes no expansion on encryption. With the QRC, 
however, the need to append the final residue means that there is a small amount of data 
expansion on encipherment. 
Proof of Security 
Even i f factoring is genuinely hard, breaking RSA is not known to be equally hard. In other 
words, it has never been proven that breaking RSA is directly equivalent to the difficulty of 
factoring. It is possible [6] that d can be computed efficiently from the public key {e,n} 
without the need to factor n. It is also possible that there is another efficient algorithm to 
recover the message m from e, n and /?f (mod n). Breaking the QRC, on the other hand, 
has been shown [7] to be directly equivalent to the difficulty of factoring. 
Leakage of information 
With RSA, even i f it turns out that it is impossible to compute all of m from the information 
available to the eavesdropper, it might still be easy to obtain efficiently some partial 
information such as half the bits in m. This may still be possible even i f random padding 
is used. This phenomenon is known as partial leakage of information. The QRC leaks no 
partial information in this way. The lack of a formal proof of security and the unresolved 
partial leakage problem are a serious limitation of the RSA system, and may well have 
contributed to the recent decision by NIST (US National Institute for Standards and 
Technology) not to adopt RSA. 
Resistance to attack 
RSA is believed to be resistant to a chosen ciphertext attack, whereas the QRC is not 
resistant to such an attack. A chosen ciphertext attack is one where the cryplanalyst can 
choose ciphertexts at wi l l , and be supplied with the corresponding plaintexts provided they 
exist. From this information, he is to infer the decrypting key. 
Digital signature 
By far the most important advantage RSA has to offer is the possibility of a digital signature. 
This allows a sender to 'sign' a message using his secret key before encrypting it with the 
recipients public key. On decryption, the recipient can verify the senders identity by 
decrypting the signature with the senders public key. The QRC is a secrecy only system, 
and suffers from the severe drawback of not admitting the possibility of digital signature. 
These aspects of the two cryplosystems are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Comparison of aspects of the RSA and Q R C Ciphers 
Aspect RSA Q R C 
Possibility of 
Digital Signature 
Existence of a 
formal proof of 
security 
ADVANTAGE 
Digital signature possible. 
DISADVANTAGE 
Has not been proven to rely on 
the hardness of factoring, 
and may have other weaknesses 
as well. 
DISADVANTAGE 
Digital signature not 
possible. 
A D V A N T A G E 
Has been proven to rely 
only upon the hardness of 
factoring. 
Resistance to 
attack 
Leakage of 
information 
Algorithm and 
implementation 
complexity 
Limitations on 
Plaintext 
ADVANTAGE 
Believed to be resistant to a 
chosen ciphertext attack. 
DISADVANTAGE 
Leakage of partial 
information even when random 
padding is used. 
S IMILAR 
Requires exponentiation and 
modulo reduction for both 
encryption and decryption. 
ADVANTAGE 
Unlimited plaintext size i f broken 
into blocks smaller than the 
modulus. 
D I S A D V A N T A G E 
Not resistant to a chosen 
ciphertext attack. 
A D V A N T A G E 
No leakage of partial 
information. 
S I M I L A R 
Requires similar operations 
for encryption and 
decryption but less of them. 
D I S A D V A N T A G E 
Plaintext limited by period 
of key generator. 
Encryption 
Principle 
Data Expansion 
DISADVANTAGE 
Deterministic - only one cipher 
text corresponds to a given 
plaintext for a particular key. 
i.e., an eavesdropper who has a 
candidate for the plaintext can 
easily verify a guess simply 
by encrypting it. 
ADVANTAGE 
No expansion of data when 
encrypted. 
A D V A N T A G E 
PnDbabilistic - many possible 
ciphertexts can correspond 
to a given plaintext, i.e., 
an eavesdropper who has 
a candidate for the plaintext 
cannot verify a guess 
simply by encrypting it. 
D I S A D V A N T A G E 
Small data expansion when 
encrypted. 
I M P L E M E N T A T I O N 
A QRC crypto package has been developed in the Network Research Group. The software 
runs on a standard I B M PC, and offers the following features, 
1. Menu driven for ease of use; 
2. Key generation up to 255 decimal digits (840 bits). Given the expected 
heuristic running time of the best known general purpose factoring algorithm 
(the multiple polynomial quadratic sieve) the expected time to factor integers 
of this size is roughly equal to the estimated current age of the universe, some 
15 billion (15 * 10^ years; 
3. Static encryption and decryption of data files for storage on disk. 
Software language 
The main shell of the program is written in Pascal for structural integrity, but all the multi-
precision arithmetic routines are written in hand-crafted 80*86 assembly language. The 
package is therefore quite fast in operation. 
Modular structure 
The software is written in modular form for flexibility and ease of maintenance. Each 
module is a stand-alone unit, so that modification of one module does not affect any other. 
This also allows for improvement in algorithms as they become available and for parts of the 
system to be written independently by different authors. At present, the system comprises 
of the following units: 
a) Prime generator 
b) Key generator 
c) Encryption module 
d) Decryption module 
e) General purpose number theory library 
The functions of the first four modules are described in the following discussion. The 
general purpose library contains all the multi-precision routines called by other modules such 
as modulo exponentiation, Euclid's algorithm and so on. 
Generation of keys 
One of the most important modules in the package is the key generator. For security it is 
very advantageous i f the key period is easily determined and, where possible, we have been 
careful to follow the criteria of [5] discussed above. When the key generator module is 
requested to produce a key of length /, the steps are as follows: 
1. The key generator module requests two primes of lengths 0.45/ and 0.55/ 
from the prime generator module. The reason for these dissimilar sizes as 
opposed to simply generating two primes of length 111 is to avoid any 
possibility of the primes being too close together and hence opening up the 
(remote) possibility of a Fermat attack [15]. 
2. For each request, the prime generator picks a random odd integer of the 
required length, and tests it for primality using: 
a) trial division up to 101; 
b) five iterations of Rabin's algorithm [8, Algorithm P] to certify probable 
primality to better than 99.90%. 
I f the number fails the tests then it is incremented such that i t is neither even 
nor a multiple of 5 (that is, in decimal notation the number can only end in 
1,3,7 or 9). I f the probable prime p" passes the tests, the prime generator 
then evaluates p' = 2p" + 1 and tests this for primality using the above 
method. I f this also passes, the generator finally evaluates p = 2p' -\- I and 
checks that it is both a probable prime and that it is congruent to 3 mod 4. 
I f this is the case then p is retumed along with p" and g". I f not, then 
another p" is chosen and the steps repeated. It is important to note that, apart 
from returning primes that are suitable for the construction of an analytic 
QRC generator, this method also has the additional advantage that the primes 
are strong in the sense discussed in connection with RSA [14]. This makes 
the work of a cryptanalyst in factoring the modulus very much harder than i f 
the primes are chosen at random. 
3. The key generator multiples p,q to produce the modulus n, 
4. The key generator evaluates 2p"q" to produce the key period x. 
5. The key generator uses the Extended Euclid Algorithm to compute a,b such 
that ap + bq = 1 (mod n). 
6. The key generator stores p,q,a,b,n and x in a disk system file for use in 
decryption. Note that p,q are not stored in encrypted form. Access to the 
system PC would ultimately allow an attacker to gain access to p,q but i f 
required considerable physical protection could be given to the system unit. 
Generation of seeds 
The second condition for the period of the key to be easily determined is that the seed XQ is 
chosen such that ord„ XQ = X(n)/2. The seed, however, is chosen by the sender of the 
messages, not by the recipient! Without knowledge of \(n) the sender cannot easily check 
that the above condition holds and he cannot obtain \{n) without factoring n. A severe 
problem thus arises in that i f this criterion is not satisfied, the key period may not be X(X(rt)) 
as desired. We have not overcome this limitation. Our attempts at a possible compromise 
are discussed in the following section. 
Encryption 
An input message may be either ASCII or binary. When a message is input to the system 
(either manually or from disk) the encryption module requests the modulus n. Again, this 
may either be input manually (which is tedious) or fetched from a file of correspondents. 
In the absence of any information about n other than the assumption that it is a Blum integer, 
the encryption module requests a prime number of no special form from the prime generator. 
This is guaranteed to be relatively prime to n and is used as the starting seed XQ. Knowing 
the bit length of the input message, the encryption module then generates the key sequence. 
The user is given the option of adding any number of least significant bits f rom the residues 
up to the maximum of log2 / as discussed on page 3. The module then outputs the XOR of 
the message with the key stream to a cipher disk file and appends the final residue in 
hexadecimal form along with an indication of the number of keystream bits added per 
residue, separated from the bitstream by delimiter sequences. 
Currently, our system is used only for encrypting relatively short messages and the module 
keeps successive residues in memory. Periodically, the module uses Floyd's cycle finding 
algorithm [15] to check that the key sequence has not started to repeat. Floyd's algorithm 
avoids the need to check every new residue pairwise against every preceding one by the 
observation that i f the sequence {x^ (mod n) is periodic then ultimately this fact will be 
revealed by the test: Is = x, (mod n)l I f the key starts to repeat, the module issues a 
warning to the user to this effect. The user is given the option of carrying on and accepting 
the resulting weakening of security or aborting the process and starting with a new seed. 
Cleariy, the limitation is on the number of residues (each up to 800 bits long) that can be 
stored. We have ciphered messages up to about 4 Kbytes (32 Kbits) in length which 
corresponds roughly to a full page of A4 text. Using 800 bit residues and adding 9 bits to 
the keystream per residue requires the storage of around 3640 residues. This is only 364 
Kbytes of memory which any PC can handle comfortably. However, someone would not be 
able to use our system to send us the Encyclopedia Britannica in ciphered form! 
Decryption 
On receipt of an encrypted message, the decryption module scans the file for the delimiter 
sequences. On finding these, the length of the message, the number of keystream bits per 
residue and the final residue are read and the module retrieves p,q,a and b from the disk 
system file. Using these parameters the module evaluates the seed residue x^ using the 
algorithm on page 7. The module then uses a similar sequence of operation to the encryption 
module to recreate the key sequence and output the XOR of the key with the cipher bitstream 
to disk. 
Speed 
Currently, the system speed is probably the optimum that can be expected from a pure 
software implementation. We have not generally used the maximum key sizes possible but 
worked mainly in the 170 digit range. This corresponds roughly to a factoring time of about 
1 million years and is deemed secure enough for most purposes! Using moduli of this size, 
the generation of a new key takes between 2 and 4 hours depending on whether the algorithm 
*gets lucky' or not. 
For encryption <md decryption, the computation of each residue involves the squaring of a 
170 digit number modulo a 170 digit number. Each square mod n operation takes around 
80mS and so about 12 residues are generated per second. Since 170 digits is approximately 
565 bits the possibility exists of appending 9 bits per residue to the keystream. Thus, 108 
bits per second of message may be processed. For the 4Kbyte (A4 page) message sizes 
discussed earlier, the processing time is around 5 minutes. 
Speeding the system in hardware 
A hardware accelerator for the QRC system is under development. The unit is arranged as 
a general purpose number theory processor with 1024 bit registers and capable of executing 
the instructions ADD, SUB, M U L , MOD and DIV - the architecture of the ultimate RISC 
processor! While using standard 50 nS 32-bit flash multipliers, it wi l l use a new algorithm 
to evaluate the MOD function using lookup tables in very fast static RAM. The architecture 
wil l be heavily pipelined to optimise throughput. 
Preliminary analysis of the prototype design indicates that the time required to square a 1024 
bit quantity and reduce the result modulo a 1024 bit quantity wi l l be at most 2mS. With 500 
residues produced per second and 10 bits appended to the keystream per residue, 5000 bits 
of message per second may be processed. The processing of a 4K message wil l then take 
less than 7 seconds. This represents a speed increase of over 40 times compared with the 
software implementation in addition to using double the length of modulus. This wil l allow 
the cipher to be realistically used for high security online applications as well as making 
static encryption and decryption very much faster than the existing software. 
It is envisaged that the system wil l be used in the Comprehensive Security System (CSS) [16] 
developed in the Network Research Group using the security management centre concept. 
A progress report on this implementation will be published in due course. 
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